Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Steven R. David

Per Egil Hegge

Richard K. Betts

MAY-JUNE 1984



Soviet Policy and the West
Hannes Adomeit

Moscow and Arms Control
Myron Hedlin

Famine in Ukraine
James E. Mace

Notes & Views

Polish Stalemate
Casimir Garnysz

Youth Soviet Style
Richard Tempest

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Problems of Communism

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May–June 1984 VOL XXXIII

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Capitalist Contradictions and Soviet Policy
Hannes Adomeit

It is a Leninist axiom that contradictions among capitalists must be exploited to socialism's advantage. At first glance, divisions between the United States and Western Europe over policy toward the USSR appear to offer the Soviet leadership promising opportunities to apply that axiom. Yet, the tactic of *divide et impera*, combining selective détente with Western Europe and tension with the United States, has not been successful, not least because it aggravated contradictions within the Soviet bloc itself.

Moscow's Line on Arms Control
Myron Hedlin

Arms control remains a central concern of Soviet foreign policy, despite the recent changes in Kremlin leadership and deterioration in East-West relations. The sustained but ultimately futile Soviet effort to prevent deployment of new NATO missiles in Europe has made it even more difficult to reach new strategic or conventional arms agreements, leaving a legacy of complication and stalemate with which the Chernenko-led Politburo must now contend.

Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine
James E. Mace

During 1932–33, millions of Ukrainians starved to death when the Soviet state seized their harvest, creating famine by an act of policy. The famine appears to have been Stalin's way of resolving his thorniest nationality problem, since the peasantry was perceived to be the mainstay of Ukrainian nationalism. The policies pursued during the famine checked national communism in Soviet Ukraine by putting the leadership of the republic under Moscow's tight control.

* * *

Notes & Views

Polish Stalemate
Casimir Garnysz

The Jaruzelski government uses a wide variety of propaganda techniques—manipulation of national and patriotic symbols, arguments based on geopolitics, appeals to the reconciling spirit of the church, and the "torture of hope"—in its effort to retain power in Poland. Nevertheless, it faces a distrustful and alienated population in an uneasy stalemate that can only be resolved by granting genuine freedoms to the Polish people.

Notes and Reviews (over)

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Youth Soviet Style
Richard Tempest

Much of contemporary Soviet youth culture is imported from the West. Teen-agers in Moscow now windsurf, disco-dance, listen to pop music, go to Western movies, practice yoga, and eat pizza. These activities represent more than just an attempt to copy their Western counterparts—many of today's Soviet youngsters feel a part of their generation the world over.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Third World Interventions
Steven R. David

Recent Soviet successes in the developing countries have led some analysts to speculate that the Third World is rapidly coming under Soviet domination. Others, however, point to numerous Soviet setbacks in such countries as evidence of a more benign trend. The critical issue may be Moscow's increasingly successful reliance on "cooperative intervention" with Cuban forces, and equally successful strategy of surrounding pro-Soviet leaders with a cocoon of party and internal security apparatuses closely supervised by Soviet-bloc advisers.

Two Scandinavians in Moscow
Per Egil Hegge

Scandinavian journalists have tended to generate "quickie" books about their experiences in the Soviet Union which combine vivid personal impressions with superficial reportage that often glosses over the myriad economic, political, and social problems of the USSR. Only very recently has Soviet behavior at home and abroad produced a shift toward more critical discussion in such books.

Controlling Risks in the East-West Conflict
Richard K. Betts

The superpowers have been relatively successful in averting major confrontations, despite persistent misperception and miscalculation. But there is a disturbing potential for recurrence and escalation of such conflict. Regulation of such crises is both necessary and exceedingly difficult.

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Capitalist Contradictions and Soviet Policy

By Hannes Adomeit

Politics, in the Marxist-Leninist view and in Soviet practice, is the craft of conflict; it consists of the skillful management of contradictions. Even a "more powerful enemy," according to one of Lenin's most basic statements on strategy and tactics, "can be conquered by exerting the utmost effort, and by *necessarily*, thoroughly, carefully, attentively, and skillfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest, 'rift' among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries, among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this do not understand even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific, modern Socialism *in general*."[1]

The principle of *divide et impera* is of course not new. For centuries it was used to great advantage by the Roman and other empires. As for the Soviet Union, it too has applied this principle. But today the utilization of conflict *between* capitalist countries ("inter-imperialist" contradictions) and conflict *in* capitalist countries ("intra-imperialist" contradictions) seems to hold greater promise for Soviet foreign policy than ever before. The capitalist economies are experiencing lower growth and higher unemployment than at any time since World War II. New and old remedies for restoring sound economic dynamism—Keynesian, monetarist, or "supply side"—appear to have, in essence, failed. Economic projections point to high or even rising unemployment in the coming years.[2] Large government deficits and the perceived need to cut government spending collide with the same governments' major commitments (some of which are legally binding) to maintain a costly social security net. All this could lead to sharper domestic conflicts over distribution of income and allocation of resources. Defense, in this context, might very well be regarded by the electorate as the prime sector for extensive cuts in expenditures.

Such a development may appear all the more probable because pacifist—mainly anti-nuclear—and neutralist currents ("peace movements") have increased in strength in the late 1970's, particularly in Western Europe. These currents, moreover, are by no means limited to environmentalist, communist, Marxist, or other groups at the fringes of Western society, but extend to the major churches, noncommunist labor unions, and social democratic parties. Finally, since the United States is the strongest military power of the Western alliance, with global commitments that could involve Western Europe in a military conflict with the Soviet Union, these currents more often than

Hannes Adomeit is Senior Staff Member, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Ebenhausen), and author of several articles and books on Soviet foreign policy, including Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior *(1982). This article is a shortened and updated version of his contribution to a joint project of the Stiftung and the Rand Corporation on differences in US and West European policy toward the Soviet Union. For complete results of the project, see Uwe Nerlich and James Thomson, Eds.,* The Soviet Problem in German-American Relations *(forthcoming).*

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder: A Popular Essay in Marxian Strategy and Tactics,* New York, International Publishers, 1969, p. 59 (emphasis in the original). The essay was written in 1920.

[2] Projections of the OECD are that unemployment in North America will decline slightly until the first half of 1985 (to 8 percent of the labor force in the United States and 11 percent in Canada) while unemployment in Europe is likely to continue its upward drift, and could approach 12 percent of the labor force. See *OECD Economic Outlook* (Paris), No. 34, December 1983, p. 48.

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not are also anti-American or at least quite critical of American policies.

Internal conflicts within "capitalist countries," as can be seen, are closely connected with "contradictions" between them. Indeed, disagreement between the United States and Western Europe as a whole on matters of substance has become more severe, and the tone of the exchanges more acrimonious. Many issues are at stake, including the scope of defense efforts and equitable burden sharing, protectionism in trade, and the level of interest rates on domestic and international money markets. But they are all overshadowed by and intertwined with one problem of major importance—relations with the Soviet Union.

Whereas in the past, too, attitudes and policies toward the Soviet Union were often characterized by disagreements both within and among the Western European countries and the United States, the late 1970's and early 1980's present a different situation. In the perception of both West Europeans and Americans, the dividing lines today run much more sharply between Western Europe as a whole and the United States. Additionally, the differences in attitude and policy toward the Soviet Union are regarded on both sides of the Atlantic as encompassing a much broader range of issues than before.

Irritations began to accumulate during the Carter Administration, whose management of policy—from the European perspective, whether correct or incorrect—was damaging the alliance because of its vacillation, unpredictability, and lack of firmness. These irritations escalated to resentment and mutual recrimination over how to react to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: how to evaluate this Soviet move and Soviet intentions; how to deter the Soviet Union from future expansionism; whether or not to use sanctions and, if so, whether to apply them in selected areas or across the board of political, economic, financial, scientific, and cultural contacts.

Resentment has deepened under President Reagan, whose electoral victory and subsequent policies seem to many European policymakers and analysts to be just one of many shifts from one extreme to the other in US policy. At issue are policies which seem to aim at "managing the decline of the Soviet empire" and making sure that this empire goes under with a "whimper" rather than a "bang"; the utility or disutility of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union; the scope of modernization for NATO's theater nuclear forces; the validity of charges that West European foreign policies reflect dependence upon and deference to Soviet power; the degree to which Soviet policies are responsible for instability in the Third World; and, finally (back to square one after Afghanistan), how to react to the "internal intervention" and "normalization" in Poland.

At the root of almost all the controversies in alliance policy toward the Soviet Union lie differing interpretations of détente. As summarized by an American analyst, the countries of Western Europe—by and large, and with some differences among and within them—have concluded that

détente, and its underlying premises about the "web of economic relationships," were valid and useful in the 1970's and remain applicable in the 1980's. By contrast, we in the United States—by and large, and also with differences among us—have concluded that détente and its premises "have been weighed in the balance and found seriously wanting." We have concluded that we should envisage drastic changes in our relations with the Soviet Union in general, and in our economic relations in particular.[3]

Imperialist Contradictions Over Time

Even under socialism, serious contradictions are admitted by Soviet spokesmen and scribes to exist, but are regarded as being "non-antagonistic" and hence solvable by definition.[4] This is not the case with three other types of contradictions: (1) the fundamental antagonism between the two opposed socioeconomic systems, socialism and imperialism; (2) conflicts *between* capitalist countries; and (3) conflicts in capitalist countries. These types of contradictions are seen as "irreconcilable." They will disappear only with the disappearance of the capitalist system itself.

As this disappearance may take a while yet, it is of considerable interest for any examination of Soviet objectives and policy toward the United States and Western Europe to note that formalized Soviet ideological perceptions about the three types of antagonistic contradictions have changed significantly over time. "How else," Lenin asked during World War I, "can the solution of [inter-imperialist] contradictions be found, ex-

[3] Charles Wolf, Jr., Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 12, 1982 (unpublished mimeograph). The author is head of the International Security Program and Dean of the Graduate Institute at the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

[4] Andropov, for instance, warned that contradictions in socialist countries should be taken seriously lest they lead to "grave collisions"; see his "The Teaching of Karl Marx and Some Questions on the Building of Socialism in the USSR," *Kommunist* (Moscow) No. 3, 1983, pp. 9-23, esp. p. 21. For more detailed discussion of the problem of socialist contradictions, see A. P. Butenko, "Contradictions in Developed Socialism as a Social System", *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 10, 1982, pp. 16–29.

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cept by resorting to *violence*?"[5] Capitalist wars for the redistribution of power and influence, colonies, markets, access to raw materials, cheap labor, and so on, he reiterated after the war, "are absolutely inevitable."[6] Furthermore, given the nature of the capitalist system, Lenin was also convinced that "a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."[7]

It was not until the last stages of Stalin's rule that a Soviet leader clearly stated which of the existing antagonistic contradictions were more likely to lead to war, those between capitalist states or those between capitalism and socialism. Stalin provided this clarification shortly before the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952. "War with the USSR," in Stalin's view, would "certainly put into question the existence of capitalism itself."[8] To that extent, such a war was not as probable as were wars among capitalist states merely for realignment of power. According to Stalin:

Outwardly everything would seem to be "going well": the USA has put Western Europe, Japan, and other capitalist countries on rations; [West] Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the USA and are merely obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to "go well" for "all eternity," that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavor to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development.[9]

Khrushchev was less impressed with the sharpness of conflict between the United States and the countries of Western Europe and Japan. To be sure, when he stated—at the 20th party congress in 1956—that "war is not fatalistically inevitable," he was referring to war between the two opposed world systems. Yet, war between capitalist states was no longer a topic for him. This is not surprising, as cooperation in the Atlantic Alliance increased steadily in the 1950's and as a new factor difficult to reconcile with traditional Marxist-Leninist precepts arose: capitalist integration.

The European Economic Community (EEC) was initially interpreted very much in the light of Lenin's criticism in August 1915 of the slogan of the United States of Europe (USE), which held that alliances under imperialism could only have a "temporary" and "reactionary" character. Internationally, USE could only be designed to reapportion colonies and markets in the competition with the United States and Japan; domestically (i.e., in Europe), it would be used to check the advances of socialism. But in any case, the whole experiment could not last. The contemporary equivalent of USE, however, *has* lasted and has been regarded by Soviet analysts as, by and large, quite successful.[10]

While the view about the relative success of the Common Market has stayed constant until recently, Soviet analysis of the economic and political *implications* of West European integration has evolved through several stages. At first, when the EEC was founded, it was thought that this venture in capitalist integration was directed primarily against the Soviet Union. In the second stage, the 1960's, integration was seen primarily as a device by the West European countries to assert themselves against the *défi américain*. In the third stage, the 1970's, Soviet experts came to the realization that the West European "power center" *(tsentr sily)*[11] was not developing as much in the direction of autonomy and independence from the United States as they had previously thought.

Most recently, the "current economic and political situation in the capitalist world system," according to one of the foremost Soviet analysts on Western integration, is characterized by "an unprecedented—for the postwar period—sharpening of imperialist contradictions among the USA, the Western European countries of the EEC, and Japan." It is a stage, to summarize the argument, that consists of a counteroffensive launched by the United States against the loss of its

[5] Quoted from Lenin's essay, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, New York, International Publishers, 1969, pp. 96–97 (emphasis in the original). The essay was written in Zurich in the spring of 1916.

[6] Ibid., p. 10, Preface to the French and German editions, July 20, 1920.

[7] V. I. Lenin, Report to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party, 18 March 1919, *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII, New York, International Publishers, 1943, p. 33.

[8] I. V. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* [a collection of comments on a draft for a new textbook on political economy written between February and September 1952, i.e., shortly before the 19th CPSU Congress in October 1952], Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952, p. 39.

[9] Ibid., pp. 38–39.

[10] One of the foremost Soviet experts on socialist integration, for instance, frankly acknowledges that "the level of the division of labor in CMEA does not satisfy the requirements of the countries participating in it. . . . CMEA lags behind the Common Market in that respect." See M. Senin (Director of the International Institute for the Study of Economic Problems of the Socialist World System at CMEA), *Socialist Integration*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973, p. 178. Although published in 1973, Senin's appreciation of the differences in the depth of economic integration achieved by the two economic organizations remains valid more than ten years later. One of the most recent indications of this is the postponement yet again of the much-delayed summit conference of the CMEA countries.

[11] The term "power center" became official Soviet usage when Brezhnev stated at the 24th CPSU Congress: "By the early 1970's, the main centers of imperialist rivalry have become clearly visible: these are the USA—Western Europe (above all, the six Common Market countries)—Japan. The economic and political competitive struggle between them has been growing ever more acute." *The Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 30–April 9, 1971: Documents*, Moscow, Novosti, 1971, p. 20.

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

Leaders of the major industrialized democracies meet in Williamsburg, Virginia, in May 1983. From left to right are Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada; Gaston Thorn, President of the Commission of the European Communities; Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of West Germany; François Mitterrand, President of France; Ronald Reagan, President of the United States; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Premier of Japan; Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; and Amintore Fanfani, Prime Minister of Italy.

—Jack Kightlinger.

economic power to the other two main competitors and the further weakening of its "political hegemony."[12]

As these shifts in interpretation show, formalized ideological perceptions and international relations analysis have fairly accurately reflected actual trends. These interpretations almost invariably are couched in combative language and—in line with communist "group-speak"—tend to dramatize aspects of threat to the Soviet Union and of conflict among the capitalist "power centers." It takes some courage and standing in the Soviet political system, therefore, to deviate from this pattern and, moreover, to stand Leninism completely on its head by arguing the following:

The strengthening of the international positions of the world socialist system, the successes of the national-liberation movement in the "Third World," and the sharpening of social antagonism and the growth of the democratic and working-class movement in the capitalist countries put clearly recognizable limits to the development of the competitive struggle and rivalry, the implementation of an autarkic policy by imperialism, grim protectionism, and trade and currency wars, not to speak of such extreme measures as inter-imperialist wars.[13]

[12] Juri Schischkow, "Rivalry Among the Three Imperialist Centers and the US Confrontationalist Course," *Aussenpolitik* (East Berlin), No. 2, 1983, pp. 49–56, esp. pp. 49 and 53. For a more detailed examination of Soviet perceptions of West European economic integration, see Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Perceptions of Western European Integration: Ideological Distortion or Realistic Assessment?" *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* (London), Spring 1979, pp. 1–24.

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The differences in this interpretation are quite significant. Growth in the power of socialist and developing countries, from the Leninist perspective, can have but one consequence: the creation of severe *constraints* on the export of capital and the possibilities of making "super-profits," and hence the *sharpening* of inter-imperialist contradictions up to the increased likelihood of violent conflict, rather than the "setting of limits to the competitive struggle and rivalry." Nevertheless, the author sticks to her point. Even though in her view, too, "American–West European contradictions have never been sharper in the post-war period than today," she also clarifies that "these two regions of the capitalist world [the United States and Western Europe] are linked by a close network of capital, growing interdependence of economic development, and alliance obligations."[14] Yet another warning against exaggerated perceptions of rivalry among the "power centers" of imperialism (rather than dramatization for maximum political effect) is contained in her observation that "Western Europe, *like the world as a whole*, is to a certain extent living through a critical period."[15]

The implications of this interpretation are quite obvious. If Western Europe and the United States are objectively closely linked, and if, furthermore, important problems exist that affect not only the capitalist countries but also the socialist countries and the Third World, i.e., problems of common concern to all socioeconomic systems, then there might be definite limits beyond which it would not be useful, from the Soviet point of view, to fuel divisions in the West.

Utility of Contradictions

In view of the above, it might not be safe to assume that the differences in perception and policy between the United States and Western Europe are invariably the result of deliberate and successful Soviet diplomacy, propaganda, and clandestine operations rather than of self-inflicted pain. Second, it is by no means correct to proceed from the assumption that the Soviet leadership is inexorably and singlemindedly trying to maximize conflict between the United States and Western Europe rather than attempting to unite Western policymakers behind certain policies favorable to the Soviet Union.[16]

Time and again, when a "power center" or country "A" proves unresponsive to overtures by Moscow, the Soviet leaders resort to indirect approaches to change its course. By demonstratively engaging in atmospheric improvements, offering political concessions, and placing economic orders in countries "B" or "C" which are more responsive to Soviet overtures, the Soviets hope to produce a "spillover" or "bandwagon" effect on "A". This technique could be seen at work during 1965–69, when Soviet-French relations were designed to accelerate the pace and broaden the scope of the incipient West German Ostpolitik. Similarly, Moscow's practice of selective détente (with strong dosages nevertheless of warning and pressure) vis-à-vis Western Europe since the end of 1979 can be interpreted as an attempt to blunt the edge of American "hard-line" policies toward the Soviet Union and to induce the United States to align its policies more closely with those of Western Europe. This purpose of Soviet policy becomes quite apparent in Moscow's dialectical view concerning the divisibility of détente. The "concept of the divisibility of détente," according to N. Portugalov, "does in our view correspond to a certain extent to political reality." It does apply in the sense that "the events of Afghanistan must not, under any circumstances, put in danger détente in Europe." And it remains applicable while the United States is attempting "to shelve détente policy, resume the cold war, put pressure on the USSR, and work towards its isolation, etc." Détente, on the other hand, is "indivisible on our continent, as well as in other regions, in quite a different sense. One cannot, as some politicians in NATO countries do, support the continuation of détente in Europe and at the same time, and not only verbally, act in solidarity with American policy which is directed at undermining it."[17]

Soviet attitudes toward the issues dividing the United States and Western Europe, therefore, can be subsumed by standard Soviet operating assumptions and procedures that posit a perennial "struggle of two tendencies" in capitalist countries. On the one hand there are said to be the "sober" and "realist" forces acting in recognition of objective tendencies and in line with the Zeitgeist *(dukh vremeny)*. They are pitted

[13] M. Maksimova, "Capitalist Integration and World Development," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter *MEMO*), No. 4, 1978, pp. 14–24, esp. p. 19.

[14] M. Maksimova, Introduction to a Round-Table Discussion, "Problems of West European Integration," in ibid., No. 11, 1982, pp. 107–11, esp. p. 111.

[15] Ibid., p. 110.

[16] This is a point well made by Kenneth Pridham, "The Soviet View of Current Disagreements between the United States and Western Europe," *International Affairs* (London), Winter 1982–83, pp. 17–31.

[17] TASS commentary as published in *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Feb. 9–10, 1980. N. Portugalov is a senior Soviet journalist who writes on West Germany and European security issues and apparently is on the staff of, or otherwise attached to, the CPSU Central Committee Department on International Information (see *Le Monde* [Paris], Mar. 2–3, 1980).

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A July 1966 Kremlin meeting of French President Charles de Gaulle with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin, and Andrey Gromyko.

—Elliott Erwitt/MAGNUM.

against, on the other hand, the "reactionary" and "ultra-rightist" forces, the "madmen" who want to turn back the course of history. Such divisions pose the task for Soviet policy, to paraphrase Soviet arguments, of encouraging the progressive against the reactionary tendencies and of making sure that the former "triumph" over the latter.

Divisions of a similar kind—into more accommodating or more uncompromising leaders—may exist in the Soviet Union as well; and it may very well be true, as reported by a prominent West German journalist after a trip to Moscow, that among Soviet middle-level party officials and higher ranking international relations experts there are those who advocate the exploitation of American-West European differences as a matter of principle and as a goal per se, and those who caution against such course of action.[18] As for the latter, "we are realists," Vadim Zagladin is reported to have said, "and it would not be a realistic goal to drive a wedge between Western Europe and America."[19]

Similarly, as two Soviet international relations experts write, people in the West who claim that the Soviet Union is trying to drive a wedge between the United States and Western Europe "do not see or do not want to see the difference between a dialectical-materialist approach to foreign policy and petty politicking *(melkoe politikanstvo)*." The main criterion on which the USSR bases its foreign policy, they argue, is not the degree of unity or absence thereof among the Western powers but "the extent to which [they] cooperate in or, conversely, oppose the solution of important international problems."[20]

Objectives of Soviet Policy

The emphasis on the "objective" nature of inter-imperialist contradictions, and the view that exacerbation of such differences by the USSR might be short-sighted, raise the question whether such arguments reflect genuine perceptions or are subtle attempts at deceiving the West. Before rushing to answer this question, it might be helpful to consider first the importance of Western Europe to Soviet policy and the objectives that the Soviet leaders may be pursuing.

Whatever the degree to which particular functions of ideology may have been eroded, Soviet concepts of international relations still proceed from the "fundamental contradiction between the two opposed socio-economic systems" as a basic fact of life.[21] On the opposing side, it is the United States that is regarded as by far the most powerful country—despite relative gains in economic power and political influence by Japan and Western Europe since World War II. Whereas Western Europe and Japan (and China, too) are looked upon as regional powers, the United States is seen as a global power whose strength or weakness will ultimately decide the outcome of the historic struggle between the two systems.

Western Europe has correctly been regarded by the Soviet leadership as the single most important region in this global competition. It is, from the Soviet point of view, both a lever and a potential prize. This is due to a number of reasons. Western Europe has a much more developed infrastructure and a much more developed technological and industrial base than the USSR. It is culturally more advanced, and its societies are more dynamic and more adaptable to change. Despite all the frictions, the European Economic Community is still functioning, attracting new members,

[18] Theo Sommer, "Do the Russians Want War?" *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Mar. 11, 1983, pp. 9–10.

[19] Ibid. Zagladin is First Deputy Head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

[20] S. Madzoyevskiy and D. Tomashevskiy, "Increase in International Tension and Western Europe," *MEMO*, No. 11, 1982, pp. 42–51, esp. pp. 50–51.

[21] See Hannes Adomeit, "Ideology in the Soviet View of International Affairs," in Christoph Bertram, Ed., *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980's*, London, Macmillan, 1980, pp. 103–10.

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and extending into political cooperation. All this has repercussions in the various countries of Eastern Europe. It reinforces the traditional affinities between the two halves of Europe. It makes the Western half a center of attraction and emulation for a significant portion of the population in the Eastern half, and hence it poses problems for Soviet control. Western Europe, beyond that, is an important political, economic, cultural and, last but not least, military bridgehead of the United States on the Eurasian landmass. Quite obviously, if this bridgehead were to be denied to the United States, the global power position of that country would be decisively weakened.

Taking these facts into consideration and looking at published Soviet analyses and the twists and turns in Soviet political approaches since World War II, it is possible to postulate the following six objectives of Soviet policy toward the Atlantic Alliance.[22]

1. To win recognition of the territorial and systemic status quo in Eastern Europe.
2. To make sure that the West European countries adhere to the Soviet definition of "peaceful coexistence," i.e., that they observe a certain code of conduct in their relations with the Soviet Union, maintain "friendly" relations with it, abandon "policies from positions of strength," refrain from "interference in the internal affairs" of the USSR and the East European countries, and so on.
3. To retain and, if possible, to broaden access to Western technology, know-how, and credits so as to overcome the Soviet Union's perennial economic and technological inferiority vis-à-vis the West.
4. To limit as much as possible Western political cooperation in the frameworks of the European Community and NATO.
5. To deny to Western Europe any viable defensive option and to make sure that the West Europeans are acutely aware of their military vulnerability in relation to the Soviet Union.
6. To transform the pluralistic systems of Western Europe from within by encouraging and supporting communist parties and other "progressive" and "peace-loving" forces.

When looking at these probable Soviet objectives in more detail, care needs to be taken not to fall into the

[22] This summary of Soviet objectives draws on Christoph Royen, *Die sowjetische Koexistenzpolitik gegenüber Westeuropa: Voraussetzungen, Ziele, Dilemmata* (Soviet Coexistence Policy Toward Western Europe: Preconditions, Goals, and Dilemmas), Series Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, ed. by Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1978. Although this summary was written in 1977–78, changes that have occurred in the meantime have not rendered it outdated.



A truck believed to be transporting US cruise missile equipment at the British military base at Greenham Common on November 15, 1983.

—Stuart Franklin/SYGMA.

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analytical trap of invariably and unquestioningly fitting every Soviet move, including moves of embarrassment, probing, or blunder, into a coherent strategic design. Care also needs to be taken not to neglect the possibility that Soviet objectives may be mutually contradictory. After all, international politics is made up of a complex web of actions and reactions, and, quite naturally, anything the Soviet Union does in one direction may contain the seeds of failure in another.

In fact, the dilemmas that lie at the heart of Soviet policy shifts are numerous. Pressure on Western Europe may make public opinion more responsive to Soviet demands but tends to strengthen hard-line, anti-Soviet currents in the United States. (It may lead to what one observer has called the "toothpaste syndrome": if you close the cap of the tube and squeeze hard, the net effect may be quite unpleasant.) Benevolent attitudes and far-reaching détente may bring trade and security gains but also raise the specters of "liberalization," waning of ideology, and erosion of the power and authority of the CPSU. Reduction in the military presence of the United States in Western Europe may open the way for increased Soviet influence but undermine the rationale for the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and encourage closer West European cooperation, including defense cooperation. Finally, support of tendencies in West Germany toward neutralism (i.e., toward the reestablishment of a unified German state) could help separate that country from NATO but it could also give rise to dangerous illusions and potentially explosive developments in East Germany.

Because of these and similar dilemmas, it is not surprising that in pursuing its objectives the Soviet leadership has vacillated between several approaches. The three most important ones can be typified as follows:

- "Europeanism," that is, encouragement of tendencies toward neutralism, foreign-policy autonomy, and the independence of Western Europe with an anti-American bias;
- "Atlanticism," that is, Soviet-American cooperation, collusion, or condominium directed at jointly "solving" European and other world problems;
- "pan-Europeanism," a combination of the two, consisting in the abandonment of crude endeavors at either forcing the United States out of Europe or trying to settle matters bilaterally with Washington at the expense of Europe. It is, thus, an attempt at *persuading* the United States to consent to a reduction in its European role and encouraging an "all-European" consciousness among the Europeans.

Pursuit of Objectives

Although these different approaches toward Western Europe testify to a certain skill and inventiveness in Soviet diplomacy, none of them has turned out to be entirely successful. Frequent shifts of approach are the result. But even when one approach is dominant and played *forte* by the Soviet orchestra, one can always discern in the background (as if waiting, in turn, to become dominant) the counter-theme played *piano* or *pianissimo*. The shifts are clearly shown by the record of Soviet policy toward the West since 1945.

The Stalin Era: "US–Go Home!" In the immediate postwar years, as the grand alliance quickly disintegrated over questions such as quadripartite control and administration of Germany and Japan, reparations, the Ruhr, free elections in Eastern Europe, and Soviet designs in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, Stalin shifted to an anti-American stance. Several years of strident "US–Go Home!" campaigns were to follow.[23] Burdened with the legacy of Lenin's "inevitability-of-war" thesis, verbal aggressiveness, and anti-American rhetoric, the Soviet Union blundered into the blockade of Berlin in 1948, only to find that if it wanted to avoid war under conditions of US nuclear monopoly, and if it desired to find a solution to the German problem, it had to appeal to the theme of "after all, we are still allies."[24]

Given the circumstances, such appeals were, of course, in vain. The blockade enhanced the impetus for closer Atlantic defense cooperation, checked to some extent, at the popular level, by a Soviet-supported peace movement. Yet Soviet foreign policy soon recovered from the setback of the Berlin crisis. The explosion of the first Soviet nuclear device in August 1949, the victory of communism in China, and nationalist, anti-colonialist uprisings in the French and British territories in North Africa and Asia apparently induced a new sense of Soviet strength and helped precipitate the Korean war. But that policy also defeated the purpose of the peace movement, undercut neutralist currents in Western Europe, led to the rearmament of West Germany, and provided the impetus for the reintroduction of sizable US forces in Europe.

[23] More detail on this is provided by Pridham, loc. cit., p. 19.

[24] Such appeals are documented in Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 67–182.

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Thus, there was no confirmation of Stalin's idea, quoted above, concerning the alleged West European (and Japanese) desire "to tear loose from American bondage."

The Khrushchev Era: Contours of Condominium. Under Khrushchev, another approach was dominant. Claiming (prematurely) that the possession of nuclear weapons with intercontinental means of delivery, and other attributes of power, established rough military parity with the United States, he asserted political equality as well: "Where there are equal forces, there must also be equal rights and responsibilities."[25] On various occasions, moreover, Khrushchev stressed that "history has imposed upon our two peoples great responsibility for the destiny of the world," and that as regards the two countries, "our interests do not clash directly anywhere, either territorially or economically."[26] Apparently unaffected by Khrushchev's fall in October 1964, Soviet writings on US foreign policy and US-Soviet relations continued to see a "community of national interests" between the United States and the Soviet Union and to state that "the two countries' national interests do not collide either globally or anywhere regionally."[27]

Soviet strategy thus assumed the contours of a Soviet-American condominium, or dyarchy, in international relations. The superpowers, according to this approach, would demarcate their respective areas of vital interest, define the areas of common interest, agree on the status quo to be preserved, and establish rules of conduct to govern their competition.[28] Furthermore, the primary focus of competition was to be not military power but ideology and economic performance. Bilateral summitry (see, for instance, Khrushchev's meetings with Eisenhower at Camp David in September 1959 and with Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961) and personal contacts at lower levels were to be the primary means of reaching agreement.

Yet the difficulties are quite obvious in a relationship of one power ideologically committed to *changing* the status quo with another power dedicated to *defending* world order. The state called upon by "history" to change the status quo will be tempted to use the special relationship as a protective umbrella under which to expand its power and influence. It will tend to interpret the agreed-upon code of conduct not as a mutual obligation but as a constraint on the freedom of action of the adversary. It will inevitably tend to regard its own sphere of influence as inviolable and that of its adversary as open to revision. The allies of the status quo–oriented power in such a condominium or dyarchy are likely to feel suspicious and insecure, since they can no longer be sure that their own vital interests will not be sacrificed. The danger of such a bilateral relationship, finally, is recurrent misperception and misunderstanding about the "rules of the game." For these reasons, "big two-ism" under Khrushchev did not prevent (and perhaps even substantially contributed to) the outbreak of serious international crises, including the Berlin and Cuban-missile crises, in 1961 and 1962.

The Brezhnev Era: Defects of Détente. Khrushchev's successors tried several changes in approach, the first of which was facilitated by a confluence of several developments. The United States was militarily and politically preoccupied with the Vietnam war. West European government reaction to that US engagement ranged from lukewarm support, at best, to thinly veiled opposition. Left-wing student unrest used the war as a rallying point for anti-American demonstrations. De Gaulle was calling for his *Europe des patries* and for a reduction in the role of the "peripheral" powers (the US and the USSR) and of the two military alliances in Europe. His withdrawal from NATO's military organization seemed to herald the beginning of the eventual dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance.

The stage was thus set for the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev in 1965–69 to try to mobilize West European sentiment against NATO, against participation of the United States and Canada in the "all-European" conference on security and cooperation, in favor of "independent" foreign policies and the dissolution of the military blocs. It was set, in short, for an attempt to fragment Europe and separate it from the United States. To support this attempt propagandistically, the "main document" adopted by the latest (and perhaps last) World Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June 1969 proclaimed that peace and security in Europe meant "guaranteeing the European peoples their sovereign right to be masters of their continent without interference from the USA."[29]

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[25] Khrushchev in a speech to graduates of Soviet military academies, *Pravda* (Moscow), July 9, 1961.

[26] Ibid., Dec. 31, 1961.

[27] Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Ed., *Dvizhushchiye sily vneshney politiki SShA* (Motive Forces in US Foreign Policy), Moscow, Nauka, 1965, p. 507.

[28] This summary of Khrushchev's détente strategy follows Vernon Aspaturian, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1971, p. 780. On Khrushchev's détente policies vis-à-vis the US and their effect on Western Europe see John Van Oudenaren, *The Leninist "Peace Policy" and Western Europe*, Research Monograph, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, January 1980, pp. 8–9.

[29] Text of the document as published in *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Prague), June 1969.

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But in the same year another set of factors converged to induce a change of approach in Soviet "Westpolitik." First, as de Gaulle left office and Willy Brandt formed a left-liberal coalition government, France's role as Moscow's *interlocuteur privilégié* diminished. The evolving Ostpolitik of the new West German government, not least because of the problems over Berlin, intra-German relations, and the borders issue, required quadripartite participation, i.e., inclusion of the United States in the negotiating process. Second, with the removal of Alexander Dubček from all positions of power, "normalization" in Czechoslovakia provided Moscow with new freedom of maneuver to launch a Peace Programme. Third, the Ussuri River clashes had transformed Sino-Soviet relations from latent to overt conflict; some initiative was needed to forestall US-Chinese security cooperation. Fourth, the conviction had grown in the United States that it would be impossible to find a military solution to the Vietnam war and that Soviet "restraint" and good offices were needed to achieve "peace with honor" (in essence, a decent interval before the collapse of South Vietnam). Finally, the Soviet leadership had been unable to reverse the trend of declining growth rates in the Soviet economy and cope successfully with the necessary transition from extensive to intensive growth. Large-scale imports of Western—including American—technology, and access to know-how and credits, began to look like an attractive alternative to far-reaching economic reform.

Thus, on all levels of East-West interaction—political, legal, military, and economic—US participation became a *conditio sine qua non*. This precondition was made even more stringent by the West as the bargaining process evolved, when two sets of linkages were made more explicit: (1) no ratification by West Germany of the Moscow treaty and the treaties normalizing relations with East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia without a quadripartite agreement on Berlin; (2) no agreement by the West to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) without Soviet consent to talks on mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR). These linkages presupposed Washington's continued involvement in Europe.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet leadership in 1970 gave up its opposition to US participation in the European security conference. It is, similarly, less surprising in retrospect that Brezhnev, in his speech in Tbilisi in May 1971, consented to talks on MBFR—even though NATO could not conceal its desire for the Soviet Union to help the West alleviate the pressures exerted by US supporters of the "Mansfield amendment" for unilateral withdrawal of American troops.[30] The Soviet leadership had decided upon a *comprehensive* management of East-West relations and a *negotiated* withdrawal of US forces. Their "all-European" security system was apparently designed to transcend the constraints of both "Europeanist" and "Atlanticist" approaches. Rather than—as in the first phase of Brezhnev's policy toward the West from 1965 to 1969—trying to achieve a fragmentation of the West and a separation of Europe from the United States through pressure and head-on propaganda campaigns to isolate West Germany and exclude the United States from European affairs, the Soviet leadership in this phase of policy allocated to the United States the noble task of presiding over a *voluntary* curtailment of its influence in Europe.

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt with Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea in September 1971.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Brezhnev's détente strategy, therefore—in contrast to all previous phases of Soviet policy—did contain new elements. These included (1) the unprecedentedly broad scope of East-West agreements, ranging from general rules of conduct to cooperation in space, from the prevention of nuclear war to environmental protection, and from strategic arms limitation talks to cultural and scientific exchanges; (2) the unprecedentedly large scale of Western commitment envisaged for the expansion of East-West trade and the development of the Soviet and East European economies; and (3) the inclusion of the West European countries as well as the United States in the overall approach, limiting the traditional attempts at

[30] The NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968 called for discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions. This call was formally reiterated at the NATO ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1970. For the context of the offer and the Soviet response see Lothar Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems*, Adelphi Paper No. 176, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982, pp. 6–8.

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playing off the "power centers" of imperialism and individual "capitalist" countries against one another. These represented improvements in strategy to which Andropov's successors may eventually revert.

For the time being, however, Brezhnev's détente strategy has been shattered, for both internal and external reasons. First, Soviet ideology, with its formalized perceptions of global systemic antagonism and the "tactical" nature of compromise, persisted, casting serious doubt on Soviet intentions. Second, Soviet leaders continued to apply a double standard to the "rules of the game" and the commitment to maintain the status quo in Europe. While they were determined not to allow any relaxation of tension to undermine the ideological, political, and socioeconomic system in Eastern Europe, they continued to actively support "progressive" forces in order to induce political change in Western Europe. Third, Soviet leaders adopted a similar double standard as regards the Third World. Claiming that the Soviet Union was consistently pursuing a "policy of peace and friendship among nations" (i.e., détente), they also stated unambiguously that the USSR would continue to "give undeviating support to the people's struggle for democracy, national liberation, and socialism."[31] In practice, this meant expansionism at limited risk (through arms deliveries and Cuban and Vietnamese intervention) in areas ranging from Angola to Cambodia, and (through Soviet forces) in Afghanistan. Fourth, the Soviet leadership embarked on a large military buildup. After ratification of SALT I, it did not seem to be content with parity in the strategic competition with the United States but was striving for "parity plus." Beyond that, it was increasing Soviet preponderance in conventional and tactical nuclear power in Central Europe.

But Western attitudes and policies, too, contributed to the demise of détente. Foremost among the factors to be mentioned in this connection was the Western—notably American—impatience with the slow pace of change in the Soviet Union. There was an almost complete lack of awareness of the need felt by Soviet leaders to make sure that an opening to the West would not lead to a rapid crumbling of their control, at home and in Eastern Europe. Vociferous Western demands regarding human rights are but one important example of this lack of awareness.

Related to this was the failure of East-West economic interaction to increase in line with the possibilities for expansion—and with probable Soviet expectations. This development was triggered by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, and the concomitant refusal by the United States to grant most-favored-nation status to the USSR or to make available government-guaranteed credit exceeding US$75 million per year.

The collapse of détente in Soviet-American relations and the survival of only limited détente in Soviet–West European relations raise questions about the effectiveness of Soviet policy in utilizing "imperialist contradictions." Put differently, assuming that the earlier enumeration of Soviet objectives is by and large correct, what are the policy areas in which the Soviet leaders have made gains, and where have they suffered losses?

Balance Sheet of Soviet Westpolitik

Contrary to some assessments made in Western Europe and (more so) in the United States, Soviet policy toward the West has not been an overall success story. The record suggests that success and failure have been mixed, the failures lying primarily in the socioeconomic realm (i.e., in the attempts to achieve objectives 1, 2, 3, and 6, mentioned earlier on p. 7) and the successes in complicating Western political and security cooperation and eroding the credibility of NATO's doctrine of "flexible response" (i.e., objectives 4 and 5).

Failures in the Ideological and Political Competition. The European security conference (CSCE), according to the Soviet agenda, was to lead to the recognition not only of the territorial but also of the systemic status quo in Europe. Some gains have been made, in the Soviet view, on the territorial issues. The CSCE did indeed declare the postwar borders in Europe to be "inviolable." But contrary to Moscow's original designs, the Helsinki conference and the follow-up meetings in Belgrade and Madrid never did codify legally or legitimize politically the existing socioeconomic order in Europe. Nor did they endorse the kind of political and military control the Soviet Union is exerting in Eastern Europe.

If, from the Soviet perspective, further proof of this were needed, it was amply provided by the Western responses to the developments in Poland after July 1980. These responses included the open support for Solidarity from the entire political spectrum in Western Europe and the United States; the ill-concealed hope for the undoing of the "shameful surrender" to Stalin at Yalta; the earnest belief in the "Finlandization" of

[31] Quoted from Brezhnev's report to the 24th CPSU Congress, March 30, 1971, *Pravda*, Mar. 31, 1971.

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The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Helsinki in July 1975: at left, the Soviet delegation led by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and including Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, Brezhnev aide Konstantin Chernenko, Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Koval'yëv, and Brezhnev aide Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov; at right, American President Gerald Ford signs the Helsinki Final Act as Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (right), West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (left), and East German party leader and Chairman of the State Council Erich Honecker (second from left) look on.

—Gerald R. Ford Library.

Poland as a realistic prospect. Finally, after the imposition of martial law in December 1981, demands were put forward by Western governments individually, as well as by the European Community and the NATO Council of Ministers collectively, for the lifting of martial law, the release of all internees, and the resumption of dialogue between the authorities and Solidarity. These demands, moreover, were backed up by sanctions—more substantive and severe on the part of the United States and less stringent, more symbolic on the part of the West European countries. Thus, neither the West European countries nor the United States adhered to the code of conduct applicable, according to Soviet interpretations of the CSCE Final Act, to the events in Poland—"non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states." Rather than cooperating with the Soviet Union in codifying the status quo in Europe, they had, in the Soviet view, tried their hardest to change it.

This points to the failure of Soviet diplomacy to achieve another of the objectives enumerated above, namely, transforming the pluralist systems of Western Europe, winning a greater degree of control over West European domestic policies, and channeling these policies in a pro-Soviet direction. In fact, all empirical evidence runs counter to the view expressed by an American correspondent that "bonds of sympathy and a community of interests are developing as rapidly between Western Europe and the Soviet Union as they are dissolving between Western Europe and the United States."[32] Obviously, it is necessary to make a distinction between some calculated adaptation to Soviet power and favorable images of the Soviet Union. Growth of Soviet power, it stands to reason, does not necessarily lead to improvements in the Soviet image. Indeed, the former may well damage the latter.

For example, recent public opinion polls show that a significant majority of West Germans believe that the aim of Soviet policy is not to achieve peaceful cooperation with the West but to dominate Western Europe. And even though they feel *more* threatened

[32] David A. Andelman, "Struggle over Western Europe," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Winter 1982–83, pp. 37–51, esp. p. 37.

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by the Soviet Union now than a few years ago, according to the polls, the West Germans' opinion of Russia has become *less* rather than more favorable.[33] Similarly, even without detailed poll data, it is evident to any casual observer that there has been a spectacular deterioriation of the Soviet image and influence in France. This was already true before the imposition of martial law in Poland and, in all likelihood, has increased since then. Concurrently, there has been broad support in France for Mitterrand's hard-line policies toward the communists at home, in relations with the Soviet Union, and on defense. Britain, in the last decade, has also been immune to an increase in Soviet influence. At the same time, it exemplifies a pattern common to other West European countries. Despite high unemployment figures, the country remains eminently "governable" and even retains an electorate that is prone to vote center-right rather than center-left or left.

The communist parties in Western Europe have been a prime instrument in Soviet attempts to transform the domestic systems and the foreign policy orientation of the countries concerned. However, in line with the declining attraction of Soviet ideology among Western intellectuals, the effectiveness of the communist parties in promoting Soviet influence has decreased. More often than not, the impact that can be made by various "peace" campaigns on domestic politics in Western Europe crucially depends on the ability of the organizers to refute the charge that they are acting on behalf of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, electoral support for communist parties has correlated nearly inversely with their pro-Moscow orientation. But more independent or even outright anti-Soviet positions do not help much either. Thus, "Eurocommunism," which thrived on the idea of a model of communism different from that of Soviet and East European Marxism-Leninism, and which to many observers seemed to become a major political force in the late 1970's, is today a dead issue.

Failures in the Economic Competition. Concerning economic issues (objective 3), the Soviet Union has abysmally failed in its attempt—still part of the official CPSU Programme adopted in 1961—to "catch up with and overtake" the United States in production by 1970. Soviet GNP stabilized at around 55 percent of US GNP in the 1970's. Economic growth rates have shown a long-term declining trend. (According to Soviet figures, they fell from around 10 percent in the 1940's to approximately 8 percent in the 1950's, 6 percent in the 1960's, and 4 percent in the 1970's. Growth rates of 2 percent are probable for the 1980's.)[34] The USSR did not achieve its aim of overcoming the perennial technological inferiority vis-à-vis the West. The structure of Soviet foreign trade is still very much that of a developing country—importing finished products in exchange for raw materials and energy supplies. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership is faced with a whole set of economic problems: declining rates of investment, underdevelopment of economic infrastructure, adverse demographic trends, exhaustion of oil reserves in the European parts of the Soviet Union, labor shortages, lagging productivity, and low competitiveness on the world market—in short, difficulties in shifting from coercion to cooperation, and from mobilization to modernization, in economic affairs.

All this casts doubt on the existence of a Soviet economic strategy designed, as Richard Pipes has argued, "to make the West Europeans maximally dependent on the Eastern bloc" by deliberately "promoting heavy indebtedness of the Comecon countries" and achieving "maximum control of West European energy supplies."[35] To put it more cautiously, even if there was such a strategy, it has not worked very well. The primary reason for the interest of the Soviet leadership in East-West economic exchanges, in the foreseeable future, will be due not to Soviet external political objectives but to domestic economic requirements.

For a time, in the first half of the 1970's, the USSR was quite successful in achieving its goal of broadening access to Western technology, know-how, and credit. This soon began to change, however. A number of economic and political factors converged to

[33] See, for instance, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967–1980,* Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1981, pp. 428–30. The deterioration of the Soviet image in West Germany was measured in February 1977 and January 1980, the latter date reflecting the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It is doubtful that the events in Poland have in any way improved the Soviet image. It is interesting to note in the context of Soviet attempts to transform military power into political influence that a Louis Harris poll conducted in the spring of 1983 showed that a significant minority of West Germans (30 percent) thought that there is a nuclear imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union. However, a majority (68 percent) held that the Soviets would be unable to exploit their advantage. See *The Economist* (London), June 4, 1983. Similar results obtained in a Louis Harris survey made later in the year, as reported in *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Nov. 29, 1983.

[34] According to a Central Intelligence Agency briefing on the Soviet economy by Henry Rowen, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, before the Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics, Dec. 1, 1982 (unpublished mimeo, p. 2), the Soviet economy—in terms of Western GNP—is expected to grow at an annual rate of 1 to 2 percent. Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates say that "the Soviet economy will continue muddling through . . . with GNP growing at 2.0–2.5 percent annually." WEFA, *Centrally Planned Economies: Current Analysis* (Washington, DC), Feb. 14, 1984, p. 13.

[35] Richard Pipes, Ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe,* New York, Crane, Russak, 1976, pp. 37–38

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limit East-West trade significantly. Such factors included (1) the burdening of Soviet-American trade with political preconditions, as noted above, in the early 1970's, and the deterioration of Soviet-American relations in the late 1970's; (2) the slowdown in the rates of growth of the Western economies in the wake of several "oil shocks," resulting in cutbacks of orders from Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries; and (3) the change in the role of commercial credit from important driving force behind East-West trade to brake on its expansion.

In part because of the deterioration of Soviet-American relations, the Soviet Union has attempted to shift much of its trade to Western Europe and Japan. This has led to widely shared impressions in the West—notably in the United States—that this "punishment" of the United States has been successful; that there has been a significant increase in Soviet–West European trade; and that the USSR, consequently, can easily do without trade exchanges with the United States.

These impressions do not correspond to the facts. There is no reason to suspect that, in principle, the Soviet leadership is no longer interested in engaging the huge US economic and technological potential for the development of its Siberian resources. Many products and types of equipment are available only from the United States. And although there has been an increase in the absolute value of Soviet–West European trade (caused mainly by the significantly higher prices charged for Soviet oil), the share of the CMEA countries in overall West European trade has been falling steadily since the mid-1970's. In the early 1980's, there has been a slight increase again in the USSR's share, but a further decline in the share of the other European CMEA countries.[36] Credit relations conform to the same pattern. It is understandable that, for financial and economic reasons, the East European countries have increasingly come to be regarded by Western banks as credit risks. This should not apply to the Soviet Union, which possesses huge gold reserves and natural resources, and whose foreign indebtedness is quite low. Yet its creditworthiness, too, has significantly suffered. Net financing flows from Western banks to the Soviet Union have decreased to a trickle. This decrease cannot be explained solely on economic grounds. It is undoubtedly due to political reasons, i.e., to the general atmosphere of tension and uncertainty prevailing in East-West relations.[37]

In sum, despite the well-publicized gas-pipes-and-credit deal (the Urengoy pipeline project), it is difficult to maintain that there has been "business as usual" in Soviet–West European economic relations. "Economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe," as even some Soviet economists acknowledge, "are closely connected with American policy."[38] Furthermore, neither the scale of the economic exchanges nor the perceptions of the West European public concerning this issue make it safe to assume that Soviet leaders think they have managed to achieve—or are able to achieve—West European economic dependence on the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary. The Soviet leaders must be aware that on matters of East-West trade they are more of a *demandeur* than are the Western countries.

Relative Success in the Military Competition. In contrast to the East-West competition in the ideological and socioeconomic spheres, the Soviet Union has been more successful in the East-West military competition (objectives 4 and 5). This is indicated by Soviet achievement of strategic parity or "parity plus"; modernization of Soviet intermediate-range and theater nuclear forces; further improvement in Soviet conventional military preponderance in Europe and the buildup of forces capable of power projection and intervention at and far beyond the periphery of the USSR.

In the Khrushchev era, as was mentioned above, the primary focus of competition between the two opposed world systems was declared to be ideological and economic. But starting with the Berlin and Cuban crises, the focus began to shift. Increasingly, the central sphere of competition between the two systems came to be military. This was perhaps not a conscious decision taken by the leadership under Brezhnev. But as the adversary superpower seemed to place such a great emphasis on military power in international relations, and as other Soviet means of influencing world events turned out to be relatively ineffective, this reorientation became ever more pronounced.

There are other reasons for this reorientation. Military competition is best suited to a centralized command economy in which military industry has been al-

[36] Concerning these economic trends, see Friedemann Müller et al., *Wirtschaftssanktionen im Ost-West Verhältnis: Rahmenbedingungen und Modalitäten* (Economic Sanctions in the East-West Relationship: Conditions and Modalities), ed. under the auspices of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Series Aktuelle Materialien, Vol. 1, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1983, pp. 130–44.

[37] Credit drawings by the Soviet Union on the Eurodollar market declined from US$750 million in 1975 to US$400 million in 1979 and US$153 million in 1982 (OECD, *Financial Market Trends* [Paris], No. 24, March 1983). Concerning interrelationships between East-West politics and finance, see Klaus Schröder, "East-West Financial Relations," in Hans-Dieter Jacobsen and Reinhard Rode, Eds., *Wirtschaftskrieg oder Entspannung?* (Economic Warfare or Détente?), Bonn, Neue Gesellschaft, forthcoming (1984).

[38] Yu. Andreyev, "East-West Economic Relations", *MEMO*, No. 12, 1982, p. 94.

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located a privileged position and national security receives top priority. Conversely, military competition is the sphere that is most controversial in Western pluralist systems. It is also the sphere where such systems are most vulnerable. Consequently, claims for a constant, let alone higher, budgetary share for defense expenditures against the background of a trend in almost all Western countries to cut government spending are likely to lead to domestic polarization. But the emphasis on military competition is bound for several reasons to lead as well to intra-Alliance polarization. In Western Europe the size of the military sector in the national economy is smaller than in the United States (i.e., the "military-industrial complex" is economically and politically less influential). Western Europe has a more extensive and costly social welfare net and strong social democratic parties committed to its protection.

The emphasis on military competition, moreover, is likely to be also a reflection of the belief held by the Soviet leadership that military power can successfully be transformed into political influence. Such transformation is probably regarded as working through perceptions or, more precisely, through a process of interaction between changes in the power relationship and the recognition of such changes. If, the Soviet leadership may reason, it can convincingly demonstrate that NATO has no viable defensive option in Western Europe, a process of political accommodation is likely to set in. This process could be furthered, to continue this reasoning, if the threat or use of force by the Soviet Union on the flanks, or in areas not directly covered by the NATO treaty, were to add to NATO's political, economic, and military constraints.

In order to accelerate such a political process of adaptation, the Soviet arms buildup, the Soviet stance in arms control negotiations, and the Soviet support for the "anti-war movement" have been integrated closely in one single approach. This much is undisputed by most political analysts. What is hotly debated, however, is the question whether West European political accommodation to or appeasement of Soviet military power is an accomplished fact; a discernible, on-going process; a conceivable, future possibility; or a distinct impossibility. It is undoubtedly a question that looms very large in the collective mind of the Soviet leadership as well.

From the Soviet perspective, looking at Western Europe and its role in the Western alliance, there are indeed some trends and issues that indicate an increase in Soviet influence over Western security relations. These trends are most likely, in the Soviet view, reflected in the following:

- the adoption of programs declared necessary by NATO but never implemented (e.g., the Long-Term Defense Program and the decision to increase defense expenditures by 3 percent in real terms);
- the announcement of production and deployment of the "neutron bomb" as necessary to counter Soviet superiority in tanks but the shelving (in part because of West European hesitation and domestic opposition) of these plans by President Carter;
- the growth—in conjunction with the domestic opposition to the "neutron bomb"—of a "peace movement" in Western Europe, rallying pacifist, environmentalist, religious, and leftist political forces against nuclear weapons in general, and against NATO's plans for the modernization of intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) in particular;

Members of the French Communist Party and its General Confederation of Trade Unions demonstrate on August 18, 1981, against the neutron bomb and the Pershing II and cruise missiles.

—Alain Keler/SYGMA.

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• major divisions in important West European political parties, notably social democratic parties, and conflicts in coalition governments *in* Western Europe and *between* Western Europe and the United States concerning NATO strategy, Western security policy, and relations with the Soviet Union.

If trends and events such as these were interpreted by the Soviet leadership as proof that the transformation of Soviet military preponderance in Europe into political leverage is well under way, the outcome of the INF controversy must give the Soviet leadership cause for reappraisal. There can hardly be any doubt that, for the Soviet Union and the "peace movement" in Western Europe, blocking the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles had been an important test case of their ability to decide significant Western security issues in their favor. This test case they lost.

This loss must appear to the Soviet leaders as particularly painful since they had characterized NATO's dual-track decision as the most serious and most hostile measure taken against the Soviet Union since World War II. Thus they portrayed the dangers of deployment as equal to those of the Cuban missile crisis, warned that détente in Europe could not survive deployment, and threatened that the USSR would reply "both militarily and politically" and that the consequences would be "very grave indeed."[39] Soviet policy toward the United States and Western Europe, therefore, has arrived at a crucial juncture.

Prospects

On the one hand, the Soviet leaders may consider the West European "peace movement" to have suffered only a temporary setback, so that it still can be an effective political instrument for Soviet foreign policy. They may still regard the erosion of consensus over NATO strategy among West European political parties (e.g., the about-face of the West German Social Democratic Party on the dual-track decision) as significant enough to be strengthened by a tough Soviet stance. Such a stance would allow a leader or a collective leadership not to be perceived as weak during a succession period. It would not antagonize an important domestic political force—the military. And, given the tremendous Soviet efforts in arms production and deployment over the past two decades, it would meet an inclination of the leadership—under the circumstances perhaps understandable—to "cash in" on its investment.

In practice, such a tough line could mean ever more threats of new deployments; closer military integration in the Warsaw Pact; pressure on the East European countries to increase their share of the defense burden; intransigence in arms control negotiations; further fueling of divergencies between the United States and Western Europe; and continued reliance on domestic pressures in NATO countries. Part of such a line could be interpreted as having begun with the Soviet walkout from the intermediate-range (INF), strategic (START) and conventional (MBFR) negotiations, and the adoption of certain countermeasures as announced in November 1983: (1) cancellation of the (self-proclaimed and arguably self-violated) moratorium on the construction of new missile sites in the European part of the Soviet Union; (2) stationing of shorter-range nuclear missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; and (3) deployment of



SCUD tactical nuclear missiles shown in launch position during maneuvers of Soviet forces in Poland.

—EUPRA.

[39] See, for instance, General and Deputy Minister of Defense, K. Mikhaylov, in an interview with the West German newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Frankfurt-am-Main), Nov. 3, 1982.

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additional missiles in "ocean areas" around the United States.[40]

On the other hand, unceasing emphasis on military power does nothing to alleviate the Soviet Union's social and economic problems. It strengthens the role of the military, and of the orthodox political and ideological forces in the Soviet system, making decentralization and other economic reforms even more difficult to achieve. The continued priority for military production and for the military instrument in foreign policy does nothing to improve Soviet control in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it serves to undermine even further the legitimacy of this control among East Europeans. It further enhances the image in Western Europe of the USSR as a repressive garrison state founded on a rigid and antiquated ideology. A tough line could, more dangerously from the Soviet point of view, harden American attitudes even further and transform the US–Soviet arms competition into a real arms race, which the USSR could still lose by a significant margin. The prospect of engaging the United States in large-scale economic ventures for the development of Soviet natural resources or of gaining access to US technology and credit would practically vanish. In short, continued reliance on military pressure entails the risk for the Soviet leaders that they may overplay their hand.

In fact, they may already have realized that there is such a risk. For instance, the "countermeasures," which Andropov announced in November 1983, can be regarded as the very minimum that the Soviet Union had to adopt so as to save face. Militarily, some of the measures are fairly mild and inconsequential; others were planned in advance and merely received a more convenient packaging. But, significantly, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania have been exempted from the military countermeasures on the nuclear level. And there are good reasons for not forcing those countries, as well as East Germany and Czechoslovakia, to put further strain on their vulnerable societies and economies, either by making them increase their defense burden or by requiring them to cut off their trade with the West.

The "countermeasures" at the political level are by and large limited to posturing—and, for the Soviet Union, not very promising posturing at that. This is the case because both the Soviet Union and the East European countries have an interest in maintaining a reasonable working relationship with the West European countries, politically and economically. For this reason, too, nothing has come of the "new ice age" in intra-German relations of which East German leader Erich Honecker warned, should Pershing II and cruise missiles be deployed in West Germany.[41] Similarly, under current conditions of Soviet military advantage in Central Europe, prolonged abstention from arms control negotiations would damage Soviet interests more than those of the West. Abstention would take away one of the most effective Soviet means for influencing domestic political processes in West European countries and, for a change, would cast the Soviet Union in the role of the *enfant terrible* holding up arms control agreements. It is most likely for these reasons that the Soviet leadership decided to take part in the European Disarmament Conference in Stockholm; that it very quickly agreed to a new date for the continuation of the MBFR talks in Vienna; and that it has hinted—even though cautiously—at the possibility of merging INF and START negotiations.[42]

If, as it appears, the scope for a "tough" line is limited, so too is the scope for a "soft" line. Any immediate, far-reaching shift away from the emphasis on military power (e.g., by agreeing to substantial cuts in conventional and nuclear forces in Europe, by lowering the rate of growth in arms production, and by consenting to genuine "equal security" for both the Soviet Union *and* Western Europe) may entail quite unpalatable consequences in the collective consciousness of the Soviet leadership. Given the relative weakness of political, ideological, economic, and cultural means for exerting influence, such consequences could include a significant decrease in political leverage in Europe. This, in turn, would have negative implications for the *global* role and status of the USSR. A reduced threat profile and lessening of

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[40] *Pravda*, Nov. 25, 1983.

[41] "Letter by Erich Honecker to Chancellor Kohl," *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 10, 1983.

[42] Lt. Gen. Viktor P. Starodubov, a member of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and for the past ten years a member of the Soviet team negotiating with the United States on strategic arms, for instance, stated in an interview that from the Soviet point of view Pershing II and cruise missiles "are considered to be strategic weapons." This is the standard Soviet position. But, more significant, he added that the "emplacement of missiles with a strategic purpose is in essence an attempt to bypass SALT II, particularly Article 12." (In this article, the parties committed themselves "not to circumvent the provisions of this treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner.") Starodubov did not explicitly say that he expected the subject of the European missiles to be merged into future discussions about strategic arms. But the linking of the new US deployments in Europe and SALT suggests that this is the case—as does his comment that a resumption of strategic arms negotiations is likely because the limitation of such arms conformed to the "general political line" of the Soviet government. See *The Washington Post*, Jan. 25, 1984.

That there is a close link between INF and START is acknowledged by other Soviet negotiators. Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, the chief of the Soviet team at the INF talks in Geneva, for instance, suggested on November 12, 1983—during the by now famous "walk in the park"—that the US propose a limit of approximately 120 SS-20's (in exchange for zero US missile deployment in Europe) in return for which the Soviet government would reserve the right to raise "in another forum" (i.e., in START) its demand for compensation for the British and French missiles and that it would "credit" the US with 120 missiles in compensation for the SS-20's. See the detailed report in *The Times* (London), Nov. 30, 1983.

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tensions could also bring with it—as the 1970's have proven—difficult management problems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Undoubtedly, verbal aggressiveness and vivid portrayal of external threats are not only in conformity with Marxist-Leninist ideology but also useful for maintaining discipline at home and in the bloc, and hence will not easily be abandoned.

Finally, given the uncertainties of the succession process and the need for any leader or group of leaders to retain the support of the military as the single most powerful institution except for the CPSU, and given the palpable aversion to aiding, or being seen as aiding, President Reagan's reelection prospects, no major conciliatory initiative in Soviet-American relations is likely. This does not exclude tactical approaches to find out whether a relatively conciliatory American posture is merely a function of the election campaign or contains some substantive elements advantageous to Soviet interests. It also does not exclude a measure of selective détente in Soviet–West European relations.

By the same token, all this does not amount to a promising blueprint of "divide and rule," not least because the differences in the Western alliance at present are showing clear signs of abating. It may not even amount to a policy of muddling *through* but simply one of muddling *on*.

This would be due to the fact that the "socialist community" (*sotsialisticheskoye sodruzhestvo*), too, is riddled with contradictions. These contradictions, moreover, are probably even more severe than those in the Western alliance. They encompass the above-mentioned gap between military strength and the relative weakness of socioeconomic instruments for exerting influence internationally. But they also extend to the conflicts between ideological rigidity and an ever more complex reality, between internal stagnation and external ambitions, and between centralized command economies and widespread corruption, as well as between integrative tendencies at the center of the Soviet empire and autonomous aspirations at the periphery. Undoubtedly, these contradictions—whether "non-antagonistic" or not—greatly reduce the effectiveness of Soviet attempts at exploiting divisions in the opposite camp.

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Moscow's Line on Arms Control

By Myron Hedlin

The Andropov legacy in Soviet arms control policy is one of meager accomplishment and a high degree of continuity in substance and strategy with the last portion of the Brezhnev era. Surveying the period of Yuriy Andropov's general secretaryship and the early months of Konstantin Chernenko's, it is impossible to point to a single change in Soviet arms control posture that clearly contradicts Leonid Brezhnev's approach.

Andropov's prolonged illness and withdrawal from all public and (one must assume) most private political activities during his final months only partly explains this immobility. The incapacitation of the General Secretary probably caused the postponement of important decisions, including decisions on arms control. The question of who would succeed Andropov, which undoubtedly asserted itself with increasing force as his inability to resume official functions dragged on, may also have produced an atmosphere of contention and stalemate within the leadership. Such a climate would hardly have been conducive to bold initiatives in the area of primary international concern to the USSR: defense and arms control policy vis-à-vis the United States. Andropov's illness alone, however, does not account for the lack of dynamism in this area during the 15 months that he was the top Soviet leader, since he advanced the framework of the Soviet arms control posture only marginally even during the period when he was still publicly active, i.e., from November 1982 to August 1983.

Other factors appear to bear greater responsibility for Soviet inertia on disarmament issues. The atmosphere of mutual suspicion already present in East-West relations when Andropov assumed the reins of power seemed to further accentuate the Kremlin leadership's long-standing reluctance to seize the initiative and modify its arms control proposals. The experience of the 1970's and 1980's strongly suggests that major arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union are more easily reached in periods of improving relations than in times of tension. Certainly, as US-Soviet relations worsened during the Andropov period, Soviet leaders appeared especially determined not to provide substantiation for the arguments of the Reagan Administration that Moscow would respond to an enhanced US defense posture with greater flexibility at the negotiating table.

The Kremlin's preoccupation with the effort to stop NATO deployment of US Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, moreover, had the apparent effect of virtually freezing all other arms control negotiations pending the success or failure of that effort. The Soviet disruption in November–December 1983 of the three most important East–West disarmament negotiations as NATO missile deployments began made clear the key role in Soviet thinking played by the struggle over those missiles.

The aim of this article is to lay out the fundamentals of Soviet arms control posture as they have evolved since Brezhnev's death, relying primarily on Soviet public statements but with the aid of Western press reports as well. These Soviet statements, of course, serve a propaganda function. That, in turn, necessitates a careful, conscious effort to separate rhetoric from substantive reflections of the Soviet position on both general and specific questions of arms control. While it is impossible to assert with absolute confidence that any single element of Moscow's publicly articulated arms control position represents the Kremlin's privately held view, discriminating use of the public record has given surprisingly accurate indications—judging from subsequent Soviet actions—of

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Soviet negotiator Yuliy Kvitsinskiy breaks off the INF talks in Geneva on November 23, 1983, the day after the West German Bundestag voted to permit the deployment of Pershing II missiles in the FRG.

—Michael Philippot, Jacques Pavlovsky, and Armel Brucelle/SYGMA.

Soviet intentions and perceptions. There is no convincing evidence that this correspondence between Soviet statements and Soviet perceptions of arms control questions has ceased to exist.

Basic Strategy

The Kremlin's basic disarmament strategy during the Andropov period was, first of all, oriented toward encouraging opposition to US arms control and defense policies, particularly among West Europeans. This effort had as its primary goal stopping deployment of US missiles in Europe and, at the same time, exerting indirect pressure on the US to become more accommodating toward Soviet disarmament interests, especially at the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations in Geneva. This strategy became more obvious as the date for the arrival of US missiles in West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy approached at the end of 1983, but it had already clearly emerged under Brezhnev. Andropov himself testified to the importance he attributed to the fight for world opinion in his June 1983 speech to the CPSU Central Committee plenum, asserting that a highly significant struggle was going on "for the hearts and minds of billions of people in the world."[1] In this struggle, in order to give its policies the appearance of dynamism and flexibility, the Kremlin repackaged and reproposed a number of its old disarmament proposals. Soviet confidence-building proposals presented in January 1984 at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and Soviet proposals at the United Nations last August for a treaty banning the use of force in and from space are but two examples of such repackaging.

Second, Soviet arms control strategy remained reactive and incremental. Andropov clung tightly to Moscow's traditional approach of responding to American actions and providing as few clues as possible to concessions the Soviet Union might be willing to make for the sake of a compromise solution. The Kremlin's

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), June 16, 1983.

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perception that it was under pressure from the Reagan Administration to modify its proposals more drastically or else face an American military buildup produced a steady stream of leadership pledges that the Soviet Union could not be intimidated into accepting arms control agreements it considered inequitable, but little that would suggest greater Soviet flexibility.

Still, notwithstanding the absence of major changes in Moscow's arms control stance in the post-Brezhnev period, the issue of controlling nuclear weaponry has remained the dominant one on the Soviet leadership's foreign policy agenda. Andropov's first major foreign policy initative, a December 1982 INF proposal, indicated the high priority he would attach to disarmament issues. Moscow's major proposals since then have all dealt with arms control—whether of European nuclear forces, strategic arms, conventional arms in Central Europe, space-based weaponry, or chemical weapons. One looks in vain for evidence of similarly sustained activity in any other sphere of high foreign policy concern to Moscow. In the area of Sino-Soviet relations, for example, where some improvement in the atmosphere has occurred in the past two years, the Politburo showed no comparable signs of focusing on the problem; after expressing interest in improved relations with Beijing in November 1982, Andropov returned to this subject only once in 1983.[2]

Nowhere was the importance the regime attaches to arms control issues, particularly nuclear weapons in Europe, more obvious than in the high public profile of the General Secretary himself. Although Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko was also prominent in arguing the Soviet case on INF to Western governments and to the Western public,[3] Andropov repeatedly took personal charge of expounding and defending Soviet arms control initiatives. The long list of his pronouncements on such issues offered convincing evidence of their centrality to Andropov's foreign policy concerns. On the INF issue alone, he made highly publicized statements in every month of 1983 except for January, June, and December. He was also active in presenting the Soviet reaction to President Reagan's plans, announced in March of that year, for conducting research on ballistic missile defense systems. Even during Andropov's prolonged absence from public view, statements continued to be issued in his name on arms limitation questions, to the neglect of nearly all other international issues.

Konstantin Chernenko, who succeeded Andropov as general secretary in February 1984, has had little opportunity as yet to take any initiatives on arms control. Nevertheless, his early statements suggest that he will maintain the traditional priority accorded to this area—and also the traditional Soviet caution.

INF Negotiations

If Andropov's highest foreign policy priority was arms control, its core was the limitation of Western INF systems in Europe. Soviet leaders have devoted much attention to this issue ever since 1979. In December of that year NATO approved a "dual-track" decision authorizing the United States to negotiate limitations on US and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear systems—while preparations were made for the deployment (beginning in late 1983) of 464 US ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles in five West European countries should these negotiations fail. The Kremlin, in preparing for and conducting those talks, was unstinting in its public efforts to justify its massive buildup of SS-20's—the fundamental cause of NATO's deployments—and to impugn American motives for matching those Soviet missiles.

Upon his accession, Andropov made prevention of NATO deployments his most important foreign policy goal. In pursuit of that goal, whether at the negotiating table or through West European resistance, already in December 1982 Andropov announced the first of a series of modifications in the Soviet INF posture. The Soviet position up until that time had been that the USSR and NATO should each limit the total number of intermediate-range nuclear missiles and aircraft in and near Europe to 300, and that no US missiles—only aircraft—be allowed in that figure. In a December 21 speech marking the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, Andropov retained this basic framework but specified a sub-limit on missiles for each side, with the Soviets retaining only as many missiles as were in the combined British and French arsenals (162, according to Moscow's count).[4] While previous authoritative Soviet statements, such as Brezhnev's November 1981 *Der Spiegel* interview,[5] had likewise insisted that British and French nuclear

[2] Ibid., Nov. 23, 1982, and Aug. 27, 1983.

[3] Gromyko's most conspicuous roles in this regard were his journey to West Germany in January 1983; his press conference on April 2, 1983, in which he replied to President Reagan's proposals for an "interim" INF solution; and his October 1983 meeting with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. See text below for details.

[4] *Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1982. For a Soviet survey of the changes in Moscow's INF position, see *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 2, 1983.

[5] As published in *Pravda*, Nov. 3, 1981.

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systems be somehow taken into account in any calculation of the INF balance, Andropov was the first to explicitly link Soviet missile deployment levels to those of Britain and France.

Moscow's insistence that the nuclear forces of those two US allies be figured in the balance and refusal to acquiesce in *any* deployment of US Pershing II or cruise missiles remained the immovable obstacles in the Soviet INF position, up to and beyond the collapse of the Geneva-based INF negotiations in November 1983. This position, tenaciously adhered to, blocked less rigid solutions that (for example) might have allowed a limited number of US cruise missiles in exchange for a specified number of Soviet SS-20 missiles. Andropov's explicit linkage on a one-for-one basis of Soviet and British-French intermediate-range nuclear missile forces made any compromise still more difficult. Brezhnev, by contrast, had left vague (in public remarks in 1981) just how British and French nuclear forces were to be regarded, saying only that "we simply propose taking into consideration what they have."[6]

Andropov tinkered with the Soviet proposal on three additional occasions before the talks collapsed. The first change came in May 1983, when he announced that the Soviet Union was willing to agree to equality in intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe "with regard to both delivery vehicles and warheads."[7] This modification was apparently made in an attempt to put to rest objections that SS-20 missiles with independently targetable warheads had far more destructive potential than the British and French missiles in question. The shift was a logical extension of Gromyko's remarks at a press conference in Moscow on April 2, 1983, describing warheads as a "more precise expression" than missile launchers of the power of nuclear weapons.[8] But it also protected Soviet interests in the event that planned British and

[6]Ibid. The British and French have insisted that their nuclear forces are independent national forces, not part of NATO, and have repeatedly rejected any counting of these forces with those of the United States in calculating the nuclear balance.

[7]Ibid., May 4, 1983.

[8]Ibid., Apr. 3, 1983.



US intermediate-range nuclear missiles of the type being deployed in Western Europe as a result of the December 1979 NATO double-track decision: at left, three Pershing II missiles with transporters; at right, a test launch of a ground-launched cruise missile.

—US Department of Defense.

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French missile modernization programs produced a significant increase in the number of warheads in their respective arsenals. Under an agreement equating Soviet warheads with the combined British and French warhead total, any increase by these two countries permitted an equal increase in Soviet deployments.

Andropov altered his original proposal a second time in late August 1983, in response to concerns in China, Japan, and NATO that Moscow intended to transfer to Asia any missiles it agreed to remove from Europe. From their new locations in Asia, SS-20's would not only threaten China, Japan, and US forces in that region, but they could also be readily returned to the European theater in a crisis. Andropov said the Soviet Union recognized the concern this created, and was therefore announcing its willingness to "liquidate" all Soviet missiles removed under the terms of an INF agreement.[9] This pledge directly contradicted Gromyko's remarks at his April press conference that the American demand for the destruction rather than relocation of these missiles made an agreement impossible.[10] Andropov's August modification indicated some sensitivity to the impact of Moscow's continued INF buildup in Asia on Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Japanese relations. It suggested what later became clear: that the Kremlin was willing to accept some as yet unspecified limitations on its Asian deployments in the interest of limiting NATO deployments in Europe.

Andropov's third modification, in late October, represented a further effort to publicize Soviet flexibility and thereby influence the debate in Western Europe—West Germany in particular—on whether or not to proceed with NATO missile deployments. With the crucial Bundestag debate over Pershing II missiles on German soil less than a month away, Andropov asserted that the Soviet Union, in pursuit of an agreement, was willing to take account of certain objections raised abroad. First, he offered to reduce the number of Soviet SS-20 missile launchers allowed in the European USSR to approximately 140, in order to reach alleged equality in missile *warheads* with the combined British and French forces. Second, he proposed to freeze the Soviet SS-20 missile force in Asia at the level existing when an INF agreement went into effect, and to maintain that level so long as there were no "substantial changes" in the strategic situation in Asia. Third, he signaled a willingness to display ill-defined "additional flexibility" on a Soviet demand to which Washington had long objected: restrictions on US intermediate-range aircraft in or near Europe that were capable of fulfilling both a conventional and a nuclear role. He also expressed a willingness to "eliminate" the more than 200 SS-4 missiles that the Soviet Union still had in service if the United States renounced deployment of its new missiles in Europe, and thereby provided "an opportunity to continue" the INF talks.[11] But these modifications in the Soviet position proved to be too little and too late to affect Bonn's decision in favor of the new NATO missile deployments.

The threat of countermeasures in the event of those deployments was also an important part of Soviet strategy in 1983. Already in March of 1982, when Brezhnev announced a moratorium on additional SS-20 deployments in the European USSR, he warned that new NATO missiles would bring about retaliatory steps that would place US territory in an "analogous position" and end the Soviet moratorium.[12] Although Andropov did not repeat such threats during his initial months as general secretary, in May 1983 he began the process of defining more specifically what the oft-mentioned Soviet countermeasures would be, indicating that they would include deployments in the USSR, East Germany, and "other Warsaw Pact member states."[13] In subsequent statements, the Soviet leadership (with help from East German leader Erich Honecker) specified that its military countermeasures in Europe would come primarily in East Germany and Czechoslovakia—threats probably designed to intensify the pressure on Bonn. Immediately after the breakdown of the INF talks in November, another Andropov statement confirmed that the Soviet Union would end its moratorium on new INF deployments in the European USSR, take measures to increase the nuclear threat to the United States in proportion to the increased threat to Soviet territory posed by the new NATO missiles in Europe, and accelerate preparatory work for siting "enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles" on East German and Czechoslovak territory. The Soviet press in January 1984 pointedly reported on the deployment of these missiles.[14]

Did the Kremlin seriously believe that an INF agreement with the Reagan Administration was possible during 1983? It is, of course, impossible to answer this question definitively. It is conceivable that in the early months of the Andropov regime there was some hope that the slightly less hostile atmosphere in US-Soviet

[9]Ibid., Aug. 27, 1983.
[10]Ibid., Apr. 3, 1983.
[11]Ibid., Oct. 27, 1983.
[12]Ibid., Mar. 17, 1982.
[13]Ibid., May 4, 1983.
[14]Ibid., Nov. 25, 1983; *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Jan. 18 and 19, 1984.

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relations that seemed to follow Brezhnev's death could give birth to such an agreement. It is also conceivable that Moscow thought it could intensify pressures in Western Europe against NATO deployments to the point that Washington, fearing it would end up with nothing, would be forced into a compromise advantageous to the USSR. But these expectations, always tinged by doubts, must have dimmed drastically in the aftermath of the Korean Air Lines disaster in early September. In fact, Andropov's bitter statement at the end of that month seemed virtually to rule out any hope for an agreement: "If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present American administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all."[15]

It is possible, nevertheless, that some Soviet officials clung to the hope that a compromise could be worked out even after the KAL incident. This may partly explain the byzantine behavior of chief Soviet INF negotiator Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, who even in November seems to have been frantically trying to maneuver the negotiations toward a settlement. In the aftermath of this unusual episode, Kvitsinskiy tried to impute to US negotiator Paul Nitze a proposal he had made privately to Nitze but that Moscow apparently was unwilling to accept.[16]

Indeed, the Kremlin's primary INF strategy seemed to be one of preventing deployments through public pressures, even while leaving open the possibility of a negotiated settlement. But there are a number of grounds for suspecting that stopping deployment was the more significant effort. First, the extent to which the Kremlin concentrated on presenting its negotiating posture in public suggests a lack of confidence in real progress at the talks. Historically, when Soviet authorities have sought to encourage serious negotiations (as in the talks resulting in the SALT agreements), the Soviet media have divulged relatively few details. Second, the pervasive pessimism in Soviet leadership statements and media commentary regarding the intentions of the Reagan Administration at least since the beginning of 1982 argues against the notion that the Politburo anticipated agreement in Geneva. *Izvestiya* newspaper commentator Aleksandr Bovin, widely reported to be a foreign policy adviser to the leadership, has personified that pessimism since mid-1982. At that time he began expressing the view,

[15] *Pravda*, Sept. 29, 1983.

[16] For each negotiator's description of this episode, see *The New York Times*, Jan. 12 and 19, 1984.



British and French strategic systems that Moscow has attempted to include in arms negotiations with the US: at left, Britain's first Polaris nuclear submarine, Resolution, *at its 1966 launching; at right, the launching of French nuclear submarine* L'Inflexible *on June 23, 1982.*

—Wide World and Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

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which he continues to repeat, that no serious US-Soviet agreements can be expected so long as Reagan is in the White House.[17]

Finally, the concentration of Soviet effort on influencing West German deliberations suggests Moscow's greater concern to stop NATO missile deployments—by pressuring the Germans into refusing to accept the missiles—than to seek a compromise settlement with the United States. Gromyko began this effort in January 1983 during his visit to Bonn, warning that the Soviet Union, in assessing the consequences of new NATO missiles, could not ignore "the fact that the FRG is the only state where plans call for deploying Pershing II missiles capable of reaching in a few minutes strategic objectives deep inside the Soviet Union."[18] He continued to apply pressure during his October meeting with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Vienna and in the East German–Soviet communiqué that followed Gromyko's stop in East Berlin on his way home. The latter document ominously warned that the appearance of new US missiles on West German soil would "contradict the spirit and letter" of the treaties normalizing Bonn's relations with Moscow and with East Berlin.[19]

Andropov, too, participated in this effort in a somewhat more restrained fashion, raising the likelihood of complications for Soviet–West German relations both in his April 1983 *Der Spiegel* interview and in remarks made during Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Moscow in July. On the latter occasion, Andropov told the West Germans that

Under the present state of affairs, the Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the European zone are merely a counterbalance to the intermediate-range nuclear systems of the NATO countries in that zone. They are not aimed against the West German armed forces. But if American missiles are deployed on West German soil, the situation will change. The military threat for West Germany will be multiplied many times over. Relations between our countries will also inevitably suffer certain complications. As for the Germans in the FRG and the GDR, they, as someone recently put it, would have to look at one another through thick palisades of missiles.[20]

Later, in the aftermath of the Soviet walkout from the INF talks, Moscow resolutely declared that only "readiness" on NATO's part to return to the situation that existed before the start of deployments could allow for the resumption of these talks.[21]

The post-Andropov leadership has shown no greater flexibility on this count. Moscow had long ago prepared the groundwork for a possible merger of the INF talks with negotiations on strategic arms by asserting that since US Pershing II and cruise missiles can reach Soviet territory, they are strategic missiles as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Soviet officials have continued to insist on this point, asserting that they must take those missiles into account in calculating the strategic balance. But Moscow, both before and after Andropov's death, has left its future position on intermediate-range nuclear systems deliberately unclear—confining its policy statements to claims that only remedial actions by NATO can repair the situation and allow negotiations to resume.

START Talks

Despite numerous expressions of deep concern for the fate of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva, the Andropov leadership gave far less public attention to those talks than to the parallel ones on INF. It also showed less interest in openly modifying its position. The basic Soviet approach under Andropov—as in Brezhnev's last years—was cautious and attuned to justifying the current balance of US and Soviet strategic forces while seeking to discredit any and all US proposals.

It seems reasonable, nevertheless, to believe that the factors that led Moscow during the 1970's to seek the SALT I and SALT II agreements and to join the United States at the START talks in June 1982 have not lost their force. Rather, the relative immobility in the Soviet START position appeared to reflect Moscow's judgment that the INF issue had to play itself out first. That judgment, and a desire to promote the impression abroad that the Reagan Administration's policies were creating a dangerous breakdown in East-West dialogue and thereby increasing the threat of nuclear war, provide the most plausible explanations for Soviet refusal to set a date for resumption of the START talks after the last session in December 1983. An unmistakable desire to do nothing

[17] *Izvestiya*, Aug. 6, 1982; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 2, 1983, p. AA/7; Oct. 17, 1983, p. A/3; Dec. 6, 1983, p. A/3; and Mar. 5, 1984, p. CC/9.

[18] *Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1983.

[19] Ibid., Oct. 19, 1983.

[20] Ibid., July 6, 1983.

[21] See ibid., Nov. 25, 1983, for Andropov's statement to this effect. Chernenko has slightly reformulated the Soviet stance since becoming general secretary, insisting that only the removal of the "obstacles" to the INF and strategic nuclear weapons negotiations allegedly created by the deployment of the new US missiles in Europe will open the way to renewed talks. For Chernenko's varied expositions of the Soviet position, see *Pravda*, Mar. 3, Mar. 13, and Apr. 9, 1984.

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Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko (center) with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (right) and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (right) in January 1983 during a visit to Bonn in which Gromyko tried to pressure West Germany not to deploy Pershing II missiles on its territory.

—Regis Bossu/SYGMA.

that would promote the reelection of President Reagan—or support the hypothesis that Soviet leaders would be more pliable after NATO missile deployments than before—also contributed to Moscow's willingness to bear the onus for disrupting the talks.

A survey of Soviet statements on START illuminates the absence of major alterations in the Soviet public stance, despite modifications in the US position during 1983 that must interest Soviet officials. The original US position, as outlined by Reagan in May 1982,[22] envisioned a first phase of major reductions in both US and Soviet ballistic missiles and warheads followed by a second phase dealing with other issues, including the introduction of equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weights. Although the Kremlin welcomed the opportunity to resume strategic arms negotiations with the United States, it claimed to find little that was attractive in this proposal, alleging that it was "one-sided" and designed to unilaterally disarm the Soviet Union.[23]

Andropov set the tone for continuing a stiff Soviet posture on START as early as December 1982, in his address commemorating the USSR's anniversary. He reiterated familiar Soviet objections to the initial US proposal and indicated no willingness to modify the Soviet position, but he did break Moscow's silence on the outlines of its own proposal. That proposal, he said, provided for reducing Soviet intercontinental arms by "more than 25 percent" and lowering "substantially" the number of nuclear warheads on each side. The American approach claimed to call for "radical reductions," Andropov asserted, but in essence it envisioned a unilateral reduction of Soviet strategic

[22]US Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (Washington, DC), May 17, 1982, pp. 599–604.

[23]See Brezhnev's remarks in *Pravda*, May 19, 1982.

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potential while leaving the United States free to build up its own strategic arsenal. Denying that the United States lagged behind the USSR in strategic arms and that a US buildup would make Moscow more flexible at the negotiating table, he contended that increases in US strategic programs would compel the Soviet Union to deploy "corresponding weapons systems of our own—an analogous missile to counter the MX missile and our own long-range cruise missile, which we are already testing, to counter the US long-range cruise missile."[24]

Pravda, in an authoritative editorial article on January 2, 1983, further expanded on the details of the Soviet position at these talks and on Soviet objections to US proposals. The article noted that the USSR proposed a stage-by-stage reduction in the number of ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and heavy bombers down to a total of 1,800 units for each side by 1990, and an unspecified reduction in the number of nuclear warheads in each side's strategic arsenal to "equal agreed levels." Although *Pravda* did not specify the breakdown of this 1,800 figure, Western media have reported that the Soviet proposal as modified during 1983 allowed 1,080 multiple-warhead ICBM's and SLBM's, 600 single-warhead ballistic missiles and 120 strategic bombers equipped with cruise missiles.[25] *Pravda* also stated that the Soviet Union proposed prohibiting cruise missiles "of all types" with a range of 600 kilometers or more. The article objected in particular to the US-proposed division of the START discussions into two phases, the first of which would force the Soviet Union "to eliminate twice as many ballistic missiles as the United States" while leaving untouched the superior US strategic bomber force and US plans

[24]Ibid., Dec. 22, 1982.

[25]For a breakdown of Soviet figures, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Moving from Standoff to an Interim Accord," *The New York Times*, Jan. 29, 1984.

US President Ronald Reagan meets in September 1982 at the White House with his chief negotiators at three sets of arms talks with the USSR: at left, Paul Nitze (at the talks on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces—INF); second from right, General Edward Rowny (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—START); and at right, Richard Staar (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks—MBFR).

—John Wicart.

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for a "massive deployment" of long-range cruise missiles.[26]

Soviet leaders and media offered little further elucidation over the following year concerning any major modifications the Kremlin might be prepared to accept in a START settlement. Even after President Reagan's announcements on June 8 and October 4, 1983, that he had authorized several changes in the American START negotiating posture to meet Soviet complaints, Moscow showed little flexibility.

Reagan's announcements indicated that the United States was willing: (1) to raise the previously proposed ceiling of 850 on deployed ballistic missiles in line with the recommendations of the Scowcroft bipartisan advisory commission on strategic forces, which had suggested that the two powers replace large multiwarhead ICBM's with small, single-warhead missiles like the new Midgetman; (2) to remove the division between a first phase reducing ballistic missiles and a second phase limiting strategic bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's); and (3) to begin a mutual "build-down" process of selective reductions in the quantity of each side's armaments as they introduced new weapons systems. To further encourage Soviet bargaining, the President's October statement acknowledged that "there will have to be trade-offs" to gain the limitations on ICBM's desired by the United States and on bombers and ALCM's desired by the Soviet Union.[27]

However intriguing these modifications might have been to Soviet leaders during periods of more productive negotiation, they responded only with words of condemnation to the revised US proposals. In a speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet on June 16, 1983, Gromyko delivered the Soviet public reply to Reagan's first announcement. The US modifications, he said, were "purely for show," sought "to deceive" the public, and kept unchanged the US effort "to disrupt the existing structure of the Soviet strategic potential" while leaving Washington free to build up its own armaments.[28]

In October, Gromyko gave a similarly uncompromising treatment to President Reagan's second announcement of changes in the American position. In a speech in East Berlin on October 17, the Soviet foreign minister alleged that the "more flexible" approach proclaimed by the White House was "a propagandist's trick and nothing else." Moreover, the



Air-launched cruise missiles such as those being fitted here onto the wing of a B-52 bomber are a subject of Soviet arms limitation proposals.

—Boeing photo released to US Department of Defense.

build-down formula, he continued, "turns out to be only a fine-sounding cover for intensifying the nuclear arms race."[29] An authoritative *Pravda* article six days later also went out of its way to reject the notion that US willingness to combine discussion of ballistic missiles and bombers into a single phase represented a positive step.[30] Moreover, to emphasize that the Soviet perspective on the START talks had not softened in the wake of US missile deployments in Europe, *Pravda* in mid-January 1984 published another authoritative article basically repeating the Kremlin's complaints of the previous year and threatening a tougher Soviet negotiating position on strategic arms. NATO's new missiles, *Pravda* said, forced the "Soviet side to review its whole approach to the problem of limiting nuclear arms, including the START problem," because those missiles affected the strategic and not just the European balance. In addition, the party newspaper denied that there had been any progress at the talks, that there had been any change in the "essence" of the US position, that "build-down" in any way moderated the "one-sided" nature of the American approach, and that US talk of a "trade-off" represented any advance or reflected a genuine desire for compromise.[31]

[26] *Pravda*, Jan. 2, 1983.

[27] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 13, 1983, pp. 841–43, and Oct. 10, 1983, pp. 1387–88.

[28] *Pravda*, June 17, 1983. See also the *Pravda* editorial article of July 16, 1983; and Andropov's remarks in ibid., Sept. 29, 1983.

[29] Ibid., Oct. 18, 1983.

[30] Ibid., Oct. 23, 1983.

[31] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1984. Remarks made by a military member of the Soviet START delegation, Viktor Starodubov, to an American newspaperman (but not reported by Soviet media) explicitly warned that the new US missiles in Europe made invalid the Soviet offer at START to reduce its strategic arsenal by 25 percent. *The Washington Post*, Jan. 25, 1984.

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In a further indication of stalemate, Moscow's own public position on a strategic weapons accord developed at an extremely modest pace during 1983. In June the Soviet government proposed a quantitative and qualitative freeze on the world's nuclear arsenals, beginning with those of the United States and the USSR[32]—a gesture that had mainly propaganda value, in view of the Reagan Administration's professed opposition to such a freeze. In more significant moves, Moscow dropped its demand that all cruise missiles be banned, agreeing "to allow the limited deployment of air-launched cruise missiles," and amended provisions of its proposal that would have prevented deployment of the new generation of American SLBM's.[33]

What then can be expected regarding the future of the START talks? The immediate outlook is hardly promising. In the aftermath of its refusal last December to set a date for resuming these talks, Moscow carefully shielded its intentions about whether it might even return to the table. In statements typical of Soviet reticence on the fate of the START talks, Andropov in his response in *Pravda* to President Reagan's January 16, 1984, speech on Soviet-US relations failed even to mention START, and Chernenko in his initial statements on arms control issues as general secretary touched on these negotiations only in passing.[34]

The Kremlin's trouble in deciding how to proceed reflected some difficult choices. Its strategy of trying to convince the West Europeans that it had been and remained the reasonable party at the Geneva talks conflicted with its refusal to resume these talks. Its assertion that the military buildup of the Reagan Administration and the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe would not make the Soviet Union more compliant left it vulnerable to American efforts to portray a Soviet return to the table as a sign that the deployments—contrary to Soviet claims—had not adversely affected East-West relations, and that Western pressures might in fact contribute to eliciting a compromise from Moscow. Anxious not to contribute to

[32] *Izvestiya*, June 17, 1983. Moscow had previously shown reluctance to endorse a qualitative freeze, expressing approval instead for the notion of "limiting" modernization to the utmost.

[33] *Pravda*, Oct. 23, 1983; Edward Rowny, "Groundwork for Arms Progress," *The New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1984.

[34] *Pravda*, Jan. 25, Mar. 3, and Apr. 9, 1984. Chernenko has appeared to link together the fate of the START and INF talks.

US Phantom F-4E aircraft on maneuvers over West Germany in late 1983. Limitation of both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe has been under discussion at the MBFR talks in Vienna since 1973.

—US Department of Defense.

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President Reagan's reelection, Moscow also had to calculate the effects of its actions on the November 1984 US vote. If—as seems increasingly unlikely—Soviet START negotiators were sent back to the negotiating table soon, Moscow would still face the question of whether or not to somehow fold the INF negotiations into START, and thereby risk complicating the latter even further. In any case, the absence of major Soviet START initiatives, the persistent tension in US-Soviet relations, and the initial indications from the Chernenko regime hardly encourage expectations of dramatically new strategic arms proposals from the Soviet side.

MBFR Talks

The third major forum for East-West arms control dialogue, meeting in Vienna, deals with limiting the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact facing each other in Central Europe. These complex multilateral negotiations have been underway since 1973 and involve 19 countries. They aim at an agreement reducing the combined ground and air forces of the two alliances (in West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, on the one side, and in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, on the other) and implementing so-called "associated measures" that would verify compliance with those reductions and reduce the risks of misperception and miscalculation. The negotiations have been stalemated above all over the data question—how many troops does each side actually have in Central Europe—and over how troop levels can be verified. NATO contends that the Warsaw Pact has a considerably greater number of ground troops in Central Europe than does the West; the Warsaw Pact insists that approximate equality already exists.[35] Both sides have agreed on the desirability of reducing the combined ground and air force totals for each side to 900,000, but they have agreed on little else. Although the longevity of the talks testifies to the continuing importance of the issues discussed, these negotiations have long been outside the limelight. Soviet leaders have occasionally mentioned MBFR, but usually only in passing. The lack of a sense of urgency has continued to characterize the post-Brezhnev approach.

Nevertheless, Moscow showed continuing interest in an MBFR agreement by presenting a new draft treaty at the talks in mid-1983, a draft that appears to remain the basis of the current Soviet position. According to surprisingly detailed Soviet media reports, that draft treaty (based on proposals submitted by the USSR delegation on February 17, but not formally presented until June 23) called for skipping over the nettlesome disagreement on the data question by simply reaching an understanding to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Central Europe over a three-year period to equal collective levels of 900,000 on each side, up to 700,000 of which could be ground forces. It proposed beginning the reductions by withdrawing 13,000 American and 20,000 Soviet servicemen with their armaments as a first step, and instituting a verification procedure providing for the invitation "on a voluntary basis" of observers from both sides to witness the withdrawals and armament reductions. After those steps were completed, three or four permanent posts would be permitted for the entry and exit of troops from Central Europe. In addition, under certain conditions—unspecified in Soviet accounts—on-site verification would be allowed. Finally, each side would be committed not to obstruct national technical means of verifying compliance with the agreement.[36]

This draft treaty obviously contained elements that move in the direction desired by NATO, particularly on verification. These elements were welcomed by Western leaders, including President Reagan.[37] But neither of the two basic problems, data and verification, has shown any further sign of resolution. NATO continues to insist that the Eastern bloc has more troops than it admits, that any agreement must be based on agreed and verifiable data, and that the provisions for verification in the Warsaw Pact draft treaty are inadequate.[38]

The Kremlin, for its part, has returned to the MBFR talks, but has shown neither enthusiasm nor signs of new flexibility. Andropov, in his January 1984 *Pravda* interview, indicated no inclination to modify the Warsaw Pact's position, noting only that the Soviet

[35] See Jonathan Dean, "MBFR: From Apathy to Accord," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1983, pp. 116–39, for an excellent discussion of the development of the MBFR talks. For a summary of the Soviet view of the issues involved, see the USSR Ministry of Defense pamphlet, *Disarmament: Who's Against?* Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1983, pp. 35–39. It provides the Warsaw Pact's figures for ground forces in Central Europe as of August 1, 1980, contending that the Eastern bloc had 796,700 soldiers vs. 792,500 for NATO. Its figures for the air forces were 182,300 for the Warsaw Pact and 198,500 for NATO.

[36] Andropov reaffirmed Soviet support for the Warsaw Pact's 1983 draft treaty in his answers to questions from *Pravda* on Jan. 25, 1984, when he indirectly confirmed the USSR's willingness to resume the MBFR negotiations. As with the START talks, Soviet negotiators had refused to set a date for resumption of the MBFR talks at the end of the last round in December 1983. For details of the Warsaw Pact's draft MBFR treaty, see *Pravda*, Feb. 21 and June 24, 1983; and *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 22, 1983, pp. AA/1–6.

[37] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 23, 1983, p. 1162.

[38] *The Washington Post*, Jan. 23, 1984.

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Soviet Col. Gen. Nikolay Chervov and Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov at a Moscow press conference on February 18, 1983, where they publicized a new Soviet proposal relating to the Vienna MBFR talks.

—UPI

Union's proposals had "long" been on the table and offered a "quick approach to agreement, provided, of course, that there is a mutual striving to reach an accord."[39] The Western MBFR proposal presented in Vienna on April 19, 1984, has also met with a cool reception from the Soviet Union. The initial response from the Soviet delegation at the Vienna talks, as reported by *Pravda*, asserted that the new Western proposal failed to solve a "single one of the questions blocking progress" at the talks and, in particular, ignored the "key" question of a reduction in armaments.[40] Thus, the prospects for progress at these talks hardly seem glowing. These negotiations have dragged on for ten years for a reason: deep, almost irreconcilable differences in approach, whereby the West wants uncertainties eliminated and the East appears willing and perhaps even eager to allow a degree of uncertainty and imprecision.

Ballistic Missile Defense

One final area of major significance for Soviet arms control policy has emerged with renewed vigor over the past year. This area, which most directly impinges on the START negotiations, involves ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the use of space for military purposes. With its usual penchant for secrecy, Moscow has disclosed nothing of its own plans for anti-satellite (ASAT) or BMD systems. The Soviet leadership has, however, reacted frequently and with vituperation to the American decision to investigate a comprehensive ballistic missile defense, which Moscow appears to believe will involve space-based components, and has treated that program as a serious long-term threat. This harsh reaction to a US initiative still years from realization suggests both a strong concern about the ultimate impact of these plans on the strategic balance and a perceived opportunity for scoring propaganda points.

As in the case of INF, Andropov took the lead in presenting the Soviet case against the US initiative on BMD and warning of the allegedly destabilizing effects of US plans for space. Suggesting the importance Moscow attaches to the BMD question, Andropov replied with unusual speed and directness to Reagan's March 23, 1983, speech announcing US plans in this area.[41] Just four days later, in a *Pravda* interview, Andropov denounced the initiative as likely to fuel a "runaway" arms race and undermine the "entire process of limiting strategic arms." He contended that recognition of these dangers and of the "inseverable interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive weapons" had been the foundation of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, in which both sides acknowledged that "only mutual restraint" in ballistic missile defenses would allow progress in limiting and reducing offensive weapons.[42]

Andropov followed up this initial dramatization of the dangers implicit in American high-technology BMD plans with numerous other expressions of anxiety over the consequences for strategic stability. In April he used his interview with *Der Spiegel* to warn that these American plans were "planting a mine under the entire process of limiting strategic arms."[43] Two days later Andropov released a reply to a telegram from a group of prominent American proponents of banning weapons in space. In that reply he pledged "maximum effort" on the part of the Soviet Union to prevent the realization of "ominous plans for transferring the arms race into space."[44] In August Andropov returned to the BMD and ASAT issues during his final public appearance, a reception in Moscow for nine Democratic US senators.[45] Finally, in

[39] *Pravda*, Jan. 25, 1984.
[40] Ibid., Apr. 20, 1984.
[41] For Reagan's speech announcing plans for intensified research on BMD technologies, see *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 28, 1983, pp. 442–48. For a report on a presidential directive issued in early 1984 that purportedly carries these plans forward, see *The Washington Post*, Jan. 26, 1984.
[42] *Pravda*, Mar. 27, 1983.
[43] As published in ibid., Apr. 25, 1983.
[44] *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 27, 1983, p. AA/1; also *Pravda*, Apr. 29, 1983.
[45] *Pravda*, Aug. 19, 1983.

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his January 1984 interview with *Pravda,* he again warned that failure to prevent an arms race in space would confront mankind with a new threat of such dimensions that it "is even difficult to imagine now."[46]

Other Soviet leaders have expressed similar sentiments both before and after Andropov's death. The most notable came from Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov in a *Pravda* article last November, in which he turned his attention to space and BMD issues three times. Although other Soviet military spokesmen and media commentators had earlier explicitly alleged that President Reagan's initiative violated the 1972 ABM treaty, Ustinov was the first Politburo member to do so. The Defense Minister also charged that "this 'anti-missile decision' by R. Reagan is aimed at securing for the US militarists the ability to deliver a first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union with impunity."[47]

The only clues the Kremlin has offered thus far about its future military response to the new US program have been of the most general kind. Andropov's warning of a space arms race implies that the Soviet Union will be a major contender. Ustinov added his own vague threat, cautioning that if the United States failed to respond to Soviet appeals to ban space-based weapons, "then we will be unable to disregard US intentions to turn space into a war theater. . . ."[48]

Moscow's main overt response, however, has been a public campaign that appears primarily designed to discredit US plans and foster opposition abroad to the development and deployment of a large BMD system or other space weaponry. Obviously with Kremlin approval, Soviet scientists assumed an unusually prominent role in this campaign. In early April 1983, 243 scientists and public officials joined in issuing and publicizing a statement outlining the case against a comprehensive BMD. Pointing to the connection between offensive and defensive strategic weaponry, the statement, billed as an appeal to "scientists of the world," also explicitly and emphatically denied the technical feasibility of effectively defending against ballistic missile attack. In an assertion with equal rele-

[46]Ibid., Jan. 25, 1984.
[47]Ibid., Nov. 19, 1983.
[48]Ibid., Apr. 25 and Nov. 19, 1983.



Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko addresses the Conference on Disarmament in Europe convened in Stockholm in January 1984.

—Chip Hires/Gamma-Liaison.

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vance to both Soviet and US defense planners, the appeal claimed that there are "no effective defensive systems in nuclear war" and that the creation of such systems "is practically impossible."[49]

Building on the expressed skepticism of the Soviet scientific community about both the feasibility and the consequences of a major BMD program, Andropov later in April made two proposals: (1) that Soviet and American scientists specializing on arms control issues "meet and discuss the possible consequences of creating a large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense system" and (2) that agreement be reached "on prohibiting altogether the use of force both in space and from space in respect to the earth."[50] He expanded further on these proposals at his August 1983 meeting with the US senators. Outlining the proposals later presented by the USSR to the United Nations, Andropov said the Soviet Union sought complete prohibition of "the testing and deployment" of any space-based weapons capable of striking targets "on earth, in the air, or in space." He also asserted that the Soviet Union was prepared to eliminate existing anti-satellite systems, to prohibit development of new ones, and to pledge not to be the first to put into outer space any type of ASAT weapons.[51]

Although the wide publicity that the Kremlin accorded these proposals suggests a propaganda motive, they may also have a serious side. Some members of the Soviet defense establishment, increasingly anxious about the possibility that the United States might gain a large technical advantage, may be pushing hard for a larger commitment to match the program announced by President Reagan. One Soviet scientist, Yevgeniy Velikhov, who has been most outspoken in denying that a defense against massive nuclear attack can be devised, acknowledged the pressures within the Soviet Union if the United States commits its resources to BMD development. In an interview with the *Los Angeles Times* last July, Velikhov, a vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a prominent nuclear physicist, argued that however irrational from a military or economic point of view a "star wars" systems might be, "it's very difficult to resist if the United States spends half a trillion dollars for this crazy development." He explained that "our people will ask why the Americans, who are not stupid guys, are spending so much money on this business. They're going to say, 'We need to have something against it.' " And even if 90 percent of the Soviet scientific community said it was completely senseless to match the United States, he added, the other 10 percent would win if "the Americans spend a trillion."[52]

Other Arms Control Issues

Although the Soviet Union since Brezhnev's death has devoted the bulk of its attention on disarmament issues to the areas discussed above, other arms control issues have periodically been raised as well. The most important of these are the problem of verification of the various arms control agreements that have been proposed, an accord banning chemical weapons, and agreement on confidence-building measures.

On the issue of verification—crucial for any East-West arms control agreement—the Andropov regime was little inclined to go beyond its predecessor. Soviet leaders have for some time been aware of the great significance the United States and its allies attach to verification, and have sought both to grant the importance of this issue and to resist what the Soviets describe as unnecessary prying. Moscow's position on verification has ever so gradually evolved toward acknowledging the possibility of more intrusive methods, even while continuing to insist that national technical means are adequate for most verification tasks and that national sovereignty and legitimate state secrets should not be jeopardized.[53] This general Soviet approach has applied to all areas of arms control. Andropov maintained past Soviet practice in asserting (in April 1983) in sweeping terms that the Soviet Union was not opposed to verification and did not hinder agreements on that account. "Our policy on questions of verification," he said, "is a far-reaching one, right up to and including the establishment of general and complete verification when matters reach general and complete disarmament. We are against the turning of the problem of verification into a stumbling block at talks."[54]

But whatever the Soviet position in theory, in practice the post-Brezhnev Politburo has been publicly unenthusiastic about accepting new, more intrusive verification methods. Only at the MBFR negotiations and on the question of on-site inspection of the de-

[49]Ibid., Apr. 10, 1983.

[50]Ibid., Apr. 25, 1983.

[51]Ibid., Aug. 19, 1983. For evidence that this remains the Soviet position, see Gromyko's remarks in *Sovetskaya Byelorussiya* (Minsk), Feb. 28, 1984.

[52]*The Los Angeles Times*, July 24, 1983.

[53]Two of the clearer presentations of the Soviet position on verification in recent years were made by Brezhnev in *Pravda*, Nov. 3, 1981, and by R. Zheleznov in "Monitoring Arms Limitation Measures," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 7, 1982, pp. 75-84.

[54]*Pravda*, Apr. 25, 1983.

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struction of chemical weapons has Moscow gone beyond its previous position. Moreover, the Kremlin's aide memoire to the State Department (published in *Izvestiya* on January 30, 1984) listing alleged US violations of disarmament agreements hardly suggests that Moscow will respond with a more flexible and understanding posture to widely-publicized US charges of Soviet violations of various arms control accords. In a similar vein, Gromyko, addressing the opening session in Stockholm of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe that same month, obliquely referred to Western demands for rigorous verification of various military confidence-building measures as attempts "to look for a crack in the fence to peep at one's neighbors."[55]

On the question of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has defined its public position in three proposals: (1) a draft treaty banning chemical weapons worldwide presented at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, (2) a Warsaw Pact proposal submitted to the NATO countries in January 1984 concerning the elimination of chemical weapons in Europe, and (3) a proposal made in February 1984 to the 40-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva indicating Moscow's willingness to allow continuous on-site inspection of the destruction of its acknowledged stockpile of chemical weapons.[56] Despite the Soviet movement toward the Western position, this last concession appears to have little chance of producing an agreement, since other key areas remain at issue—among them a major loophole in verification procedures. Under the Soviet plan each country participating in the agreement would still have to agree *voluntarily* to international inspection when suspected of possessing unacknowledged stockpiles or committing other violations of an agreement, including the ban on manufacture of chemical weapons. And although Chernenko, in his speech on March 2, 1984, declared that the "prerequisites" for a solution to this question "are beginning to ripen," the Soviet response to the new US chemical weapons proposal (presented by Vice President George Bush on April 18, 1984, in Geneva to the Disarmament Conference) has been implacably negative.[57]

On confidence-building measures, though Moscow has often expressed an interest in expanding the steps incorporated in the 1975 Helsinki agreement, its current posture leaves unclear how willing it is to address the specifics of this issue. At the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe in January 1984, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko seemed more interested in pressing his case against US policies than in striving for mutually acceptable agreements. The proposals he presented on behalf of the USSR were in fact merely recycled Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals: to outlaw the first use of both nuclear and conventional forces, to create zones free of nuclear weapons in "various parts" of Europe, to reduce military spending, and to expand procedures for prior notification of major ground, air, and naval exercises.[58] While Gromykyo's approach to confidence-building measures was hardly forthcoming, these measures are one area where early progress toward agreement seems possible—if for no other reason than that any accords would be extremely narrow and would seem to be in the interest of all sides.

Conclusion

Given Soviet historical experience and the constraints on Soviet economic resources, there is little reason to doubt that Moscow's current leaders, like Brezhnev and Andropov before them, genuinely desire arms control agreements. The real question for the post-Andropov leadership is not whether to have arms accords but rather at what price. The unmistakable indications from the brief period of Andropov's reign are that the Kremlin feels the price asked by the current US Administration is too high, and that while adjustments have been made in US proposals, these have not altered what Moscow considers an attempt to force the Soviet Union into highly disadvantageous agreements.

Apparently convinced that under these circumstances it had less to gain by courting the White House than by appealing to opponents (and potential opponents) of current US defense and arms control policy, the Kremlin under Andropov steadily increased its wager on frustrating NATO missile deployments in Europe. It put its efforts into trying—both by persuasion and by intimidation—to convince the West Europeans that they should refuse these new missiles, and that the Reagan Administration was an unreasonable

[55] Chernenko less forcefully reaffirmed the impression of inflexibility on verification issues in his *Pravda* interview on April 9, contending that the United States "drags out" the question of verification "whenever it does not want an agreement."

[56] *Izvestiya*, June 19, 1982, and Jan. 11, 1984; *Pravda*, Feb. 22, 1984; *The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1984. The proposal for eliminating chemical weapons in Europe had been foreshadowed in the Warsaw Pact's "Political Declaration" of January 1983. *Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1983.

[57] *Pravda*, Mar. 3, 1984. For examples of the Soviet assessment of the new US chemical weapons proposal, see *Pravda*, Apr. 21 and *Izvestiya*, Apr. 17 and 21, 1984. For Chernenko's recent remarks on banning chemical weapons, see *Pravda* Mar. 3 and Apr. 9, 1984.

[58] Ibid., Jan. 19, 1984. For an example of previous Soviet formulations on confidence-building measures, see Brezhnev's speech to the 26th CPSU Congress, in ibid., Feb. 24, 1981.

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negotiating partner bent on a fanatical crusade against Soviet communism. But Moscow's strategy has proven itself highly questionable at best; the initial Pershing II and cruise missiles are now in place. The Soviet leadership thus faces the need to reevaluate the fundamentals of its strategy.

How that strategy might change is far more difficult to predict than how it is likely to remain the same. It is most improbable, for example, that Moscow will concede one inch of its claim to parity with the United States, something in which Soviet citizens high and low appear to take some pride. Indeed, a Soviet perception that Washington is now disdainful of the Soviet claim to equality with the United States appears to be a significant irritant to Moscow's foreign policy establishment. The debate in Moscow is more likely to be about whether the approach to relations with Washington has been forceful, imaginative, or flexible enough. Naturally, these questions are not openly debated by the leadership, but there have been recurrent signs over the past year and a half that some differences exist among those in a position to offer advice to the Kremlin on the future of Soviet policy toward the United States. And policy toward the United States, especially in the present period of strained relations, amounts primarily to arms control policy.

Soviet commentators with current or past connections to the leadership (such as Fëdor Burlatskiy, Aleksandr Bovin, and Georgiy Arbatov) have all touched on the issue of whether the Reagan Administration represents the future or the past of America, implicitly raising the question of whether or not Moscow needs to revise its strategy. Although, predictably, they have justified the conclusion that Soviet détente policy has a long future, it is clear that they are confronting real doubts about the adequacy of current Soviet policy and genuine popular fears of nuclear war generated by the overblown rhetoric of Moscow's propaganda apparatus. In an article written in late 1982, Bovin acknowledged that a "skeptic" was "bound to ask" a whole series of questions that in effect cast doubt on the fundamental assumptions of Soviet policy: whether the Soviet Union was "overestimating" its strength, whether international security and cooperation could be expected in a world divided into two hostile camps, and whether "the Reagan phenomenon" was an accident.[59] More recently, Burlatskiy, in his capacity as political observer for *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, addressed a similar series of queries from Soviet readers, including one who asked whether "the present militarist course in the United States is irreversible" and in place for "the foreseeable long-term future," and another who questioned the viability of peaceful coexistence itself.[60] How prevalent these doubts are among policymakers and what their potential is for bringing about changes in Soviet policy remain, of course, open questions.

What then does the future seem likely to bring in Soviet arms control policy? In the long term, it seems highly probable that Moscow's interest in avoiding nuclear war and engaging the United States in negotiations on major bilateral disarmament issues will bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table. Soviet leaders continue to express their unwavering commitment to negotiations on nuclear arms as a top priority, even as they insist that such talks must meet certain preconditions (for instance, that they be intended for "serious" rather than public relations purposes). Gromkyo, in his election speech in Minsk on February 27, 1984, for example, asserted that the Soviet Union has always believed that negotiations, including those on the reduction of nuclear weapons, are a "necessary and indispensable matter."[61] Moreover, despite Moscow's unvarying assertions that it cannot be pressured into talks or into increased negotiating flexibility, the Kremlin has in recent years demonstrated that its willingness to engage in negotiations and to alter its arms control policy is indeed affected by Western defense plans.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the record of negotiations on INF. Initially, it was NATO's movement at the end of the 1970's toward deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe that pushed Moscow toward the negotiating table. The Soviet Union had ignored the problem of European theater arms talks until November 1978, when, in response to mounting pressures in Western Europe for a NATO answer to the new Soviet SS-20's, Warsaw Pact leaders issued a declaration hinting vaguely at a willingness to talk about appropriate arms control arrangements.[62] Later, Moscow's interest in INF talks quickened as NATO's December 1979 decision approached. In October of that year, Brezhnev announced Soviet readiness to reduce unilaterally the number of missiles in the western USSR if NATO would forgo new INF deployments. A month later he proposed that negotiations start "without delay."[63] And even though Brezhnev in January 1980 declared that NATO's two-track decision on INF had made talks "impossible," by the summer of that year the Kremlin had reversed field and proposed

[59] *Izvestiya*, Nov. 5, 1982.

[60] *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 4, 1984, p. 15.

[61] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 28, 1984.

[62] *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1978.

[63] Ibid., Oct. 7 and Nov. 6, 1979.

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beginning negotiations on these nuclear systems.[64] The changes made by Andropov to the Soviet INF posture in 1983 also provide powerful support for the argument that Soviet policy is far from uninfluenced by Western defense plans. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that Soviet leaders at some time in the future will again see it in the interest of their country to return to the table and try to limit both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weaponry.

The short-term outlook is both less certain and less promising. In general, early indications from the Chernenko-led Kremlin are that it continues to be ill-disposed toward any gestures that might break the ice in East-West relations. Although the leadership is leaving its options open for a return to negotiation, it is giving no encouragement to the idea that bilateral talks with Washington are about to be resumed, much less that a breakthrough may be imminent.

Of the major arms control issues, the least likely for near-term Soviet flexibility, judging by Soviet statements, is INF, followed closely by START, because it is on these talks that Moscow has most firmly staked out an uncompromising position. Also, as noted, the Kremlin is anxious to avoid having a resumption of negotiations on nuclear weaponry used to Reagan's political advantage. Gromkyo's late February speech in Minsk, for example, indicated great sensitivity to US electoral politics: "the candidate of the currently ruling Republican Party," according to the Soviet Foreign Minister, was concerned to attend to his foreign policy image lest Americans "vote for the other party's candidate"; and Moscow hoped the "pronouncements in favor of improving relations" coming from official Washington were "not the product of an election situation."[65]

Altogether, then, the Soviet leadership's future strategy on arms control remains far from clear. The dim outlines that have appeared since Andropov's death suggest a strategy of patient reassertion of past policy while awaiting Western concessions or a changed political climate in the United States. Within that framework, the Kremlin is apparently seeking to exert what pressure it can on Washington through public criticism of US policy and improved Soviet relations with Washington's major West European allies. Chernenko's election speech in Moscow on March 2 did hint at a possible shift in the Soviet approach to progress in East-West arms control. The speech gave more than usual prominence to some of the less contentious arms control issues—such as nuclear test ban treaties, nuclear nonproliferation, and confidence-building measures. In so doing, Chernenko raised the faint possibility that Moscow might be moving toward a strategy of seeking to resolve lesser disarmament problems, as a step toward progress on the more significant and more difficult ones. But recent Soviet leadership statements, including those of the General Secretary, and Moscow's negative response to Western MBFR and chemical weapons proposals offer no reinforcement for a more flexible Soviet approach.

[64] Ibid., Jan. 13 and July 5, 1980.

[65] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 28, 1984.

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Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine

By James E. Mace

After the harvest of 1932, millions of Ukrainians starved to death in one of the world's most fertile regions. The local population had produced enough food to feed itself, but the state had seized it, thereby creating a famine by an act of policy. The areas affected were demarcated by internal administrative borders in the Soviet Union, leaving immediately adjoining areas virtually untouched. Thus, the famine appears to have been geographically focused for political reasons. Since it coincided with far-reaching changes in Soviet nationality policy, and since the areas affected were inhabited by groups most resistant to the new policy, the famine seemed to represent a means used by Stalin to impose a "final solution" on the most pressing nationality problem in the Soviet Union. According to internationally accepted definitions, this constitutes an act of genocide.[1]

Information About the Famine

Once an event of this magnitude fades from public consciousness, official efforts to deny that it had occurred are reinforced by a human tendency to disbelieve that such a thing could ever have happened. For this reason, it is necessary to sketch briefly what we know about the famine and how we know it.

The most obvious source for what happened is the memory of those who survived the famine. Eyewitnesses to any event of half a century ago become fewer in number with each passing year, but there are still hundreds, perhaps thousands, of them living in the West. A few managed to flee across the Prut River into Romania at the height of the famine, but most left the Soviet Union during World War II. Soon after the war, they formed organizations which published their testimony in their native Ukrainian or still imperfect English.[2] Others were interviewed as part of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project.[3] Still others published individual accounts. Most, of course, remained silent.

There are also individuals who may broadly be classified as perpetrators of the famine, and who have told their story in print. Lev Kopelev was a young communist who was sent into the Ukrainian countryside to procure grain in 1933, and he has written with regret about those whom in his youthful enthusiasm for the communist system he condemned to death by starvation.[4] Victor Kravchenko, a Soviet trade official who defected at the end of the war, has also written about what he did and witnessed as a young Ukrainian com-

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[1]The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the Soviet Union signed in 1954, defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such" by the following means, among others:

- Killing members of the group.
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

See Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, Eds., *The Human Rights Reader,* New York, New American Library, 1979, pp. 201–02.

[2]The largest collection of this type was published by DOBRUS, a Ukrainian acronym for the Democratic Association of Ukrainians Formerly Repressed by the Soviets, *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book,* Toronto/Detroit, DOBRUS, 1955. Other sources of various types are analyzed in Dana Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932–34," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), No. 3, 1964, pp. 250–84, and No. 4, 1965, pp. 471–74. The best bibliography is by Alexandra Pidhaina, "A Bibliography of the Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933," *The New Review: A Journal of East European History* (Toronto), No. 4, 1973, pp. 32–68.

[3]The files of this project, which include transcripts of interviews with famine survivors, are housed at Harvard University.

[4]Lev Kopelev, *The Education of a True Believer,* New York, Harper and Row, 1980, pp. 224–86.

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munist.[5] Nikita Khrushchev, who was not in Ukraine at the time, remembered how he learned about it:

Mikoyan told me that Comrade Demchenko, who was then First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, once came to see him in Moscow. Here's what Demchenko said: "Anastas Ivanovich, does Comrade Stalin—for that matter, does anyone in the Politburo—know what's happening in the Ukraine? Well, if not, I'll give you some idea. A train recently pulled into Kiev loaded with the corpses of people who had starved to death. It picked up corpses all the way from Poltava to Kiev. . . .[6]

As we shall see, Stalin knew perfectly well what was happening. He had ample warnings that a famine would result if his policies were carried out, and received continuous appeals to change the policies once the famine had started.

A number of foreign journalists reported the famine, among them Malcolm Muggeridge of the *Manchester Guardian,* William Henry Chamberlin of *The Christian Science Monitor,* Eugene Lyons of United Press, and Harry Lang of the Jewish daily *Der Forvert.*[7] Others, most notably Walter Duranty of *The New York Times* and Louis Fischer of *The New Republic,* seemed to have been perfectly aware of it, but actively aided the Soviet state in suppressing the story.[8]

Soviet historiography sporadically refers to the famine by using euphemisms such as "a severe shortfall of edible produce," caused partially by the "incorrect planning of the grain procurements campaign."[9] In the Soviet Union, what purports to be fiction is often more forthright than what purports to be history. Ivan Stadnyuk, a recipient of a Lenin Prize whose fiction portrays Stalin in a relatively positive light, wrote about the famine in a 1962 novel called *People Are Not Angels.* Set in Vynnytsya oblast near what was then the Soviet border with Poland, this work gives the following eloquently simple description:

The first to die from hunger were the men. Later on the children. And last of all, the women. But before they died, people often lost their senses and ceased to be human beings.[10]

Demography can aid us in deriving approximate numbers of those who died. Sergey Maksudov has demonstrated that at least 9.1 million people in the Soviet Union died prematurely between 1926 and 1939, that 8.5 million of them died before 1935 (i.e., during the period of collectivization and famine), and that 4.5 million died in the Ukrainian SSR.[11] Since his analysis assumes the absolute accuracy of the 1939 census and does not take into account the effects of interrepublic migration, the figure for the Ukrainian SSR probably underestimates the loss of life suffered there, by not making allowances for the policy of resettling villages depopulated by the famine in the Ukrainian SSR with villagers from other republics.[12]

A more accurate estimate of Ukrainian population loss can be derived by examining the 1926 and 1939 censuses on the basis of nationality, since the new settlers were not ethnic Ukrainians. In the 1926 census, the USSR contained 31.2 million Ukrainians, while the 1939 census lists only 28.1 million, an absolute decline of 9.9 percent or 3.1 million individuals.[13] On the basis of official Soviet administrative estimates of the natural rate of population growth for the Ukrainian SSR up to 1931, we can project a probable Ukrainian population total of 34,165,000 on the eve of the famine (1931).[14] Yet, because Ukrainians were concentrated in the countryside, where the natural

[5]Victor Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official,* New York, Scribners, 1946, pp. 91–131.

[6]Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers,* tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown, 1970, p. 74.

[7]Malcolm Muggeridge, *Winter in Moscow,* Boston, Little, Brown, 1934, pp. 39–57. 150 et passim; idem, *Chronicles of Wasted Time. One: The Green Stick,* New York, William Morrow, 1973, pp. 205–76; William Henry Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age,* Boston, Little, Brown, 1934, pp. 367–69. 377–78; Eugene Lyons, *Assignment in Utopia,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1937, pp. 488–93, 572–80. English translations of Harry Lang's reports were published in *The New York Evening Journal,* Apr. 15–23, 1935.

[8]James William Crowl, *Angels in Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in Soviet Russia, 1917 to 1937, A Case Study of Louis Fischer and Walter Duranty,* Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1982, pp. 133–80; Marco Carynnyk, "The Famine the 'Times' Couldn't Find," *Commentary* (New York), November 1983, pp. 32–40; and Myron B. Kuropas, "America's 'Red Decade' and the Great Famine Cover-Up," *The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust,* Jersey City, NJ, Svoboda Press, 1983, pp. 38–45.

[9]*Istoriya selyanstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (A History of the Peasantry in the Ukrainian SSR), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1967, Vol. 2, p. 175.

[10]For an English translation, see Ivan F. Stadnyuk, *People are not Angels,* tr. by P. A. Spaulding and J. Antonenko. London, Mono Press, 1963, p. 119. First published in Russian in *Neva* (Leningrad), December 1962.

[11]S. Maksudov, "Losses Suffered by the Population of the USSR in 1918–1958," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* (Paris), No. 3, 1977, p. 235; idem, "Population Loss in Ukraine, 1926–1938," unpublished paper, University of Alberta, 1983.

[12]Numerous eyewitness accounts of such resettlement are confirmed by a document in the Smolensk archive, ordering local officials to recruit settlers for this purpose. See Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule,* New York, Vintage Books, 1958, p. 444.

[13]Figures on the ethnic composition of the USSR are taken from a table in V. I. Kozlov, *National'nosti SSSR (Etnodemograficheskiy obzor)* (Nationalities of the USSR [Ethnodemographic Overview]), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, p. 249.

[14]The rate of natural growth of the population in the Ukrainian SSR was 2.4 percent in 1926, 2.25 percent in 1927, 2.15 percent in 1928, 1.77 percent in 1929, 1.56 percent in 1930, and 1.45 percent in 1931. See V. I. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad naselennya Ukrainskoi RSR: Statystyko-kartohrafichne doslidzhennya* (The Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR: Statistical-Geographical Analysis), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1965, p. 84.

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rate of population growth was higher at the time, this is a conservative estimate.[15] We may then project back from the 1939 figure to ask how many Ukrainians would have had to have been alive in 1934 to result in 28.1 million half a decade later. Since the natural rate of population growth was declining up to 1931 (when it reached a low point of 1.45 percent annually) and we lack similar statistics for the later 1930's, we have little choice but to project back from the natural rate of population growth observed for Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR in 1958–59 (1.39 percent), which gives us a 1934 population estimate of 26,211,000.[16] If we subtract our estimate of the post-famine population from the pre-famine population, the difference is 7,954,000, which can be taken as an estimate of the number of Ukrainians who died before their time. Again, this is a conservative estimate because it assumes that no one was born in the years 1932 or 1933. From this figure one must subtract victims of unnatural deaths not related to the famine. Some 200,000 farms in the Ukrainian SSR were "dekulakized." Estimating five persons per family on average, this makes for a total of 1,000,000 individuals of whom perhaps 250,000 were either executed or died in the harsh conditions of exile.[17] Let us assume that another quarter of a million Ukrainians were executed or died in exile in 1936–39. This still leaves almost 7.5 million Ukrainians who died in the famine.

This is only a rough estimate. The figure might be lower, because some persons who were counted as Ukrainian in the 1926 census could have been listed as Russian in 1939. It could also be significantly higher, because the circumstances surrounding the 1939 census indicate that its figures were inflated. A

[15]On rates of natural growth of the rural population, see ibid.

[16]The 1.39 percent figure was taken from ibid., p. 85.

[17]The number of dekulakized families is taken from *Komunist* (Kharkiv), Dec. 21, 1934. I. I. Slyn'ko states that as of Mar. 10, 1930, in 309 rayons of the Ukrainian SSR, 11,374 families consisting of 52,660 individuals had been exiled as kulaks. See his *Sotsialistychna perebudova i tekhnichna rekonstruktsiya sil's'koho hospodarstva Ukrainy, 1927–1932 rr.* (The Socialist Transformation and Technical Reconstruction of Agriculture in Ukraine, 1927–1932), Kiev, Akademiya Nauk Ukrains'koi RSR, 1961, p. 190. These fragmentary figures from the first wave of dekulakization show an average of just under five persons per exiled family. Eyewitnesses maintain that about 25 percent of those exiled perished.

Frozen bodies of the starved at a Kharkiv cemetery in 1933.

—From Stephen Oleskiw, *The Agony of a Nation*, London, Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., 1983, p. 56.

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census was taken in 1937, but it was never published. Instead, an announcement was made that the officials in charge of preparing the census were participants in a plot to discredit the progress of socialism by deliberately undercounting the Soviet population.[18] Since the census officials were shot for not finding enough people in 1937, we may safely assume that their successors made every effort to avoid any perception that their own work suffered from similar shortcomings.

Another way to estimate the famine losses is to compare the Ukrainians' demographic fate with that of the Byelorussians—a closely related nation that had a somewhat lower rate of natural population growth before 1931; went through similar political campaigns against "bourgeois nationalism" and similar pressures to assimilate; and had a lower level of literacy and weaker traditions of national self-assertion, which might have made them more prone to assimilation. However, Byelorussia did not go through the famine, and the number of Byelorussians in the USSR increased 11.5 percent in the time that the number of Ukrainians decreased by 9.9 percent. If Ukrainian population growth had matched that of their Byelorussian neighbors—and by every indication it would have surpassed that of Byelorussia but for the famine—there would have been almost 6.7 million more Ukrainians in the Soviet Union in 1939 than were recorded.

Census data is also helpful in tracing the geography of the famine. Maksudov has shown how this could be done on the basis of the 1959 census. Since birthrates decline and infant mortality soars during a famine, we have clear evidence of extraordinary mortality in areas where the number of rural women (the least mobile segment of the population) is exceptionally small in age groups born immediately before or during the famine. Since the 1959 census provides age data for five-year periods, this yardstick can only provide information about areas where mortality was exceptionally high from the beginning of forced collectivization through the famine, that is, for the years 1929–1933. Areas that show evidence of high mortality in this period are Ukraine, the then heavily Ukrainian and Cossack North Caucasus kray, Kazakhstan, some areas of the Volga basin, and parts of Western Siberia, where collectivization was carried out in a particularly harsh manner.[19] If we exclude areas where mass mortality can be attributed to the years before 1932 (Kazakhstan and Western Siberia), we are left with areas containing Ukrainians, Cossacks, and Germans, the last being affected somewhat less than the two others.[20] What is particularly striking is the sharp contrast between contiguous oblasts along the border between Ukraine and Russia proper. For example, Kharkiv oblast on the Ukrainian side of the border shows demographic evidence of being one of the most devastated areas, while Belgorod oblast, contiguous to it on the Russian side, shows no evidence of exceptional mortality. Both oblasts have the same sort of farming and weather, while the cities of Kharkiv and Belgorod are only about 35 kilometers apart. The fact that one was affected and the other was not can only be attributed to a deliberate policy to concentrate the famine geographically for political ends.

The State and National Communism

A key to understanding the geography and motive of the famine is to recall events that took place immediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power. During the 1918 German occupation of Ukraine, even Mennonite German communities welcomed their conationals and provided volunteers to fight the Bolsheviks, despite old pacifist traditions. (Later, in 1941, the Volga Germans as well as those in Ukraine were deported en masse as a possible security threat.) The Cossacks attempted to establish a separate state under General Alexey Kaledin and later provided the most important base for the anticommunist forces of Anton Denikin. The Ukrainians not only formed their own nation-state but—after their military defeat and incorporation into the USSR—became what Poland would become in the Soviet bloc after World War II: that part of the larger entity that was most conscious of its national distinctiveness, most assertive of its prerogatives, and least willing to follow Moscow's model in arranging its own affairs. Not coincidentally, it was the territories inhabited by Ukrainians, Cossacks, and Germans that were affected by the famine in 1933.

[18] *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 26, 1937. See also Boris Souvarine, *Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1939, p. 669; and Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny*, New York, Harper and Row, 1981, pp. 205–09.

[19] S. Maksudov, "Geography of the Famine of 1933," *SSSR: Vnutrenyye protivorechiya* (New York), No. 7, 1983, p. 5–17.

[20] On mass starvation in Kazakhstan, which began around 1930 but continued until virtually the end of the decade, see Martha Brill Olcott, "The Collectivization Drive in Kazakhstan," *Russian Review* (Stanford, CA), No. 2, 1981, pp. 136–37. Western Siberia was an area where Stalin personally supervised the initial collectivization drive, which was notorious for its brutality. Along the Volga the dead seem at least to have had coffins, whereas mass graves were widespread in Ukraine, indicating differing magnitudes of mortality for the two areas. See the brief account of Mikhail Alekseyev, "Sower and Protector," *Nash sovremennik* (Moscow), No. 9, 1972, p. 96.

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In order to understand the function that this famine performed in Soviet history, it is first necessary to comprehend that the Soviet leadership perceived an additional link between nationalism and the peasantry in the so-called borderlands *(okrainy)* outside ethnic Russia. Stalin wrote: "The nationality question is *in the essence of the matter* a question of the peasantry."[21] Like much else in Stalin's writings, the aphoristic form encapsulates a commonplace idea. As early as the 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in March 1919, the nationality question was discussed as an aspect of the regime's relationship with the peasantry.[22] Since the borderlands by and large consisted of Russian-speaking cities surrounded by non-Russian speaking villages, this was little more than a matter of simple observation. National resistance to Russian rule came primarily from the countryside, and coming to terms with non-Russian national aspirations meant of necessity coming to terms with the peasants who formed the mainstay of the national movements.

In Ukraine, the Soviet state was plagued by what the newspapers called "kulak banditism"—actually guerrilla bands of Ukrainian nationalists who harassed the Bolsheviks from rural areas. The Ukrainian national government, an anticommunist but thoroughly socialist people's republic *(Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika)*, had been pushed out from Ukrainian territory by the end of 1920, but thousands of individuals loyal to it continued to fight for independence.[23] Since the Soviet state proclaimed in Ukraine, as in other so-called borderlands, had been imposed by the Bolsheviks, and such support as it had came mainly from Russian or Russified urban dwellers, the Soviet state was viewed in the countryside as an occupation regime. As time went on, even the Bolsheviks came to realize this.

The wars of the Russian Revolution had ended in military victory and socio-political stalemate for the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks had attempted to impose a completely new structure on society from top to bottom, but their attempts to regiment society through the policy of War Communism had failed. Peasants would not join communes. Intellectuals who did not find themselves in complete accord with the party's views could not be immediately dispensed with by the Bolsheviks. Guerrilla fighters for national self-determination could not be defeated as easily as conventional forces.

Lenin realized that a period of respite, a domestic equivalent to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, was necessary for the survival of his government. In 1921 he proclaimed the New Economic Policy, designed to appease the peasantry by replacing forced requisitions of foodstuffs with a tax in kind and allowing the peasants to sell their surplus produce on a free market. Peasants were assured that they had secure tenure on their individual farms. Intellectuals were allowed to express themselves quite freely, as long as they were not openly disloyal. With regard to the nationalities, a policy more attuned to their national aspirations was introduced.

In 1923, the 12th Party Congress formally adopted the policy of *korenizatsiya,* which literally means "taking root," but whose meaning is better conveyed by the word "indigenization." Ukrainization, the Ukrainian version of korenizatsiya, was designed to give the Soviet Ukrainian state a veneer of national legitimacy by actively recruiting Ukrainians into the party and state apparats, switching official business to the Ukrainian language, and supporting Ukrainian cultural activities.[24]

Ukrainization went much further than comparable policies elsewhere in the USSR, further than Moscow evidently ever intended. Prominent Ukrainian socialists were invited to return from exile. Many did, including Ukraine's ex-president Mykhaylo Hrushevsky. In 1924, the Declaration of the Sixty-Six, among whose signatories were former cabinet ministers of the Petlyura government, pledged loyalty to the Soviet state on the grounds that Ukrainians had always been an oppressed people with a natural affinity for socialism and that it was only early Bolshevik hostility toward Ukrainian culture and aspirations that had prevented Ukrainians from cooperating with the Soviet state. Now that the Bolsheviks had repudiated their past errors, the declaration concluded, Ukrainians were willing to be loyal Soviet citizens.[25] The document had the character of a national covenant: those who felt themselves to be the natural leaders of the Ukrainian people declared their loyalty to communism on the grounds that this was compatible with loyalty to their nation.

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[21] I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol. 7, 1946, p. 72.

[22] František Silnický, *Natsional'naya politika KPSS v periode s 1917 po 1922 god* (The Nationality Policy of the CPSU from 1917 Through 1922), Munich, Suchasnist', 1978, pp. 196–97.

[23] As of April 1921, the Soviet government estimated that 102 armed bands were operating in Ukraine and the Crimea, each with from 20 to 800 men, in addition to Nestor Makhno's anarchist force of 10,000 to 15,000. O. O. Kucher, *Rozhrom zbroinoi vnutrishnoi kontrrevolyutsii na Ukraini u 1921–1923 rr.* (Destruction of the Armed Internal Counterrevolution in Ukraine in the Years 1921–1923), Kharkiv, Vydavnystvo Kharkivs'koho Universytetu, 1971, p. 18.

[24] See, for example, Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1917–1953*, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, pp. 56–90.

[25] *Visti VUTsVK* (Kharkiv), May 18, 1924.

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The Ukrainian intelligentsia made use of the relative freedom and state sponsorship of the 1920's by creating something like a golden age in Ukrainian letters, a period later called the "executed rebirth," *(rozstrilyane vidrodzhennya)* because of its abrupt and violent termination. What the party more prosaically called the "Ukrainian cultural process" posed a direct challenge to party legitimacy, and the issue of what to do about this development was one of the dominant political issues of the 1920's. Ukrainian communists, many only recently recruited from Ukrainian non-Bolshevik socialist parties, became prominent in official cultural life and extremely vocal in protesting the constraints on Ukraine's culture imposed by its association with Russia.

Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, the most popular Ukrainian communist writer of the day, created a sensation by constructing a whole theory of national cultural liberation. He called on Ukrainians to develop a literature based on West European models. In order to do this, Khvyl'ovyi insisted that Ukrainian literature repudiate Russian culture and turn to West European culture, so that it could then promote an "Asiatic renaissance" by serving as a conduit transmitting the highest achievements of European culture to the rising colonial peoples of the East. Ukraine's Commissar of Education, Oleksander Shums'kyi, who had originally been leader of a Ukrainian revolutionary group that was admitted to the Bolshevik Party only in 1920, led a delegation of West Ukrainian Communists to Stalin in 1925, demanding that Ukrainization be speeded up and that the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine be headed by a Ukrainian. In 1928, another high official in the commissariat of education, Mykhaylo Volobuyev, argued that Soviet Ukraine was being exploited by the Soviet government in a manner virtually indistinguishable from prerevolutionary times; that its economic development was therefore being distorted; and that the only solution was for Soviet Ukraine to be given control over its economic resources and develop them in a relatively autarkic fashion.[26]

Although Stalin personally insisted on the condemnation of such "national deviations" (and condemned they were), in 1927 he withdrew his personal satrap, Lazar Kaganovich, from Soviet Ukraine and left a relatively autonomous national communist leadership in charge. After Kaganovich was replaced as First Secretary of the CP(B)U by Stanislav Kossior, the real political strongman in the Ukrainian SSR became Shums'kyi's successor as commissar of education, Mykola Skrypnyk. As an Old Bolshevik who had been closely associated with Lenin—one of the few ethnic

A 1931 photo of Mykola Skrypnyk, Ukrainian party leader in the late 1920's and early 1930's, promoter of the policies of Ukrainization.

—From Iwan Koszeliwec's *Mykola Skrypnyk*, Munich, "Suchasnist'," 1972, p. 225.

Ukrainians to have such credentials—Skrypnyk was able to extend his authority over anything touching on the nationality question—which meant practically everything—in Ukraine. He became the chief advocate of his republic's national interests and chief defender of its prerogatives at Union councils. One of his first acts as education commissar was to chair an orthography conference, which brought together experts from Europe, Russia, and Ukraine, to standardize Ukrainian spelling and purge the language of Russianisms. He took it upon his office to satisfy the "cultural needs" of Ukrainians in Russia on the grounds that the Russian Soviet government was not devoting adequate resources to them. On one occasion, he stated that Russia's record in this area was so abysmal that it was giving political ammunition to the anticommunist Ukrainian nationalists in Polish-ruled Western Ukraine. In his view, the only solution was to transfer to the Soviet Ukrainian republic certain border areas of the Russian republic with Ukrainian majorities. In other words, a Soviet Ukrainian leader was demanding territorial concessions from Soviet Russia. His demands did not meet with success.[27]

[26] See my *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933*, Cambrige, MA, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983, pp. 86–191.

[27] Ibid., pp. 192–231.

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The period of Skrypnyk's dominance (1927–1933)—while marked by the same cultural restrictiveness characteristic of this period in Soviet history as a whole—was the high point of Ukrainization, to the extent that urban inhabitants who did not speak Ukrainian began to feel like foreigners in the cities where they had been born. Industrialization flooded the workplaces with Ukrainians from the countryside to a point where Ukrainians became an absolute majority in the industrial work force by 1930. Many daily newspapers switched from the Russian to the Ukrainian language. By early 1933, 88 percent of all factory newspapers were in Ukrainian. All university lectures had to be delivered in Ukrainian.[28] The original constituency of Soviet rule in Ukraine, the Russian and Russified urban dwellers, was being severely undermined.

Collectivization and Ukraine

Nevertheless, the state's relations with the Ukrainian countryside remained uneasy. For one thing, Soviet power there continued to depend largely on a barely changed reincarnation of the old committees of poor peasants (*kombyed,* renamed *komnezam* in 1930) abolished in the Russian SFSR before the end of the Civil War. In fact, the Ukrainian village *komnezam* was until the end of 1923 empowered to "dekulakize" villagers by seizing and redistributing (usually to *komnezam* members) any "surplus" land and property it wished. It retained state power in the village, often in the absence of a village soviet, until well into 1925. Kept in a sort of limbo thereafter, the *komnezam* returned to prominence when the state turned once again to compulsory grain collection after the 1927 harvest. Those who participated in these "procurements" were allowed to retain a share of the booty. The *komnezam* would also play an important supporting role in the collectivization and famine, but almost always under the leadership of an outsider. It was abolished only in 1933.[29]

Even at the height of the state's "honeymoon" with the countryside in the mid-1920's, there were occasional frank admissions that its few rural supporters were an isolated and despised minority. One high Soviet Ukrainian official addressed a group of village newspaper correspondents in 1926, openly sympathizing with the fact that they were a small minority whose lives were often made difficult by "kulaks" and even by state functionaries.[30]

In 1928–29, Stalin began his "socialist offensive," consisting in the abandonment of Lenin's New Economic Policy in favor of a crash program of rapid industrialization, forced collectivization of agriculture, and the subordination of all societal resources to this "socialist transformation." In many hastily collectivized villages, the kolkhoz meant only that implements and livestock were brought to the center of the village and dubbed "socialized property," while the peasants were told to plant and harvest as a group. This did nothing to raise output or benefit the rural population, but bringing the entire harvest to a common threshing room made it much easier for the state to "procure" a larger portion of the harvest. Collectivization was thus extractive, recognized by the peasants to be such, and could only be carried out as a program to subjugate the rural population in its entirety.

Ukrainization had tilted the ethnic balance of power toward the nation that was dominant in the countryside. This was a political necessity as long as the state felt that it needed to secure at least the tolerance of the countryside. Once the state felt strong enough to initiate the forced collectivization of agriculture, the political equation was radically altered.

The drive for the immediate and total collectivization of agriculture meant a return to civil war. Although the opposition remained leaderless and uncoordinated, Stalin himself admitted that this war was more difficult to fight than World War II.[31] It was a war of town against country, and, in Ukrainian terms, this implied a war of what remained of the non-Ukrainian city against the Ukrainian countryside. Once the state embarked upon this struggle, policies to placate the countryside became irrelevant.

Forced collectivization was carried out by means of dispatching individuals from the cities to the villages. There were various waves of this invasion, but the most important one was that of the "twenty-five thousanders," so called because of a 1929 decree authorizing the recruitment of 25,000 proletarian volunteers to help carry out collectivization. We do not have official figures on the national composition of those "thousanders" who worked in Ukraine, but the evidence suggests that relatively few were Ukrainians. Many—the Soviet sources do not give a precise figure

[28] Ibid.; and Bohdan Krawchenko, "The Impact of Ukrainization on the Social Structure of Ukraine," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Toronto), No. 3, 1980, pp. 338–57.

[29] For a lengthier discussion of this institution, see my "The *Komitety Nezamozhnykh Selyan* and the Structure of Soviet Rule in the Ukrainian Countryside, 1920–1933," *Soviet Studies*, No. 4, 1983, pp. 487–503.

[30] V. Zatonsky, *Leninovym shlyakhom* (On Lenin's Path), Kharkiv, Radyans'ke selo, 1926, p. 21.

[31] Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1950, p. 498.

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but indicate that the number was substantial—were sent from the Russian SFSR to Ukraine. Seventy-five hundred of those sent to the Ukrainian countryside were recruited locally, but since over 75 percent of them had been workers for over 12 years, this would indicate that few of them were Ukrainians.[32] Mass Ukrainian migration to the cities and factories was too recent a phenomenon, and most urban Ukrainians were undoubtedly still too close to their village origins to take part in a campaign to force the villagers to give up their private farms. This of necessity introduced an ethnic factor into the collectivization campaign in Ukraine. Meanwhile, official statements asserted that collectivization in Ukraine had a special task, namely, as the newspaper *Proletars'ka Pravda* put it on January 22, 1930, "to destroy the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism—individual peasant agriculture."[33]

Ukraine was designated as a priority area for collectivization, and the policy was carried out more rapidly there than in Russia, as the following figures show:

	Percentage of farms collectivized	
Date	Ukraine	Russia
December 1929	8.6	7.4
March 1930	65.0	59.0
Mid-1932	70.0	59.3

The trend continued. By 1935, 91.3 percent of all peasant farms in Ukraine were collectivized, while the 90 percent mark was not reached in Russia until late in 1937.[34]

Ukrainian peasants (like their Cossack counterparts) resisted collectivization with particular determination. Soviet Ukrainian historians record that the number of "registered kulak terrorist acts" (and any anti-Soviet act was by definition "kulak") grew fourfold from 1927 to 1929, with 1,262 such acts recorded for the latter year. In the first half of 1930, the number rose to over 1,500.[35] Later figures are unavailable, perhaps because the authorities could no longer keep count. The memoir literature is filled with accounts of killings of those enforcing collectivization. Instances where the women would forbid their men to fight and take it upon themselves to drive the local Soviet administration from the village became proverbial as "babas' revolts."

Collectivization provoked a crisis within the Communist Party of Ukraine and a rapid turnover of personnel. Newspapers carried daily denunciations of "opportunists" who failed to fulfill their tasks. Village communist organizations lost almost half their membership as a result of the 1929–30 purge, declining from an already weak 40,000 party members in January 1929 to 21,000 members a year later.[36] Between January 1930 and July 1932, 80 percent of rayon party secretaries were removed.[37] Since the vast majority of those purged were excluded because of opposition to or inadequate results in carrying out collectivization, it is logical to assume that the new raykom secretaries were chosen for their devotion to collectivization rather than for their loyalty to the Ukrainization policy and the Skrypnyk leadership. In short, collectivization not only undermined the political basis for Skrypnyk's policy; it also undermined his personal political base.

Politics of Hunger

When Skrypnyk turned 60 in January 1932, the official celebrations in the Ukrainian capital of Kharkiv rivalled those of the Stalin jubilee of 1929 in Moscow. For days the newspapers were filled with official biographies and expositions of his ideas. His picture was visible everywhere. Yet, his actual position was already extremely weak. Ukrainization had become secondary to the policy of collectivization. Some of his past actions had already been attacked implicitly by denouncing as nationalistic sabotage similar actions committed by others.[38]

The famine of 1932–33 came about primarily as a result of excessive grain procurements. Since the Ukrainian harvest of 1932 was better than that of the worst NEP year, it is clear that without the forced pro-

[32] I. F. Hanzha, I. I. Slyn'ko, and P. V. Shostak, "The Ukrainian Village on the Road to Socialism," in V. P. Danilov, Ed., *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khozyaystva v soyuznykh respublikakh* (An Outline History of the Collectivization of Agriculture in the Union Republics), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1963, p. 177.

[33] Quoted by F. Pigido, *Ukraina pid bolshevytskoyu okupatsiyeyu* (Ukraine Under Bolshevik Occupation), Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1956, p. 107.

[34] Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Causes of the 1932–1933 Famine," *Vpered: Ukrainskyi robitnychyi chasopys* (Munich), No. 10, 1958, p. 5.

[35] A. F. Chmyga, *Kolkhoznoye dvizheniye na Ukraine* (The Kolkhoz Movement in Ukraine), Moscow, Izd. Moskovkogo universiteta, 1974, p. 302; and O.M. Krykunenko, *Borotba Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy za zdiysnennya lenins'koho kooperatyvnoho planu* (The Struggle of the Ukrainian Communist Party for the Realization of the Leninist Cooperative Plan), Lviv, Vydavnytstvo L'vivs'koho Universytetu, 1970, p. 55.

[36] *Natsional'naya politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh* (The National Policy of the All-Union Communist Party [bolshevik] in Numbers), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1930, pp. 144–45.

[37] Myroslav Prokop, *Ukraina i Ukrains'ka polityka Moskvy* (Ukraine and Moscow's Ukrainian Policy), Munich, Suchasnist', 1981, p. 32.

[38] Most blatantly in the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine show trial, where evidence was fabricated in order to link Ukrainian purism in linguistics with treason to the Soviet state. Skrypnyk had been a vocal and public advocate of linguistic purism.

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curements of grain there would have been no starvation. The procurement quotas that were being imposed by Union authorities on Soviet Ukraine in conjunction with collectivization were clearly discriminatory. Thus, in 1930 the Union insisted that 7.7 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain be procured, a third of that year's exceptionally good 23 million ton harvest. By contrast, in 1926, the best year before collectivization and compulsory procurements, only 3.3 million tons had been acquired by the state, 21 percent of that year's harvest.[39] In 1931 the harvest was poorer than in 1930 because of the disorganization accompanying collectivization, a heat wave during the growing season, and hard rains at harvest time.[40] Thus, the 7.7 million ton quota could not be met from an 18.3 million ton harvest, in spite of tremendous pressure from Moscow.[41] Yet, fully seven million tons were ultimately collected. According to official Soviet statistics, the 1932 grain harvest in Soviet Ukraine was 14.4 million tons, which should still have been adequate to feed the population and livestock but which would have left few reserves. In spite of this, the high quotas were retained. Ultimately, only 3.7 million tons were actually procured, despite the draconian collection measures.[42]

The Ukrainian party leadership appealed for lower quotas to the delegates from Moscow at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference in July 1932. Kaganovich and Vyacheslav Molotov listened to one official after another tell of the hardships the quotas had caused. Kossior, Skrypnyk, and Panas Lyubchenko all told of villages where everything had been taken and where there was no longer anything to eat. Molotov responded that the quotas, which had already been lowered by 18 percent from the previous year (to 6.6 million tons), would remain in place, and the party conference duly included the figure in its resolution.[43] However, Ukrainian warnings about the dire consequences of what Kossior called the "mechanistic" enforcement of quotas, without regard for areas where the harvest had been poor, show that officials on the scene were giving Moscow ample warning of what was to come. When the predictions came true, officials on the scene pleaded for relief. For example, one obkom secretary told Stalin to his face that there was mass starvation.[44] Admiral Fyodor Raskolnikov, of the Black Sea Fleet, and General Yona Yakir, the commander of the Kiev Military District, both sent Stalin letters of protest.[45] Moscow was warned of the danger before the harvest and had accurate information throughout the famine.

Stalin's public response was to disbelieve the reports. Furthermore, the Soviet Union continued to export grain. Net Soviet grain exports during the famine years were 1.54 million tons in 1932 and 1.77 million tons in 1933.[46] These exports were possible only because of such measures as the law of August 7, 1932, which provided for the execution (or ten years' imprisonment in extenuating circumstances) of anyone caught pilfering collective farm property or encouraging others to leave the collective farms. Fully 20 percent of all cases in Soviet courts in 1932 were tried under this decree, and Stalin himself referred to it as "the basis of socialist legality at the present moment."[47]

The Ukrainian Soviet government adopted additional harsh measures. A November 1932 decree prohibited collective farms from creating any reserves or distributing any food to its members until the quota was met.[48] A decree of December 6, 1932, assigned an initial six villages to a "blacklist" *(chorna doshka)* subject to the following measures: 1) the immediate closing of state and cooperative stores, and the removal of all goods in them from the village; 2) a complete ban on all trade (including trade in essential commodities such as bread) by collective farms, collective farmers, and individual farmers; 3) the immediate halting and compulsory repayment of all credits and advances (including bread); 4) a thoroughgoing purge of local collective-farm, cooperative, and state apparatuses; and 5) the purge of all "foreign elements" and "saboteurs of the grain procurement campaign" from the collective farm.[49] On December 13 the blacklist was extended to 82 rayons, and at the same time a special system of local prosecutors was established to prosecute those held criminally responsible for nonfulfillment of the quotas.[50]

Portraits of village life during succeeding months emerge from the files of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, which was conducted during the early 1950's. It should be stressed that the inter-

[39]Holubnychy, loc. cit., p. 5.

[40]Slyn'ko, op. cit., pp. 286–88.

[41]See, for example, the lead editorial in *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1932, insisting Ukraine could and must liquidate its "backwardness" in procuring grain.

[42]Hanzha et al., loc. cit., p. 199.

[43]*Visti VUTsVK*, July 11–15, 1932.

[44]Roman Terekhov, who actually lived to write about this (See *Pravda*, May 26, 1964) was secretary of the Kharkiv obkom.

[45]Leonid Plyushch, *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, pp. 40–41.

[46]*Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1918–1940 gg.* (The Foreign Trade of the USSR for the Years 1918–1940), Moscow, Vneshtorgizdat, 1960, pp. 144, 360.

[47]Robert Conquest, Ed., *Agricultural Workers in the USSR*, London, Bodley Head, 1968, pp. 24–25.

[48]Slyn'ko, op. cit., p. 297.

[49]*Visti VUTsVK*, Dec. 8, 1932.

[50]Slyn'ko, op. cit., p. 298.

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viewers were not particularly interested in the famine and that the information was therefore given without any prompting while the respondents were relating their life experiences. One rather typical account (Case 128) is the following:

... there was the famine in the Ukraine in 1933. We saw people die in the streets; it was terrible to see a dead man, when I close my eyes I can still see him. We had in our village a small church which was closed for services and in which we played. And I remember a man who came in there; he lay down with his eyes wide open at the ceiling and he died there! He was an innocent victim of the Soviet regime; he was a simple worker and not even a kulak. This hunger was the result of Soviet policy.

Other accounts are more graphic, as this one by a Russian woman (Case 373):

Well, in 1933–34 I was a member of a commission sent out to inspect wells. We had to go to the country to see that the shafts of the wells were correctly installed, and there I saw such things as I had never seen before in my life. I saw villages that not only had no people, but not even any dogs and cats, and I remember one particular incident: we came to one village, and I don't think I will ever forget this. I will always see this picture before me. We opened the door of this miserable hut and there ... the man was lying. The mother and child already lay dead, and the father had taken the piece of meat from between the legs of his son and had died just like that. The stench was terrific, we couldn't stand it, and this was not the only time that I remember such incidents, there were other such incidents on our trip....

Nor were such horrors confined to the countryside. Cannibalism occurred even in the cities, as a worker (Case 513) described:

I remember a case in 1933. I was in Kiev. I was at that time at a bazaar—the bazaar was called the Bessarabian market. I saw a woman with a valise. She opened the valise and put her goods out for sale. Her goods consisted of jellied meat, frozen jellied meat, which she sold at fifty rubles a portion. I saw a man come over to her—a man who bore all the marks of starvation—he bought himself a portion and began eating. As he ate of his portion, he noticed that a human finger was imbedded in the jelly. He began shouting at the woman and began yelling at the top of his voice. People came running, gathered around her and then seeing what her food consisted of, took her to the militsia (police). At the militsia, two members of the NKVD went over to her and, instead of taking action against her, they burst out laughing. "What, what, you killed a kulak? Good for you!" And then they let her go.

The main victims, however, were not "kulaks," who had long since been exiled, or even the individual farmers, who were by then a minority. Figures cited at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference in July 1932 indicate that at that time 81 percent of all tilled land was either in collective farms or state farms and that over 70 percent of all farm families were in collectives.[51] This means that the majority of the victims were collective farmers.

The All-Union Central Committee weighed in with

[51] *Visti VUTsVK*, July 14, 1932.

Pavel Postyshev, a secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) who in March 1933 was elected second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party and who enforced Moscow's brutal policy of grain procurements in Ukraine.

—Cover photo of E. Yu. Rivosh's biography, *P. P. Postyshev*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1962.

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two decrees, on December 14, 1932, and January 24, 1933, the first demanding that Ukrainization be carried out "properly" and that "Petlyurists and bourgeois nationalists" be dispersed, the second declaring that Ukrainian authorities were guilty of laxity in failing to meet the procurement quotas. The January decree was tantamount to Moscow's taking direct control of the Ukrainian party apparatus by appointing Pavel Postyshev (a non-Ukrainian former obkom secretary who had been transferred to Moscow some years earlier) as second secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee and obkom secretary in Kharkiv; and by appointing new obkom secretaries in Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk. Ukrainian Commissar of supplies and Odessa obkom secretary Mikhail Mayorov, Dnipropetrovsk obkom secretary Vasiliy Stroganov, and Kharkiv and Donets obkom secretary Roman Terekhov, the second-tier officials who had protested the procurements most vigorously, were removed from their posts.[52] This meant placing Ukraine directly under Moscow's control through the person of Postyshev, who acted as Stalin's viceroy.

Postyshev immediately ruled out any aid to the countryside and even sent procurement brigades to seize what was left—mainly that part of the harvest that had been distributed to collective farmers. This could not have been large, because only 22.7 percent of the collective farms had distributed any grain whatsoever to their members.[53]

Demise of Ukrainization

While the published sections of the January decree referred only to the failure of the Ukrainian procurement campaign to meet its quota, Postyshev later indicated that the decree also dealt with nationality policy. Other Soviet officials never contradicted him on this. In any case, a campaign against an initially unidentified Ukrainian national deviation was begun, and it was conducted in a manner reminiscent of the campaign against a "right deviation" that had preceded attacks on Nikolay Bukharin in 1929. On February 28, 1933, a major government reshuffle was announced, transferring Skrypnyk from his post as commissar of education to that of deputy premier and head of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission.[54] On March 4, *Pravda* carried a self-critical letter from the leadership in Soviet Byelorussia, confessing to "errors in the nationality question." A few days later *Visti VUTsVK*, the daily newspaper of the Soviet Ukrainian government, published a lead editorial informing its readers that the Byelorussians' letter was relevant to Ukraine as well.[55] In late April a special conference on nationality policy was held under the sponsorship of the Ukrainian Central Committee and served as a forum for denouncing national deviations in educational and linguistic policy.[56] Clearly, a final assault against Skrypnyk was being prepared. This came at the Ukrainian Central Committee's June plenum. Skrypnyk's speech was never published, but according to accounts that leaked out, he denied that hitherto loyal communists were guilty of national deviation and of intentionally sabotaging the grain procurement campaign. He asserted that opposition was the inevitable consequence of the policies imposed by Moscow, the restrictions on Ukraine's autonomy, and the famine, for which he laid the blame squarely at Moscow's door.[57]

Postyshev's speech, on the other hand, was published under the telling headline: "We Are Mobilizing the Masses for the Immediate Delivery of Grain to the State." He defended the compulsory procurements policy and made it clear that it was Skrypnyk who had been the target of his campaign against "national deviations." He portrayed Skrypnyk as a leader of nationalist heretics, the protector of "nationalistic wreckers" responsible for the inadequate fulfillment of grain procurements. Interestingly, the only specific charge against Skrypnyk in Postyshev's stream of abuse was Skrypnyk's advocacy of orthographic changes tending to make Ukrainian spelling more distinct from Russian, something that "served only the annexationist designs of the Polish landlords."[58]

A few days later Skrypnyk's erstwhile colleagues joined in a rather unsavory competition in denunciations. Andriy Khvylya, the post-Skrypnyk deputy commissar of education, declared:

The fundamental cause of errors in the procurement of grain during the past year consists in the fact that many of Ukraine's party organizations did not exercise the requisite Bolshevik vigilance and uncompromising attitude toward hostile elements, which is rooted in the very fact that they sabotaged us at every turn of

[52] Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p. 135; "Decree of the CC of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) of January 24, 1933, and the Tasks of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy* (Kharkiv), No. 3, 1933, p. 3.

[53] Hanzha et al., loc. cit., p. 202.

[54] *Visti VUTsVK*, Mar. 1, 1933.

[55] Ibid., Mar. 11, 1933.

[56] Ibid., May 1, 1933.

[57] Ewald Ammende, *Human Life in Russia*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1936, pp. 122–23.

[58] *Visti VUTsVK*, June 22, 1933.

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our activity.... And our commissariat of education not only failed to expose wrecking, but, on the contrary, sheltered wrecking elements. Worse, the commissar himself ... Comrade Skrypnyk, made it possible for these elements to conceal their activities in linguistics....[59]

Panas Lyubchenko, then a secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee and destined to become head of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars within the year, linked Skrypnyk with the cultural "wrecking" exposed at the 1930 trial of members of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, and held him responsible for "kulak Ukrainian nationalist deviations" in linguistics, literature, literary scholarship, and historical writing.[60]

Skrypnyk, who committed suicide on July 6, 1933, was no longer alive when Nikolay Popov, a secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee since March 1933, linked the struggle to extract grain to the struggle against Skrypnyk, both apparently being equally necessary to transform Ukraine into a model Soviet republic:

The task of raising our agriculture cannot be accomplished unless we correct errors which have been permitted in the national question, unless we purge our party, our state, cultural, agricultural, collective-farm and other institutions of bourgeois nationalists, without mobilizing the entire party mass to fight nationalism, without strengthening our efforts to bring the masses up in the spirit of internationalism.... Bolshevik nationality policy, most intimately connected with all our party's tasks ... will be a mighty weapon for the consolidation of Soviet Ukraine as an indivisible part of the Soviet Union.... We face here and now the task of making Soviet Ukraine into a model Soviet republic.[61]

By then Postyshev had already set about making Soviet Ukraine a model Soviet republic. In March 1933, the Ukrainian deputy secretary of agriculture and 22 others were shot for alleged attempts to sabotage agriculture. Other alleged conspiracies were connected with the old revolutionary Ukrainian parties, the Poles, and the underground Ukrainian Military Organization in Western Ukraine.[62] Virtually all prominent communist dissenters from the past were arrested at this time in what became known as the "Postyshev terror." Arrests of writers became a wholesale process; and of the 259 Ukrainian writers whose works were published in Soviet Ukraine in 1930, only 36 had their works still printed after 1938.[63]

Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, a communist writer active in the Ukrainization of the 1920's and early 1930's; he committed suicide in May 1933 as a result of Moscow's policies of grain procurement and repression of Ukrainian intellectuals.

—Frontispiece of Vol. 2 of Khvyl'ovyi's collected works, *Tvory*, Ellicott City, MD, Smoloskyp, 1980.

Visible reminders of Ukraine's distinctiveness began to disappear. For example, Vasyl Ellan-Blakytny had been revered as a sort of founding saint of Ukrainian proletarian literature. His statue stood at a principal intersection in Kharkiv—until one day a truck ran into it. The statue was not replaced.[64] As

[59]Ibid., June 30, 1933.
[60]Ibid., July 7, 1933.
[61]M. M. Popov, "On Nationalist Deviations in the Ranks of the Ukrainian Party Organization and Tasks of Struggle with Them," *Chervonyi shlyakh* (Kharkiv), No. 7, 1933, pp. 110, 126.
[62]Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study in the Decade of Mass Terror, 1929–1939*, London, Atlantic Books, 1960, pp. 46, 85.
[63]Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainians*, London, Minority Rights Group, 1981, p. 8.
[64]Kostiuk, op. cit., p. 47.

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time passed, not only statues but also artistic and architectural monuments to the Ukrainian past either fell prey to trucks or were removed to make way for new projects, many of which never materialized.[65]

In the remaining months of 1933 many of the organizations and individuals that had been central to Ukraine's intellectual life in the 1920's simply disappeared. Linguists, fiction writers, historians, poets—virtually everyone who had anything to do with creating a distinctly Ukrainian cultural scene in the 1920's—disappeared. Ukrainization became a dead letter. Concessions to Ukrainian national identity came to an end.

Postscript

A changed ideology in the national sphere made itself felt in late 1934 with the publication of a decree denouncing the hitherto dominant Marxist historical school in Russia, the followers of M. N. Pokrovskiy, who had narrated Russian history as the history of an oppressive empire, a prison of peoples.[66] Instead, a new history of the USSR portrayed the extension of the Russian empire as a progressive process. Tsars were rehabilitated as state-builders. This interpretation was intended to be the basis for a new national ideology, Soviet patriotism, which held that national differences within the Soviet Union were secondary to the shared history and loyalty that united all Soviet citizens. A German scholar, in describing the new self-definition of the USSR, called it "a kind of *Reichsidee* for a new Soviet imperialism."[67] Others have likened it to the prerevolutionary slogan of "Russia one and indivisible."

Ideology mirrored politics. By the time the 1936 Soviet Constitution was adopted, the Soviet Union had become a state in which the administrative competence of its constituent republics had been sharply reduced and that of the Union greatly enlarged.[68] The ideology of Soviet patriotism dominated by Russian culture and centralism was in no small part a legacy of the Ukrainian famine. While the suppression of national self-assertion and the introduction of centralization were principal features of overall Soviet policy in the 1930's, the Ukrainians, as the largest and most self-assertive non-Russian nation, seemed to be singled out for special treatment. Only they had to suffer the loss of several million villagers to starvation in an artificially contrived famine. Placed in this context, the famine of 1933 makes sense as one of a series of policies designed to neutralize Ukrainians as a political factor, indeed, as a social organism in the Soviet Union. These policies entailed the destruction of the spiritual and cultural elites of Ukraine and the subordination of the Ukrainian structures to central ones; the destruction of the officially sanctioned Ukrainian Communist political leadership as a distinct force in Soviet politics (almost all of those who turned on Skrypnyk perished as well in the 1937–38 purges); the abandonment of Ukrainization and the gradual abolition of structures designed to prevent the assimilation of Ukrainians entering Russified urban and industrial environments; and a body blow against the main constituency of Ukrainian nationalism—the peasantry. In sum, one cannot understand the famine without understanding the turnabout in Soviet nationalities policy—from seeking to foster to seeking to absorb national cultures. By the same token, one cannot understand how this policy was imposed without reference to the famine. The famine must therefore be understood within the context of an attempt to impose a final solution on the "Ukrainian problem" as it had hitherto existed.

Nevertheless, the Soviet state never solved its "Ukrainian problem," which still haunts Soviet leaders. Stalin himself helped to undermine his policy by annexing Ukrainian territories from Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia during World War II. Western Ukraine never went through such devastation as the famine and related repressions of the 1930's, and it was inevitable that the traditional cross-fertilization of ideas between Western and Eastern Ukraine would flourish when the two parts became united. In the 1960's a dissident movement arose that included Ukrainians from all Ukrainian territories and combined demands for national and human rights, while even the Soviet Ukrainian government under Petro Shelest edged a little further away from Moscow for a brief moment. Shelest was removed and the dissidents were arrested. Yet, after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, a Helsinki Monitoring Group, similar to and connected with counterparts in other parts of the Soviet Union, was formed in Kiev. Attempts to

[65] Titus Hewryk, *The Lost Architecture of Kiev*, New York, The Ukrainian Museum, 1982; and B. Mikorsky, *Razrusheniye kul 'turno-istoricheskikh pamyatnikov v Kiyeve v 1934–1936 godakh* (Destruction of Cultural and Historical Monuments in Kiev in 1934–36), Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1951.

[66] A good selection of Pokrovskiy's works in translation, introduced by a useful exposition, is M. N. Pokrovskii, *Russia in World History: Selected Essays*, tr. and ed. by R. Szporluk, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1970.

[67] Erwin Oberländer, *Sowjetpatriotismus und Geschicthe: Dokumentation* (Soviet Patriotism and History: Documentation), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1967, p. 21.

[68] The process of increasing Union competence at the expense of Republic authority is traced by V. Sadovs'ky, *Natsional'na polityka Sovitv na Ukraini. Pratsi ukrains'koho naukovoho instytutu* (National Policy of the Soviets in Ukraine. Works of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute), vol. 39 (Warsaw, 1937), pp. 102–16.

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abolish the Ukrainian national churches have succeeded only in changing the official affiliation—not the spiritual essence—of Ukrainian Christianity.[69]

[69]The USSR banned the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1930 and the Uniate Catholic Church in 1946. One measure of the continued strength of the Ukrainian Catholics is the fact that the region of their traditional dominance, Western Ukraine, now contains one-fourth of all officially sanctioned Orthodox parishes in the USSR, which are kept open only to prevent a greater portion of the population from attending underground Uniate churches.

Only a few years ago there were Western scholars who argued that the USSR would assimilate the Ukrainians in a relatively brief period of time. No one makes such predictions today. It is difficult to see how the problem of the Soviet Union's non-Russian nations, having defied the most brutal attempts at solution, can ever be solved to the government's satisfaction.

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Notes & Views

Polish Stalemate

By Casimir Garnysz

IF POLAND today resembles the state depicted in George Orwell's *1984*, the resemblance is of a peculiar kind: a strong police state endowed with the most advanced means for suppressing civil unrest, yet a weak state, deeply afraid of its citizens; a state that can rule but cannot govern, and that has maneuvered itself into a spectacular civil-political stalemate.

The results of General Wojciech Jaruzelski's "state of war" have been mixed. He has won some important battles, but has also suffered serious defeats. As admitted even by some members of the Government Commission on Economic Reform, Poland's economy remains in critical condition: constant modification of rules and regulations creates chaos in economic management and increases its inefficiency; a virtual freeze on investment is bringing about a progressive industrial decapitalization; the gap between supply and demand in the consumer market remains as wide as ever.[1] The bulk of society regards communist rule as illegitimate and responds to it with sullen foot-dragging. Although Solidarity has been de-legalized and its strikes and street demonstrations crushed, numerous Solidarity activities continue underground. In all probability, Poland's economic problems cannot be resolved unless the system is reformed politically. The behavior of the Poles during the Pope's visit in June 1983 gave a spectacular confirmation to Solidarity's fundamental message that there can be no economic turnaround without the ruling party granting to society a Magna Charta—an honest and binding agreement to establish a system of moderate political pluralism, with the freedoms of speech and press restored and legally guaranteed. In the unlikely event of such an agreement, the Polish crisis would subside; without it, a crisis will begin anew, perhaps in an even more virulent form. Thus the problems facing the group known to Polish society as the "owners of People's Poland" are serious and their resolution remains a cliffhanger. In order to resolve the crisis, Poland's rulers have resorted to a variety of means. The forcible methods of pacifying the population have been detailed elsewhere.[2] This essay will instead focus on the attempt of the Jaruzelski regime to gain popular support through control and manipulation of public opinion.

DURING 1982, General Jaruzelski's government repeatedly applied a "torture of hope" to Polish society. Thus, on May 3, the anniversary of the 1791 Polish Constitution, General Jaruzelski delivered a speech in Parliament, which hinted that the state of war was about to be lifted and that political prisoners were soon to be released. His call was for "reconciliation." Yet virtually at the same time the ZOMO riot squads started beating up casual pedestrians, people in side-

[1] For evaluations of the Polish economy, see the report of the Government Commission on Economic Reform, *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), Feb. 22, 1984; a report from a conference of the Institute of Organization and Management, Tomasz Jezioranski, "Two years of Economic Reform," *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), Jan. 22, 1984; a discussion organized by the journals *Veto* and *Polityka* on the state of the economic reform, in *Polityka* (Warsaw), Jan. 7, 1984; and Marek Misiak, "The Economy in 1983: At the Beginning of the Road," *Zycie Gospodarcze*, Jan. 22, 1984 (based on reports of the Statistical Bureau).

Casimir Garnysz is the pen name of a Polish social scientist now teaching at a major university in the United States.

[2] On the hard methods of repression used by the Jaruzelski government, see the reports in *Biuletyn Informacyjny* published since the beginning of 1982 by the Committee in Support of Solidarity, New York. See also "Military Penal Camps," in "Poland Under Jaruzelski—Part II," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1982, pp. 69–70; Tomasz Mianowicz, "The Department of Disinformation at Work," in "Poland Under Jaruzelski—Part I," *Survey*, Summer 1982, pp. 36–42; Michal Kolodziej, "The Universities under Martial Law," in "Poland Under Jaruzelski—Part I," pp. 47–52; Hanna Filipowicz, "From Solidarity to Arts Control," in "Poland Under Jaruzelski—Part II," pp. 13–26; and Alina Perth-Grabowska, "Forgeries, Composite Photographs, Denunciations and Disinformation," *Studium Papers* (Ann Arbor, MI), January 1984, pp. 26–30.

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walk cafes, the old, and students.[3] Toward the end of June, all women were released from internment camps, and rumors emanated from the party and government that on July 22 (a state holiday commemorating the establishment of the communist government in 1944) the state of war would be softened or abrogated, and that the Pope would be allowed to visit his native land in August for the celebrations in Czestochowa. Neither rumor proved to be true. Instead, there was a new wave of arrests and repressions.[4] In October Solidarity was de-legalized, but high officials hinted heavily both in the media and privately that martial law was about to be lifted. At the end of that year, however, it was merely "suspended" and many of its provisions institutionalized in legislation.[5] Similarly, it remained uncertain until May 1983 whether the visit of John Paul II would actually be permitted to take place.[6] This zigzag behavior of the communist authorities was interpreted by many in Poland as a deliberate policy—not a response to either popular resistance or Soviet pressures, nor a reflection of infighting among factions within the communist party.

Nevertheless, the pattern of the Polish communists' attempts at influencing the minds of their subjects reflects the ambiguity of their situation and attitudes. The Soviet Union is at the same time the guarantor of their rule and their stern taskmaster. Polish society is both the source and the weakness of their position in the world. The West is a potential prop, a potential threat, and an intended dupe. Their behavior also reflects such factors as the Marxist-Leninist outlook that views current events as dynamically interconnected and filled with profound contradictions, to be played upon and exploited; a worldview that combines a bunker mentality with confidence in the traditional communist ability to solve the recurrent crises of their own making; and the struggle of factions within the establishment and of individuals within these factions. Not all of the many discordant messages from the authorities are the result of deliberate attempts at dividing and confusing Polish society. The ruling group is driven by internal contradictions and conflicts, including those between the top oligarchs, who want to reduce corruption among middle- and lower-level apparatchiks, and the latter, who are bent on maximizing their take; between central planners and local managers; between the secret police and those bureaucrats responsible for making the communist state look more attractive to the population.

The resulting pattern of mind-manipulation becomes, therefore, a crazy quilt made up of several elements: attempts to gain legitimization and public support while striving to gag and repress the widespread public opposition to the communist monopoly on power; the need to play to often mutually unfriendly domestic and foreign audiences; and the constant permutation of party and government officials in a continuous serial of reorganizations. The first two elements endow the Jaruzelski government's attempts at gaining support through the manipulation of public opinion with planned contradictoriness and ambiguity; the third, with random shifts. It is at times difficult for an outside observer to tell whether certain actions or statements are the product of a planned policy or of internal contradictions and infighting among personalities and interest groups. The partly intentional effect of this behavior is increased confusion among the spectators.

The propaganda methods employed by the Jaruzelski government include not only the standard hard techniques of censorship, new-speak, name-calling, and ritualistic incantations pictured in *1984*, but also subtle, "soft" mind-manipulating devices. The purpose of the former is to convince society that the ruling group is firmly in control and cannot be induced—or compelled—to give up its monopoly on power. They include threatening pronouncements by various generals/ministers, their civilian colleagues, and party officials. For example: "In various circles of the intelligentsia, we encounter activities which are clearly hostile, adventurist, and destructive, and against which appropriate means have to be used and are used. Here, we have to be consistent."[7] The hard techniques also include offensively mendacious laudatory stories about the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries, and fiercely-worded statements about the West—Orwellian reminders that the establishment is strong enough to say what it pleases, whether true or false. For example, on the occasion of the 60th an-

[3]On the events of May 1982, see *Biuletyn Informacyjny*, No. 62, June 25, 1982.

[4]On the events of the summer of 1982, see ibid.; and Tad Szulc, "Can Poland Be Free?" *Parade* (Washington, DC), July 18, 1982.

[5]On the course of events between August and December 1982, see Lawrence Weschler, "A Reporter at Large. Poland: A State of War—II," *The New Yorker*, Apr. 18, 1983, pp. 71–93; John Kifner, "Poland Will Lift Basic Restrictions by the Year's End," *The New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1982; Zygmunt Szeliga, "A Transitional State," *Polityka*, Dec. 18, 1982; interview with Sylwester Zawadzki, Minister of Justice, "Why Suspend and Not Repeal," ibid.; and "Poland Under Jaruzelski—Part II," pp. 60–68.

[6]As late as April and May 1983, during street demonstrations, the Polish media warned that "undermining the process of normalization may jeopardize the Pope's visit." See *Nowy Dziennik* (New York), Apr. 21, 1983; also Casimir Garnysz, "Warsaw's Wary Welcome for John Paul," *The New Leader* (New York), May 30, 1983, pp. 6–8.

[7]Jaruzelski speaking at a regional party meeting, quoted from *Nowy Dziennik*, Mar. 29, 1983.

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niversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "It is the first state in the history of mankind founded on genuine equality among its component nations, as the embodiment of the Leninist principle of the new state that bases its policies on the principles of social justice."[8] After the death of Yuriy Andropov, Polish radio and television broadcast several eulogies for the Soviet leader on February 11 and 12, 1984. In one of them Professor Jerzy Wiatr, the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, praised

... the outstanding contribution of Yuriy Andropov to the struggle for peace against the aggressive policies of American imperialism and its allies and to the averting of the threat of nuclear annihilation. As Poles we shall always remember the understanding and the support, expressed inter alia through significant economic aid, that Yuriy Andropov lent to Polish patriots striving under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party for socialist renewal, stabilization, and the victory of socialism in Poland.[9]

On the other hand, the function of soft propaganda is to persuade people to accept the existing state of affairs, give up resistance, and let themselves be harnessed to the task of salvaging the economy. The first and favorite of these techniques consists of attempts to persuade the population that the interests of the ruling communist establishment in general and of the Jaruzelski group in particular are identical with Polish national interests and *raison d'état*. The principal means to this end is manipulation of emotion-laden national symbols and of the popular interest in national history so as to legitimize the status quo.

THE MANIPULATION of national symbols takes many forms, and the media used for this purpose range from postage stamps to films, plays, and television programs. Thus, a postage stamp in a standard denomination has been issued with the picture of Czeslaw Milosz, an immensely respected and admired, Nobel Prize–winning, anticommunist émigré writer and poet. Another postage stamp shows a celebrated patriotic painting of a 19th-century Polish partisan detachment in desperate combat with the Russians. Television shows an assortment of productions ranging from Napoleonic extravaganzas (the Poles fought on the side of France against Russia) to historical dramas and epics. The changing of the guard at Warsaw's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is now performed by soldiers dressed in brand-new hats—copies of the pre–World War II army hats—to the tune of the "Warszawianka," a patriotic song of the anti-Russian uprising of 1830. The state radio broadcasts the marching songs of the Polish Legions of Jozef Pilsudski who fought for Polish independence during World War I and defeated the Red Army before Warsaw in 1920.

Another device for convincing the Poles of the legitimacy of communist rule is the exploitation of popular interest in national history. On the one hand, historical events—particularly the more recent ones—are rewritten in the style of Orwell's Ministry of Truth to make the establishment appear more legitimate. On the other hand, the official media and publishing houses are allowed to promote competent and accurate accounts and analyses of carefully selected historical events. Thus, it is brought out that during the Polish uprising of 1830, various West European statesmen wanted the Russians to defeat the Poles, and that during the uprising of 1863, West European diplomats were irked by the Polish aspirations for national independence that resulted in "disorders."[10] The media also dwell on the accomplishments of the Polish republic existing between the Treaty of Versailles and World War II, and feature the biographies of interwar national figures.[11] Furthermore, in addition to frequent references to the battles of the Soviet-organized Polish armies ("from Lenino to Berlin"), the great national victories of Grunwald in 1410 (over the Germans) and Vienna in 1683 (over the Turks), the World War II battles of Narvik, Britain, Tobruk, Monte Cassino, and Falaise—in which Polish forces fought under British command—are also remembered. The Polish contribution to the cracking of the "Enigma" codes is carefully noted. On the other hand, many events of the "Bolshevik war" of 1920, of the Soviet-Nazi pact and the resulting partition of Poland, of Soviet deportations and executions in the annexed territories, of their cold-blooded execution of nearly 15,000 Polish prisoners-of-war, of the Soviet refusal to assist the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, of the liquidation of thousands of Polish communists by

[8] "In a Festive Spirit. The 60th Anniversary Celebration of the Soviet Union," *Rzeczpospolita*, Feb. 21, 1982.

[9] "Polish Society's Sorrow," ibid., Feb. 11–12, 1984.

[10] "*In Parisian Salons. Conversations about Poland (The November Uprising)*," *Polityka*, Jan. 22, 1983; "Debating the Results (The January Uprising)," ibid., Jan. 15, 1983.

[11] "Deeds of a Legend (Edward Rydz-Smigly)," ibid., Mar. 13, 1982; "The President's Men," Parts I and II, ibid., May 22 and 29, 1982; "Forty Years of a Political Career (Wl. Sikorski's Political Biography)," ibid., Sept. 4, 1982; a series on Ignacy Moscicki, ibid., June 12, 19, and 26, 1982; a series on Jozef Pilsudski, ibid., Mar. 13, May 8 and 29, Sept. 4, 1982, and Jan. 28, 1984; a series on Slawoj F. Skladkowski, ibid., May 1, 8, 15, and 29, 1982; "Stanislaw Wojciechowski," ibid., May 22, 1982; an article on interwar leaders Maciej Rataj and Wincenty Witos, ibid., Feb. 18, 1984.

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Stalin, and countless other well-known but inconvenient facts are glossed over, misrepresented, or denied.

In this context, one should also mention the handling of the Jewish issue by the authorities. Since World War II, the Polish media, textbooks, as well as scholarly and popular publications have systematically ignored the history and culture of Polish Jews. Recently, however, this previously taboo topic has suddenly become a popular one. In April 1983 the Jaruzelski government even sponsored an elaborate international commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.[12] Glossy albums on the history of Polish Jews are being published, and popular journals print articles on Jewish life in prewar Poland. None of them, however, addresses directly the problem of various types of antagonisms in Polish-Jewish relations.[13] This unexpected outpouring of Judaica seems related to the government's desperate attempts to improve its image in the West. Many Polish communists, from General Jaruzelski down, seem genuinely to believe that "the Jews control international banking" and that cultivating some Jewish groups may assist the Warsaw government in obtaining Western financial support.[14] At the same time, in reporting on the events in the Middle East, Polish media use the term "Zionism" to denote "racism and warlike aggressiveness by a settler state." The Warsaw authorities have also legally registered the association "Grunwald" and the state-subsidized journal *Rzeczywistosc*—widely perceived as being anti-Semitic—which specialize in alleging "Jewish infiltration" of the Solidarity movement.

BESIDES attempting to mesh itself into national history in order to be perceived as the legitimate and natural successor, the Jaruzelski regime also seeks to achieve this goal by means of arguments based on Poland's geopolitical situation. Thus, it is pointed out that Poland needs the protection of the Soviet Union to retain the territories acquired from Germany after World War II, and that the Polish economy is heavily dependent on Soviet raw materials and CMEA cooperation.[15] It is also brought out that for the West, Eastern Europe is now significant mainly in connection with the Soviet Union; that the West—plagued by problems of its own—is mainly interested in profitable relations with communist-bloc countries and would on the whole prefer that there be order in Poland. In this regard, it is worth mentioning an article in *Polityka* that simultaneously praises the Soviet Union for liberating Poland and blames the West for its abandonment of Poland at Teheran and Yalta—"a lesson that the Poles should remember forever."[16] Its author, Professor Adam Schaff, argues as follows: The Soviet Union liberated Poland, and since Poland has been liberated, it is free. (Orwell's "Slavery is Freedom.") However, the West has abandoned Poland to the Soviet Union. (So, after all, "Slavery is Slavery.") Yet, because of geopolitics there was really no other way. ("Slavery is Slavery, but it is also Necessity.") In another issue of *Polityka*, columnist Daniel Passent quotes approvingly from an article in *Foreign Affairs*, whose author questions whether the Reagan Administration's sanctions against General Jaruzelski's government would be effective in restoring the free union movement in Poland. First, Passent tells the reader that *Foreign Affairs* is "the most prestigious organ of the political and military circles responsible for the direction of American foreign policy," and then points to the compatibility of the views of the Polish government with those of *Foreign Affairs*.[17]

Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Poland's deputy premier, argues in an issue of *Kontrasty* that world peace depends on the equilibrium of forces between East and West, and that the loss by Polish communists of their monopoly on power would destroy this equilibrium and could lead to war. He implies that other communist states would invade Poland preventively and says that the declaration of the state of war by General Jaruzelski saved Poland from a "calamity of historical proportions." Rakowski goes on to say that in the

[12] On the Polish government's handling of the anniversary of the Ghetto Uprising, see John Kifner, "Few Flowers for Ghetto Memorial at Warsaw," *The New York Times*, Apr. 17, 1983; and Abraham Brumberg and Richard Davies, "Specious Ceremonies. Jaruzelski's Insult to Warsaw's Martyrs," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Apr. 18, 1983; Lawrence Weschler, *The Passion of Poland*, New York, Pantheon, 1984, pp. 182–84.

[13] *Polish Jewry—History and Culture*, Warsaw, Interpress, 1983. For the examples of recent Judaica in the Polish media, see, e.g., "Isaac Singer—The Poet of Exile" (Reprint of an interview in *Le Monde*), *Polityka*, Nov. 20, 1982; "Everybody Wants to Play Host to Hela" (an article about Polish Jews visiting their former homeland), ibid., May 28, 1983; "Anti-Semitism" (an essay discussing the general concept and definition of anti-Semitism), *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1983; "*The Last Moment*" (an article about Jewish life in late 19th-century Galicia, based on the new Polish film *Austeria*), *Tu i Teraz* (Warsaw), Feb. 9, 1983; Marek Pluzanski, "The Eagle and the Lions," *Polityka*, Mar. 10, 1984.

[14] It has been reported that at preliminary meetings regarding the commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Polish authorities appealed to Jewish-American visitors to use their influence with Western banking circles to facilitate the obtaining of financial support for Poland.

[15] For instance, in *Polityka* there were during 1982 numerous articles describing Poland's economic dependence on the Soviet Union. See issues of Mar. 20, July 24, Sept. 4, Nov. 6 and 20, 1982. References to this situation are also regularly made in the Polish daily newspapers, usually under headlines such as "Soviet Union—Our Traditional and Reliable Partner," *Rzeczpospolita*, Dec. 21, 1982. On the Soviet protection of postwar Polish borders, see, e.g., Marian Dobrosielski, "The Yalta Conference—On the 39th Anniversary. The Polish Question. Parts I and II," ibid., Feb. 9–10, 1984.

[16] Adam Schaff, "Speaking Plainly," *Polityka*, Jan. 22, 1983.

[17] Daniel Passent, "Revisionist," ibid., Mar. 12, 1983.

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course of 1982 "the wrecking of the foundations of the Polish state was ended and the dilution of the social and economic contents of socialism stopped." Now, with the process of political normalization proceeding satisfactorily, the major battlefield is the economy. What Poland needs now is "peace, law and order, steady and hard work, and increased trust in the state."[18] In line with this reasoning, a concerted change occurred during 1983 in the tone of the Polish media's reports on the economic situation in the country: while the reported facts remain largely negative, they were presented with a positive emphasis under headlines such as "Progress—but Still Unsatisfactory"; "Better—but Still Shortages"; "Closer to Normal Conditions—but ..." (followed by a lengthy enumeration of problems).[19]

Another implicit line of argument found in the Polish media is that although political conditions in Poland may not be quite satisfactory, they could be worse—as bad as in Czechoslovakia or Romania. Thus, without apparent reason and in violation of the principle of *nihil nisi bonum* about other communist states, the Polish press reported in full detail on the harsh police ordinance introduced in Czechoslovakia concerning the registration of residents.[20] The obvious implication was that Poland's regime is milder than Czechoslovakia's, and is therefore something to cherish and protect.

Another example of the soft style of manipulating public opinion is the treatment in the Polish media of the problems facing capitalist economies: overproduction, unemployment, inflation, recession, the nuclear threat, pollution, public anxiety. Discussions of these problems are generally not in new-speak, but are well-written and based on statements by respected Western figures: prime ministers, parliamentarians, religious leaders, philosophers, writers.[21] These discussions imply that the crises of capitalism are even harder on the ordinary working people than those of communism. The indirect message sent to the Poles is that life under communism, gray and frustrating though it may be, is still better than the "mixture of socialism for the rich and of capitalism for everybody else" prevailing in the West. Polish economic security may be shabby, but it is there. ("Slavery is Slavery but it has its Good Points.") This message is further reinforced by occasional televised interviews with individuals who have returned to Poland after disillusioning stays in the West.[22]

The obverse side of this technique is to convince the Poles that the system is capable of reforming both itself and the economy, and of providing the population with a decent standard of living. Messages to this effect, generally perceived by the Poles to be "siren songs," can be paraphrased thus: Forget the past. From now on, we will take good care of you. Prosperity is on its way. Twenty-five years ago, Hungarians hated Kadar, but now they love him. Once, Kadarization was a bad word; now it is a good one. Give us a chance to Jaruzelski-ize Poland, and all will be well. Help us to help you, work with us, do not fear us. Stop being rebellious. We, your leaders, are Polish patriots. If you, too, are patriots, you will support your leaders. We are all in the same boat; let us row it together. We are not perfect, but if we do not succeed, the Russians will replace us with hard-liners, who are a nasty lot indeed, much worse than we are. And should you succeed in overthrowing the hard-liners, the Russians will occupy Poland, and that will be a national disaster. So, forget about independence. The best deal that can be obtained from the Russians is local autonomy under our undivided rule. Let us work together because united we stand, divided we fall. But there is a light at the end of the tunnel! There will be a chicken in every pot![23]

A PARALLEL approach consists of projecting an image of democratic pluralism, tolerance, and freedom.

[18]Mieczysław F. Rakowski, "The Principal Battlefield," *Kontrasty* (Warsaw), No. 3, 1983.

[19]From *Rzeczpospolita*, Jan. 4, and Feb. 7 and 22, 1984. See also Jerzy Pawlino-Pacewicz, "Better, But ...," *Polityka*, Jan. 28, 1984.

[20]"Decree on Registration of the Population (Czechoslovakia)," *Polityka*, Dec. 4, 1982.

[21]There are frequent reprints in the Polish newspapers of Western articles critically discussing current social and political issues in particular countries; e.g., "Are Labor Unions Becoming Obsolete?" (a reprint from *International Management*), in ibid., Apr. 23, 1983; "A Single Pin [on a map]—200,000 Dead" (reprint of an article by Roger Molander), ibid., Feb. 5, 1983; "Philosophy of Leaving" (reprint of autobiographical fragments by Helmut Schmidt), ibid., Oct. 9, 1982; "Annoying Like a Fungus" (reprint of an article by G. Geschke in *Deutches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*), ibid., Dec. 4, 1982; reprint of an interview with François Mitterrand on French foreign policy and relations with the United States, ibid., May 29, 1982; "No Money for the Poorest" (reprint of an article by Alex Brummer from *The Guardian*), ibid., Apr. 3, 1982; and "The Concept of Agreement" (reprint of an article by F. Brühlman and W. Schudel about labor unions in Switzerland), ibid., July 24, 1982, p. 14.

[22]Usually, however, these public appearances of the prodigal children are choreographed so poorly that they provoke protests from the viewers. "After the TV evening news [on Feb. 8] we saw an interview with a couple of miserable 'emigrants'," writes A.C. in a letter to the editor. "We are not even surprised that they agreed to an interview of this kind. For infantilism and stupidity, no effective medicine has yet been discovered. But we are bothered by the prodigal wasting of film for the revelations of these two...." *Polityka*, Mar. 3, 1984.

[23]Since the imposition of martial law, Polish media have been regularly reporting on the achievements of Kadarism in different spheres of Hungarian economic and political life. See, e.g., *Polityka*, Feb. 27, 1982, on the Hungarian fiscal system; ibid., Mar. 20, 1982, on cooperation between the Hungarian communist party and other affiliated parties; ibid., June 24, Aug. 7 and 14, 1982, on the Hungarian economy; ibid., June 19, 1982, on economic management; ibid., July 10, 1982, on the church in Hungary; ibid., May 8, Sept. 25, and Nov. 13, 1982, on emigration; ibid., Mar. 5, 1983, on people's councils in Hungary; and ibid., Feb. 4, 1984, on price increases and on the Hungarian government's handling of popular discontent.

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While communists generally regard civil liberties and the sharing of power with the people's authentic representatives as unacceptable threats to their monopoly on power, they seem to believe that a convincing illusion of participatory democracy can contribute significantly to maintaining social peace and raising economic productivity. Therefore, they attempt to create for themselves an appropriately democratic and liberal image in the hope that this will give them the benefits of democracy without its inconveniences. Two types of methods are used for this purpose. The first is political manipulation, the second, mind-manipulation. Among the first are company-type labor unions, acquiescent people's councils, a supportive popular front (the "Patriotic Front for National Renewal"), and an accommodating parliament. Among the second are public debates in the media; letters to the editor; media interviews with the proverbial common man, his wife and children; round-tables and panels with carefully screened participants; and newspaper exposés of carefully selected social iniquities.

For instance, during a debate organized by the consumer weekly *Veto*, state agencies were openly accused of engaging in black market operations.[24] In a discussion on nominations to managerial positions conducted by the journal *Tu i Teraz*, "competence and initiative" were strongly stressed—hardly revolutionary demands in themselves; yet, in the communist system they amount to a thinly veiled attack on the nomenklatura system.[25] A debate in *Polityka* pondered whether "independent political thought is possible in Poland." The debaters acknowledged more or less explicitly that communism is rejected by the vast majority of Poland's population but imposed by its "geopolitical situation" (read the Soviet Union). The conclusion reached: independent political thought in Poland is both possible and impossible.[26]

A letter to the editor states: "The lack of independent thought in economics results in the general acceptance of solutions that look rational but are not. They bring some immediate benefits, but lead to incalculable waste of public resources and cause a never-ending series of political crises."[27] Another letter complained: "Every day we buy adulterated butter, adulterated cheeses that taste like linings of old boots, sandwich meat made without meat, milk that is mainly water. But they cost more and more. Don't their producers realize that in cheating others they are cheating themselves?"[28]

The substitution of the appearance of participatory democracy and civil freedoms for their reality is deliberate. In November 1982, a confidential meeting of senior party officials and military commanders took place in Warsaw at which the following propaganda directives were formulated:

A certain degree of criticism is being allowed on economic and social subjects in a number of selected publications. Outright oppositional articles by Kisiel will appear in Tygodnik Powszechny. *All such moves are under strict control and their intention is to create an impression of growing tolerance and normalization in public life.... To neutralize public hostility toward the authorities, a "series of smiles" has been organized, e.g., Rakowski's meeting with the actors.... Walesa's release will be used to discredit him in the eyes of public opinion, as an element in the destruction of the mythology and symbolism of Solidarity. The appropriate services of General Kiszczak are already working on it.*[29]

More recently, a confidential instruction on propaganda prepared by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee formulated the following directives:

Place in close proximity the words "Solidarity," "crisis," "strikes" so that they become associated with one another.... At every opportunity draw a distinction between Solidarity's leadership and its rank and file (the working class).... Associate with one another the terms "extremism," "leadership," and "political goals alien to the working class." ... At every opportunity charge Solidarity with the responsibility for the decrease in production in the past years, particularly for the shortages of apartments, food, and consumer goods.... Avoid references to the errors committed by the party.... Ridicule Walesa, undermine confidence in him, foster discord between him and his advisers, expose his American connections and his foreign bank accounts.... Avoid references to the size of Solidarity's membership.[30]

[24] "We the Black Marketeers," *Veto* (Warsaw), Jan. 23, 1982.

[25] Janusz Letowski, "How to Fill Important Government Posts," *Tu i Teraz*, Feb. 9, 1983, pp. 3–4.

[26] See the following items published in *Polityka* under the rubric "Is Political Thought Possible in Poland?": J. Szczepanski (Nov. 13, 1982); J. Stefanowicz (ibid.); A. Luczak (Nov. 17, 1982); K.T. Toeplitz (ibid.); A. Werblan (Jan. 8, 1983); J. Tereszynski (ibid.); T. Bielicki (Jan. 15, 1983); A. Syzdek (ibid.); R. Woyjna (Jan. 29, 1983); T. Tittenbrun (ibid.); and letters to the editor (Feb. 19, 1983).

[27] "Letters," *Polityka*, Mar. 12, 1983.

[28] "We Cheat Ourselves," *Veto*, Jan. 23, 1983.

[29] Quoted in "A Confidential Assessment of the Situation," in "Poland Under Jaruzelski—Part I," pp. 108–09. Kisiel is the pen name of the respected publicist Stefan Kisielewski of that Catholic weekly. General Kiszczak is the Minister of the Interior.

[30] Reprint from Polish underground press, cited in *Nowy Dziennik*, Jan. 18, 1984.

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Another type of soft propaganda is directed at the young, who are a serious source of concern for the authorities—not surprising, given the young's grim present and abysmal-looking future. The government is well aware that most of the participants in recent demonstrations were under 20 years of age and that the young generation is embittered and hostile toward communism. Therefore, a special Government Committee on Youth has been formed recently, and the media publicize its activities and pronouncements.[31] At the same time, in an effort to neutralize the young, the authorities encourage a never-ending series of rock festivals, fairs, and happenings. Some radio stations have been devoted almost exclusively to Western music for the young. Special programs and publications foster the cult of Western rock idols and feature rock gossip. Also, talented young Polish writers (e.g., Marek Hlasko and Edward Stachura), whose art opposed communism but who are now safely dead and unable to threaten the regime, are suddenly eulogized and panegyrized in the media, their long-banned books printed in pocket editions for the young and turned into plays and films.[32]

YET ANOTHER genre of public-opinion manipulation is the highlighting—with the help of establishment-oriented social scientists—of the latent and patent contradictions within Polish society. During the Gierek regime, prior to the events of August 1980, an officially approved interpretation billed as "Marxism for the state of developed socialism" represented Polish society as a continuous, classless gradation of fundamentally non-opposing segments. When the absurdity of these claims was demonstrated by the Solidarity movement—a vast popular revolutionary upheaval against the deep-seated inequities of the communist social order—courtier sociologists started stressing internal conflicts of interests in Polish society, its lack of cohesiveness, in a word, its lack of solidarity. For instance, *Tu i Teraz* published a long scholarly essay by Mariusz Gulczynski stating that a classless society is for Poland a very remote prospect indeed.[33] Meanwhile, other establishment publicists explore the specifics of conflicts of interests between workers in different industries, between workers and the intelligentsia, between urban and rural dwellers, between professions, between generations, between producers and consumers, and so forth. Yet, frictions and conflict among establishment groups and between the establishment and society remain outside their range of interest.[34]

While the establishment social scientists merely uncover social conflicts, these are fanned and exploited by the rumor mills and by the media. In accordance with the directives issued by the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, the favorite targets are "Solidarity extremists" and Solidarity's intelligentsia consultants, particularly those affiliated with the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR), who, it is alleged, sought to hijack the Solidarity movement in order to make it subservient to their private, antipatriotic, and antisocialist ends. Nor has there been any shortage of inspired rumors. They are the preferred means of character assassination, and their favorite target is the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Lech Walesa.

Another device used by Polish officialdom to confuse and divide society is the frequent changing of roles by members of the communist hierarchy. One highly visible Polish official who often alternates between "good cop" and "bad cop" roles is Deputy Premier Rakowski. The purpose of the first role is to placate Polish intellectuals and the West.[35] The function of the second, performed by Rakowski most spectacularly at a meeting in the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk on August 25 of last year,[36] is to intimidate the work-

[31]See, e.g., a report from a special meeting of the Government Commission on Youth (Jan. 27, 1984), *Rzeczpospolita*, Jan. 28–29, 1984; also a report from a meeting of Polish United Workers' Party youth activists with M. F. Rakowski in Czestochowa, March 7, 1984, ibid., Mar. 8, 1984 .

[32]Even *Polityka*, the leading socio-political journal of the party, has lately devoted much space to reporting on rock groups, concerts, and events. See, e.g., the "rock series" by U. Bialous in *Polityka*, July 17, Sept. 4, Oct. 2, and Dec. 11, 1982; Apr. 2 and June 18, 1983; and Feb. 4 and 25, 1984. Also similar accounts by M. Garztecki, ibid., July 17, 1982, and by B. Pietkiewicz, ibid., Apr. 2, 1983.

Another popular topic in the Polish media is the discussion about and with young people concerning their problems. See, e.g., B. Bartz, "Youth Went Its Own Way," *Tu i Teraz*, Jan. 2, 1983, p. 13; "With Wings or Hunchbacked (A Discussion with Youth)," *Polityka*, May 7, 1983; Z. Pietrasik, "Less Than Nothing," ibid., Feb. 11, 1984. On Marek Hlasko, see J. Artowski, "Hlasko," *Tu i Teraz*, Mar. 9, 1983; P. Bratkowski, "He Came From Nowhere and Conquered the World (On Hlasko)," *Polityka*, Dec. 4, 1982; Bogdan Loszewski, "The Return of Marek Hlasko," *Rzeczpospolita*, Mar. 29, 1984; and Bogdan Rudnicki, *Marek Hlasko*, Warsaw, PWN, 1983. At the beginning of 1982, Polish media announced that producer Feliks Falk was working on a film depicting the life of Hlasko.

[33]Mariusz Gulczynski, "How to Govern a Dissatisfied Society," Parts 1 and 2; *Tu i Teraz*, Mar. 2 and 9, 1983.

[34]See, e.g., an essay by K. T. Toeplitz, "From Slogans to Deeds," *Polityka*, Nov. 13, 1982.

[35]"[Rakowski's] Meeting with Actors," ibid., Dec. 13 and 20, 1982; P. Moszynski, "Everyone Sees How the Country Is (M.F. Rakowski in Lodz)," ibid., Apr. 3, 1982; M. F. Rakowski, "In Defense of the Word 'Yes'," ibid., Nov. 13, 1982; "Passing and Permanent Conflicts," ibid., Oct. 22, 1983; "[Rakowski's] Discussion Meeting at Poznan Polytechnic," *Rzeczpospolita*, Mar. 3–4, 1984; M. F. Rakowski, *Partnerstwo* (A Partnership), Warsaw, Ksiazka Wiedza, 1982; and *Trudny Dialog* (A Difficult Dialogue), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1983.

[36]Here are excerpts from a letter to M. F. Rakowski by an anonymous shipyard worker-participant in a Gdansk meeting: "I have just seen a TV program presenting your meeting with shipyard workers. This is already the fifth version of this meeting: I was there in person; in the evening I listened to Radio Gdansk; I read newspapers; I listened to Radio Warsaw; and finally I watched the TV program. Five different versions. . . . Is anybody still to believe your honesty and goodwill? . . . The TV showed

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ers and to please the Soviets, the secret police, and middle-level party and government officials. However, another Politburo member, Albin Siwak, has apparently been cast permanently in the role of "heavy" to be a foil for such "moderate" figures as Jaruzelski (the government's standard-bearer) and the ambiguously defined Rakowski (Jaruzelski's would-be successor).

FINALLY, there are attempts to manipulate the Polish Catholic Church. Although the communists might consider the Poles' attachment to Catholicism to be an "unfortunate survival of the past" and the church to be a "brake on progress" and a "force of reaction and obscurantism," they acknowledge the church's influence on national life and its role as a repository of popular admiration and trust.

Thus, while communist authorities have repeatedly assailed the church for its alleged improper political activities, they generally avoid direct confrontations. They realize that the church has been trying to influence the angry and frustrated nation in the direction of reconciliation, and that the professed goal of the church—the eternal salvation of its charges—transcends mundane political struggles. The communists are eager to use the restraining influence of the church for their own ends. Therefore, they woo the church hierarchy with a show of respect and such moves as the issuing of extra allocations of newsprint to Catholic periodicals, the granting of building permits for new churches (something the Gierek regime refused), and allowing unprecedented media coverage of events of international Catholicism—including the travels of Pope John Paul II. The pronouncements of Jozef Cardinal Glemp, the Primate of Poland, and the speeches of the other members of the Episcopate are rebroadcast by radio and television, but reformatted in such a way as to suggest a commonality of political views and interests between the church and the communist party.[37]

IN SUMMARY, it has to be said that Jaruzelski's government is a competent user of a variety of propaganda devices. In particular, it is proficient at the manipulation of national symbols, arguments based on geopolitics, appeals to patriotism, and getting the church to pour oil on the turbulent waters of popular discontent. It is also a capable practitioner of the technique that has been called the "torture of hope."

But how effective are these actions? Even the party periodical *Polityka* admits that the majority of Polish society remains "distrustful and alienated."[38] This is indeed so. An opinion poll conducted for *Paris-Match* clandestinely in Poland in the summer of 1983 on a representative national sample revealed that no more than 3 percent of respondents thought that the communist party and its government represent the interests Polish society.[39] Although such classic methods of mind control as censorship or ideological incantations help to persuade society that the establishment remains in control and is determined to retain its monopoly on power, the soft means of persuasion have not succeeded in convincing the Poles that they should reconcile themselves to communist absolutism. The official promises of Poland's progressive Kadarization are not given credence because the population does not believe its rulers capable of salvaging the economy, which they have wrecked once more. Having repeatedly deceived Polish society and gone back on their word (in 1945–48, 1956–57, 1970, and 1980–81), the authorities are now regarded as fundamentally untrustworthy. Their promises of an economic turnaround are viewed as transparent attempts to harness people once more to a task that will remain Sisyphean as long as Poland is ruled by a communist autocracy.

Although a section of Polish society responds positively to various manipulations of the national symbols by the authorities and to their appeals to pariotism, the majority interprets them as symbolic "winks," whose purpose is to indicate that the establishment is on the side of its Polish subjects and not of the Soviet Union. Most Poles simply regard this type of behavior as an attempt by the authorities to assume patriotic protective coloring for the purpose of gaining public acceptance. Thus, such "winks" are commonly interpreted as a form of double-con, whose goal is to deceive the population into thinking that their rulers are trying to deceive the Russians.

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only one of your reactions, the mildest one. But in reality you yelled at us in a horrible way, insultingly, in a rage, disdainfully, shaking your fist at us and shouting about political culture.... " (reprint from *Kontakt*, a Solidarity bulletin published in Paris, cited in *Nowy Dziennik*, Nov. 2, 1983). Also see Rakowski's reply to public criticism of his performance in Gdansk in *Polityka*, Dec. 31, 1983.

On Rakowski's political career (with excerpts from his speeches and writings), see "The Dialectic of Opportunism: Rakowski and Solidarity," "Poland Under Jaruzelski—Part I," pp. 182–89.

[37]On the situation and role of the Polish Catholic Church in Jaruzelski's Poland see Nina Darnton, "The Subtle Power of the Polish Church," *The New York Times Magazine*, June 6, 1982; and Dominik Morawski, "The Polish Church Under Martial Law," *Studium Papers*, April 1983, pp. 13–17.

[38]Krzysztof Komornicki, "Not Bad After All," *Polityka*, Nov. 13, 1982; see also Janusz Reykowski, "Psychological Barriers to Reconciliation," ibid., Oct. 2, 1982; and "Resolution of the Conflict," ibid., Jan. 1, 1983.

[39]*Paris-Match*, June 24, 1983. The poll was taken May/June 1983 on a 600-person sample. See also *Nowy Dziennik*, Oct. 8-9, 1983.

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Similarly, most Poles see through the mimicry of democratic pluralism and civil liberties and refuse to offer their support to the authorities in exchange for the "privileges" of joining official labor unions and other front organizations, of voting in communist-style elections, or of participating in the charades of free speech, free press, and "socialist legality."

On the other hand, a majority does not reject arguments that point to Poland's geopolitical situation between the Soviet Union and Germany. As long as Europe remains divided, the majority also accepts Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact, and the necessity of some form of Soviet protectorate. What the Poles do want is a Magna Charta. But the foremost concern of the ruling oligarchy is to remain in power. Without the Kremlin's approval—which does not seem forthcoming—it will not risk granting its subjects a Magna Charta, lest it be swiftly ousted by Moscow. But without such a charter, there can be no lasting solution to the Polish crisis and no economic turnaround. Hence, a stalemate, a cliffhanger, desperate groping for handholds and footholds, and endless maneuvers by the regime to dissimulate reality.

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Youth Soviet Style

By Richard Tempest

SEVEN YEARS AGO, in the summer of 1977, a student at one of Moscow's chemistry institutes spent his vacation with relatives in a village near Krasnodar in southeast Russia. The area—which is not unlike Illinois in climate and geography—is adjacent to the Caucasus and is one of the Soviet Union's richest agricultural regions. From the Muscovite student's point of view, the village was in the deepest provinces. The local toughs strutted in the streets wearing toilet seats around their necks and flushing-chains for belts. They boasted that they were following the latest Western fashion, which led the visitor to make some disparaging remark in reply—or so he claimed. When he returned to Moscow, he tuned in to the "Top 30 countdown" of pop music on the BBC World Radio Service, and for the first time heard about punk rock.

When Westerners think of foreign influences on Soviet youth, they invariably think of blue jeans. Jeans are as popular as ever in the Soviet Union, and a pair of new Levi's can fetch up to 200 rubles (approximately US$270), depending on locale. Indeed, there is a strict gradation of jeans according to prestigiousness. Levi's are the most highly valued, followed by Wranglers and Lees; other brands, including the Soviet-made *Orbita,* are esteemed much less. Calvin Klein jeans do not carry the cachet they do in the United States, as the brand name is not widely known; they are admired and worn only among the very select (and exclusively Moscow-based) set of young people whose parents work abroad as journalists and diplomats.

Jeans, however, are merely the most visible mark of foreign influence on Soviet youth. In Moscow in the summer of 1982, young people were windsurfing, hanggliding, practicing Yoga, Transcendental Meditation, and Zen Buddhism, disco-dancing at school proms, buying Soviet-made recordings of ex-Beatle Paul McCartney and the Swedish pop group ABBA, going to rock concerts, teetering on skateboards, scrawling graffiti (often in English), learning kung fu and karate, and eating pizza at the country's first pizza parlor (on Gorky Street).[1] Moreover, in the week ending on July 11, six American and West European films, among them *The Stunt Man* with Peter O'Toole and *Raging Bull* with Robert DeNiro, were playing in Moscow cinemas. That week, though, the most popular film with Moscow's young was *Wings Over America,* a documentary depicting Paul McCartney's 1976 tour of the United States.

THE SOVIET YOUTH culture is almost wholly imported from the West. The Soviet teen-ager strives to look, and more frequently does look, like his Western counterpart. He wants to listen to the same music, enjoy the same hobbies, and, above all, similarly assert his independence from and rejection of adult society. Moreover, in a country where the dearth of consumer goods—*defitsit*—curtails the possibilities for conspicuous consumption (which lies at the heart of the Soviet youth culture), young people grow up looking and listening for what they like far more keenly than their contemporaries abroad.

The village visited by the chemistry student from Moscow was hundreds of miles away from the nearest border, well beyond the reach of Western radio broadcasts. Nor had foreigners or foreign magazines ever been seen there. Yet, by dint of word of mouth, the peasant boys in the village were able to emulate the latest Western youth fad. Their spirit was correct, even if their execution was homespun *(domoroshchennyy).*

A 15-year-old boy explained to me the source of this spirit: "My teachers treat Western youth culture as a 'forbidden fruit,' and this makes it more attractive, more interesting, more popular." He looked down at his American-made black jeans with the Wrangler label, which were decorated with chains and trinkets,

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[1] *Time* (New York), Aug. 9, 1982, p. 40.

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and added: "A big portion of the youth culture is beautiful, and I see no reason why I should be deprived of beauty." Other youngsters are drawn by a slightly different spirit. Twenty-year-old Alyosha worked full time in the summer of 1982 as a windsurf instructor for the *TsSKa* (Army) sporting club, which like other officially sponsored clubs has about 100 members. Membership in the club enabled Alyosha to use a fancy, Polish-made board and sail to hone his skills. He said that he had decided the year before to take the sport seriously, and take it seriously he does, following every race in the Soviet Union as well as abroad. "Sergey Somokish and Edgar Triokhin last year won prizes at Cannes in France," he told me intently.

To put it somewhat crudely, Alyosha and others his age are the first Soviet generation bent on having fun. This, at least according to the official line, is not incompatible with the duties and demands imposed on the young by the Soviet state. "You can be a windsurfer and dance at a disco," noted a 23-year-old Moscow student, "and still be a good Komsomol." In fact, virtually no Soviet youngsters escape the organizational hand of the system. At age seven, all boys and girls become "Little Octobers" (*Oktyabryata*, or Octobrats); at age 11, Young Pioneers—with all the obligatory political activities involved at each stage. Every summer, millions of young people participate in Komsomol work projects, clearing fields, digging ditches, carrying cement blocks. Moreover, college students in Moscow and other cities are required to help with the harvest, such as it is. Although the academic year begins on the first day of September, for most of that month students are away from the capital gathering potatoes, an activity that has come to be known as "going potatoing" (*byt' na kartoshke*).

Such state-decreed toil is, perhaps surprisingly, not widely resented. For one thing, the authorities are not averse to tapping some aspects of the youth culture to make working on these projects more attractive (for example, encouraging student work teams to wear colorful logos and emblems on the backs of their green uniform jackets). For another, participation in this kind of work has been a feature of Soviet life for so long that it is accepted as an unavoidable inconvenience. Indeed, the potato-picking expeditions are regarded as the price one has to pay for being a student in Moscow.

OFFICIAL SOVIET ATTITUDES toward manifestations of Western youth culture have changed over the years. In the late 1970's, for example, the state showed less hostility toward Western pop and rock music than before or since. Big-name acts from the West toured the country to enormous acclaim on the part of their young fans. In 1976, it was Cliff Richard who visited the USSR; in 1979, Elton John;[2] in 1980, the Jamaican-German group Boney M. The state record company, *Melodiya,* brought out several rock albums under license, and Soviet rock musicians themselves were allowed to release a few discs, one of which, *On the Wave of My Memory (Po volne moyey pamyati)* by David Tukhmanov, is particularly interesting.

While the music on this album is what would be termed middle-of-the-road pop rock in the United States, the lyrics Tukhmanov uses are poems by classical poets. He sings Baudelaire in Russian, Percy Bysshe Shelley in English, Heine in German, and Adam Mickiewicz in Polish. In the West, where attempts to elevate rock music to the status of "serious" art were abandoned a dozen years ago, such a device would be considered pretentious; but for Soviet rock, whose style is anyway more of the 1960's than of the 1980's, it would not be considered inappropriate, as a newly legitimate musical form, to strive after cultural respectability.

Alla Pugachëva, the Soviet Barbra Streisand, is today the closest equivalent in the Soviet Union to the pop idols of the West. Her material is composed mostly of love songs and "songs about nature," and her voice quite mellifluous. She credits William Shakespeare and Osip Mandelshtam as the co-writers of some of her songs, and even sings Mandelshtam's prescient 1930 poem *Leningrad* to a disco beat! (One may point out, in slight mitigation, that the 1973 Soviet collection of Mandelshtam's poetry came out in an edition of 15,000 copies, whereas Pugachëva's record will have made the poem familiar to millions of young Soviets.)

A general flavor of the Soviet youth culture can be captured from an incident that took place on a balmy evening in July 1982 at a huge fountain in Moscow's Gorky Park. As young men and women between the ages of 15 and 25 danced to the amplified cassette music of the New Seekers, ABBA, and Diana Ross, a Western visitor took photographs. The dancers soon asked in Russian who she was. Discovering that she was an American, the young people thronged around her and began to question her intently, but with no sense of antagonism: "What are the new rock groups in America?" "Do American youngsters know about our Soviet rock musicians?" "Do they ever dance to

[2]With a frugality characteristic of their expenditure of foreign currency, the Soviets paid a portion of John's fee in souvenirs like Palekh boxes and Bukhara rugs.

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our groups?" "What do you think of Vysotskiy?" (Vladimir Vysotskiy, the Russian actor, singer, and poet who died in 1980 and whose gravelly voice and bitter lyrics made him the only modern figure admired today on every level of Soviet society, "from academician to alcoholic," as one Russian put it).

The dancers' reaction is notable for several reasons. Any other group of Soviet citizens would have certainly shown their hostility at being surreptitiously photographed by a foreigner. Moreover, the nature of the questions asked indicates not only the kind of national—and occasionally parochial and defensive—pride that foreigners have come to associate with Russians, but also that young Soviets are conscious of taking so much from the West. The incident suggests another important point as well: the Soviet youth culture can be observed in its most striking and developed form in the capital, the city most accessible to foreign visitors. This is because in the Soviet Union today, one still comes across the 19th-century phenomenon of a capital city completely dominating, both culturally and politically, the rest of the country.[3] And the young of Moscow are more affluent and sophisticated than their counterparts elsewhere in the USSR.

This is not to say, however, that youth in other areas of the Soviet Union are not exposed to foreign ideas and culture. In Estonia, for example, young people learn of the latest Western fads and fashions by watching Finnish television, which makes Estonian youths much more susceptible to foreign influences than, say, young people in Saratov, a city on the lower Volga that is closed to foreigners because of the important defense industries there. The younger generation in Soviet Central Asia has, because of the Islamic culture to which it belongs, an outlook and a way of life markedly different from those of Russian boys and girls. And it is interesting that in the Central Asian republics the authorities are on occasion rather lenient toward manifestations of Western influences among young people, for it is Eastern influences—especially the impact of the Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran—that pose the greatest potential danger to the Soviets' control of their Asian subjects.

THE SOVIET YOUTH culture is of necessity largely do-it-yourself. A windsurfer must not only build his own board and sail, he must first laboriously copy (by hand) the design from a photograph in a foreign magazine, then draw up his own blueprint. And when deciding to follow the latest kid craze in the West, punk rock, the youths in the remote Russian village did not simply go to the nearest plumbing supply store, but had to invent their own costumes and creations. Indeed, one reason why Rubik's cube did not catch on in a country where every foreign fad flourishes is that it is too difficult to make at home.[4]

So, too, is the pool of heroes of Soviet youth somewhat limited. Apart from the usual run of (mainly Soviet) actors and athletes, Vladimir Vysotskiy, John Lennon, and Jane Fonda are widely revered: the music of Vysotskiy and Lennon is available on tape, and Fonda's films like *They Shoot Horses, Don't They* and *The China Syndrome* have been shown in the USSR. Thus, among the mass of young Soviets, it is accessibility that is *the* prerequisite for popularity. The opposite is true, however, with the intellectual minority of young people, for whom popularity is largely the product of inaccessibility. Thus, the English actor John Hurt *(I, Claudius; Alien),* none of whose films have played in the Soviet Union, and the French erotic author Pauline Réage have their fanatical admirers in Moscow, who have formed fan clubs of a kind.

Today, in Moscow and other major cities, it is no longer shoulder-length hair and patched jeans that surprise people in the street. Indeed, the new teenage look is short hair and black leather clothes adorned with zippers, badges, and in a few cases the ultimate dare to society, a Nazi emblem. By Western standards, the dimensions of the problem seem modest: the kids' hair is not dyed bright green or orange, and the punkers' familiar safety pins tend to be used to decorate the youngsters' attire, not to pierce their cheeks. In fact, Soviet punkers seem no more offensive in appearance than those one encounters in the American Midwest (as opposed to those in New York and London).

If the Soviet press regularly castigates young people on ideological grounds for wearing foreign-made T-shirts with seditious slogans, for sporting Western jeans, or for displaying caps and bags with the insignia of the US Army, the average man in the street tends to regard such youngsters as "uncultured" *(nekul'turnye),* just as he frowned on narrow trousers and jazz in the 1950's, long hair and the miniskirt in the 1960's, and platform shoes and the maxiskirt in the 1970's. Attitudes among the older generation toward the latest Western fashion can be quite hard. A young-looking grandmother of two teen-agers told me: "I try to understand the young people, but if my

[3]For one journalist's insights on this phenomenon, see Serge Schmemann, "Majesty Fading from Russia's Window on West," *The New York Times,* Apr. 7, 1984.

[4]Recently, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Hungary for the production of the cubes under license in Soviet factories.

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grandchildren came home with a swastika on their clothes, I would consider my life a failure."

There are, of course, numerous other manifestations of Western youth fashion and culture to be seen in Moscow. Among young girls, for example, a popular fad is the short, blow-dried "Lady Di" hairstyle inspired by the wife of England's Prince of Wales. Also, various Eastern teachings are now in vogue among the capital's university students: two of the most eagerly sought books there are *Zen and Oriental Religions (Zen i vostochnye religii)* and *Oriental Culture in Contemporary Western Society (Vostochnaya kul'tura v sovremenom zapadnom obshchestve),* both by Yuliya Zavadskaya.

The Soviet state itself sometimes generates a fad, though unintentionally. The uniform worn by young Soviet guides, translators, and technicians at the 1980 Moscow Olympics, for example, consisted of blue jeans or jeans skirts, colorful Adidas T-shirts with matching jackets, and Adidas walking shoes. These uniforms were provided free of charge, and the youngsters who worked at the Olympics got to keep them. The following year, Adidas, the "official" supplier for the 1980 Olympics, opened a shoe factory, called "Sunrise" *(Voskhod),* on the outskirts of Moscow. Today, shoe stores are mobbed whenever a consignment of Adidas shoes arrives. The shoes—which are green, yellow, or purple, with the characteristic Adidas triple white stripes on the instep and the word *Moskva* in gold letters on the side—have even spawned a little Russian rhyme all Moscow teen-agers know: "With Adidas on my feet, I'll make every chick I meet."

On at least one other occasion the authorities inadvertently created a stir among young people. The Soviet press—which is, of course, an extension of the state—was the cause of a street riot by youths in Leningrad. A local newspaper announced that on July 4, 1978, a concert featuring Western pop stars would take place in the city's Palace Square, in front of the Winter Palace. On that day, hundreds of young people from Leningrad and elsewhere converged on the square. When it was learned that the authorities had canceled plans for the event at an early stage (and that the announcement had been a blunder!), some of the frustrated fans marched down Nevskiy Prospekt, shouting protests and refusing to disperse. That the youngsters' chants of "Santana, Santana" changed into shouts of "Down with the party"[5] is apocryphal. The local militia was called in and used fire hoses to scatter the crowd; a few arrests were made, but those taken in were soon released.

[5]Andrea Lee, *Russian Journal,* New York, Random House, 1981.

ORGANIZED STREET GANGS like those depicted in *West Side Story* have always existed in Soviet cities. But if in American cities it is the block that constitutes the tribal territory or "turf," in the Soviet case it is the courtyard *(dvor).* In recent years, there has been a proliferation of urban youth groups and gangs in the Soviet Union. As a result, it is now possible to speak of the "coagulation" of Soviet city young into various unauthorized bodies on the basis of social class or shared interests.

Among these are the bands of 15- to 18-year-old *fanaty*—the senior technical and vocational school students from the working-class areas of Moscow who are avid followers of local soccer teams. The *fanaty* wear scarves and shirts in the colors of their clubs, and are often involved in fights, usually with one another. In this way, they resemble English and Scottish soccer hooligans.

The gangs of street toughs known as the *urla* are also composed of working-class lads, but their members tend to be older than the *fanaty.* The *urla,* who wear their hair either short or long and like Western hard rock (their favorite groups being Deep Purple and Black Sabbath), are usually found in the newly built-up areas on the outskirts of large cities. Those who do reside in the capital are fond of persecuting the small number of Moscow hippies who, contravening Soviet laws against "parasitism," cling precariously to the lifestyle (minus the drugs) of their American progenitors of the 1960's and travel to Central Asia to escape the harsh Moscow winters.

Another youth group in Moscow is united by an interest in prerevolutionary clothes and *objets d'art.* "The New Romantics" *(Novye Romantiki),* as they are called, are the sons and daughters of artists, actors, and writers. Each year on May 9, Victory Day, they don authentic Edwardian clothes, assemble at the Kropotkin Metro Station (opposite the *Moskva* public swimming pool), and promenade down Gogol and Pushkin boulevards to Pushkin Square.

The year 1982 saw the appearance in Moscow of yet another gang—a group of "skinheads" known as *fashisty.* On the evening of April 20, 1982, the 94th anniversary of Hitler's birthday, a crowd gathered in Pushkin Square, a favorite hangout and dating place for teen-agers and students, and formerly the site of the annual dissident demonstration against human-rights violations. In looks, those assembled were reminiscent of British "bovver boys": some were attired in black shirts, had their heads shaved, and wore caps with swastikas; others sported a rope around the neck with a knot over the Adam's apple, as a sort of tie. It seems that some kind of a public disturbance was

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planned. One eyewitness claimed that the skinheads had intended to hang up a poster or banner on the railing of the terrace in front of the *Rossiya* cinema, which overlooks the square. But the *fashisty* were chased away by some *fanaty,* after which the militia intervened.

The *fashisty* are notable for reasons other than their fascination with fascism. Indeed, unlike the *urla* and *fanaty* they are not members of the working class, but rather are said to come from families of the cultural elite. This can be seen from the fact that many of them favor wearing black leather jackets, an item of clothing that is definitely *defitsitnyy* and that would be available in quantity only to those in the upper echelons of society.

THE APPEARANCE OF A GANG of juveniles with a "fascist" style in the final year of Brezhnev's secretaryship is just another manifestation of the Soviet youth culture, a culture that is exotic and occasionally even uncouth to the Western eye, but that is by no means a complex or sophisticated phenomenon. It is the expression, whether conscious or unconscious, of the desire of young people to stand out among the sloganized masses of the older generation.

After Yuriy Andropov's accession to power, the punks and skinheads were cleared off the streets of Moscow. The authorities also showed a tougher attitude toward the more villainous and meretricious aspects of the youth culture, criticizing in the Soviet press the cult of karate and the Anglicized slang of the young.[6]

As in the West, it was the mid-1950's that marked the appearance of an identifiable "youth" culture in the Soviet Union. The Soviet youth culture, however, was not immediately mass in character, and only in the last 10 years has it become so. Unlike their elders, Soviet youngsters today have a feeling of being part of their generation all over the world. The spectacle of the Soviet youth culture suggests a conclusion that might not appeal to many Soviet émigrés, but one that those in the West who study the USSR or deal with it should not be loath to draw: the ideological walls of the Soviet state might more easily be breached by pop music and pizzas than by Zionism and Solzhenitsyn.

[6]See *The New York Times,* Jan. 14, 1984.

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Books

Third World Interventions

By Steven R. David

STEPHEN T. HOSMER and THOMAS W. WOLFE. *Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1983.

MARK N. KATZ. *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought.* Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

E. J. FEUCHTWANGER and PETER NAILOR, EDS. *The Soviet Union and the Third World.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

IN THE PAST few years there has been a good deal of controversy on the role of the Soviet Union in the Third World. Some analysts argue that recent Soviet successes there represent a dangerous trend that will place much of the Third World under the Kremlin's dominance, thereby threatening the vital interests of the West. Others assert that Soviet gains are more than balanced by reverses, and, in any event, are not significant enough to warrant concern by the United States and its allies. What is the basis of this controversy, and which interpretation is more accurate? Where has Soviet policy been most effective, and why? And what are the prospects for future Soviet activity? This essay examines these issues and assesses the importance and potential of the Soviet–Third World relationship.

Much of the present debate stems from recent Soviet successes. Since 1975, the Soviet Union and its allies have either assumed power or substantially increased their influence in Afghanistan, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Laos, Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. In Southwest Asia, the Soviets have established a puppet regime in Kabul, but have still managed recently to conduct important talks in Moscow with high-ranking Pakistani officials.[1] In Southeast Asia, they have enhanced their capacity to project military force throughout the region, establishing naval and air bases in Vietnam and supplying Vietnamese forces with missile and torpedo boats, as well as with numerous military aircraft.[2] In Africa, they have gained an ally in Ethiopia, extending considerable support to the current regime in its intermittent war with Somalia, and have encouraged Angolan-based insurgencies against South African forces.[3]

Along with these tangible successes there is a sense shared by many observers that the Soviets are becoming more influential in the Third World in general. Unlike the West, the Soviet Union is rarely criticized in international forums; and Soviet allies like Cuba regularly advance the Kremlin's line in such influential gatherings as the Nonaligned Movement, often without an effective Western response. For a state that once counted only North Korea and the People's Republic of China as Third World allies, the Soviet Union appears to have come a long way.

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[1] According to a report in *The Washington Post* of Jan. 27, 1984, Pakistani Minister of Finance Ghulam Ishaq Khan met with Soviet officials in Moscow for six days in December 1983 to discuss future Soviet aid to Pakistan. Among the issues raised during the talks were the possibility of Soviet participation in the construction of a US$1.7 billion nuclear power plant at Chashma and the building of a $3.7 billion dam at nearby Kalabagh. According to Pakistani officials, the Soviet response was favorable, but unspecific. Although the meetings did seem to signal a Soviet commitment to provide substantial economic and technical aid to Pakistan in its current five-year plan, the Soviets later issued a stern warning to the Pakistani government to stop aiding Islamic insurgents in Afghanistan or face the prospect of a joint Soviet-Afghan punitive action.

[2] See Douglas Pike, "Southeast Asia, the USSR, and Vietnam," paper prepared for a conference on Soviet foreign policy, cosponsored by the United States Information Agency and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, DC, March 2, 1984. See also Drew Middleton, "Soviet Buildup in Far East Causing U.S. Concern," *The New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1984.

[3] Raids against Namibia have been carried out by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which has reportedly been operating out of bases in Angola since the mid-1970's. For an account of the Soviets' use of Cuban forces in the hostilities between SWAPO and South Africa, see Merritt Robbins, "The Soviet-Cuban Relationship," in Roger E. Kanet, Ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s*, New York, Praeger, 1982, pp. 157–64.

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But there have been notable setbacks as well. The Sino-Soviet split has been extremely costly to Moscow, perhaps even more costly than all of its gains in the Third World. In the mid-1960's, the Chinese tarnished Moscow's image in emerging nations, challenging the Soviets' leadership of the international communist movement and seeking to mobilize Third World states in an international "united front" against both superpowers.[4] More recently, the decade of the 1970's saw several once pro-Soviet leaders reject their alignment with Moscow and turn to the West. Egypt's Anwar Sadat expelled most Soviet military and technical advisers in July 1972 and abrogated his country's treaty of friendship with Moscow four years later.[5] In neighboring Sudan, President Gaafar al-Nimeiri violently suppressed a communist-inspired coup in 1971 and has since sided with pro-Western Egypt against pro-Soviet Libya.[6] And in Somalia, in late 1977, President Siad Barre expelled his Soviet advisers and abrogated his country's friendship treaty with Moscow. Barre has since reportedly agreed to allow the United States access to some of the extensive military facilities the Soviets built in Somalia.[7] Interestingly, by 1978, all three leaders had switched from overwhelming dependence on Soviet weapons to primary reliance on American arms.[8]

Less dramatic losses of Soviet influence have occurred in Peru, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, and Equatorial Guinea. Even where the Soviets have not been expelled, their position has been seriously challenged. The late 1970's and early 1980's have witnessed the rise of nationalist, anti-imperialist guerrilla forces that are also anti-Soviet. Included in this group are the resistance fighters in Afghanistan, the "Contras" in Nicaragua, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, headed by Dr. Jonas Savimbi) in Angola, the Eritrean and other separatists in Ethiopia, and the remnants of the Khmer Rouge (and smaller groups claiming allegiance to Prince Norodom Sihanouk) in Kampuchea. The seriousness of the challenge posed by these insurgencies makes Soviet influence in these countries both expensive and precarious.

Equally important, most of the recent Soviet gains have come about through opportunities *not* created by Moscow. Indeed, the Soviets are quite adept at exploiting developments that arise through indigenous forces. The collapse of Portuguese rule in Africa in 1974–75, for example, opened the door for Soviet involvement in Angola and Mozambique. The overthrow of the staunchly pro-American Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia by radical army officers brought about that country's dramatic alignment with the Soviet Union. And much of the continuing Soviet influence in Africa owes its strength to the festering confrontation of black Africa with white-ruled South Africa. Thus, the key to Soviet strength in the Third World lies not so much in the Soviets' ability to create instability as it does in their ability to manipulate whatever instability already exists.

Virtually all of the major Soviet operations in the Third World have been low-risk affairs designed not to challenge either regional sensibilities or important American interests. The (perhaps) Soviet-inspired coup in South Yemen in 1978[9] and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the following year merely placed countries already in the Soviet sphere of influence more firmly in the Kremlin's grasp. Similarly, Soviet support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) faction in Angola was extended largely in the face of American indifference (due in part to the post-Vietnam malaise) and with significant black African support (the MPLA fought against South African troops). In Ethiopia, the Soviets initially responded cautiously to the request of the existing government for protection against its irredentist neighbor, Somalia. Such actions were consonant with the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) principles of preserving the territorial integrity of African states and of recognizing the right of all governments to seek outside assistance.

It is generally acknowledged that the Soviets are severely limited in the range of programs they can offer to attract Third World countries.

[4]For an excellent overview of Chinese foreign policy, including China's challenge to Soviet dominance in the Third World, see Harry Harding, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1983, pp. 1–19.

[5]For a firsthand account of Sadat's actions, see Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, New York, Harper and Row, 1977, esp. pp. 228–31.

[6]For an account of the 1971 coup in the Sudan, see Peter Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan*, New York, Praeger, 1976, p. 268; and Gabriel A. Warburg, *Islam, Nationalism and Communism in Traditional Society: The Case of Sudan*, London, Frank Cass, 1978. The assertion by a KGB defector that the Soviet Union supported the 1971 coup is reported in the Hosmer and Wolfe book under review here (p. 49).

[7]Christopher Clapham provides a concise treatment of the reasons for Somalia's turn away from the USSR in his chapter, "The Soviet Experience in the Horn of Africa," in the Feuchtwanger and Nailor book under review here (pp. 202–23).

[8]US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969–1978*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980.

[9]Indications of a possible Soviet role in the South Yemeni coup can be found in Nimrod Novik, *On the Shores of Bab Al-Mandab: Soviet Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics*, Monograph No. 26, Philadelphia, PA, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979; and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula," *World Today* (London), November 1979, pp. 443–51.

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Economically, the USSR is no match for the United States. Soviet economic aid and trade with the Third World is but a small fraction of that of the United States.[10] Also, the low quality of Soviet goods, the terms on which these goods are offered, and the Soviets' inability to provide Third World countries with what they need most (e.g., food) make it practically impossible for the Soviets to compete economically with the West.

Ideologically, the Soviet model seems to have lost much of its appeal, even though some leaders of developing countries may still affect an identification with communism in order to secure Soviet support. Others, of course, might actually be dedicated Marxist-Leninists. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to imagine a Third World regime or radical movement deriving its inspiration from the gray bureaucrats in the Kremlin. Similarly, Soviet propaganda, for all its massive quantity, has yet to find a receptive audience in the developing countries. Nor does actual contact with Soviet personnel help Moscow's appeal. The drabness of life in the Soviet Union and the occasionally boorish behavior of Soviet personnel abroad win few genuine friends or converts for the Kremlin.

Finally, there appears to be nothing very new about Soviet motivations for involvement in the Third World. The Soviets still seek to expand their influence and improve their strategic position vis-à-vis the West, to deny gains to the United States, and to compete effectively with China. While the precise role of Marxism-Leninism in determining Soviet behavior remains murky, it is certainly a factor in the formulation of Soviet policy toward the Third World. Nonetheless, when assessing Soviet actions one must also take into account the traditional drives of a great power seeking to create a congenial international environment for itself.

IF THE SOVIET record appears so benign, why then all the fuss? The reason lies in the new *ways* the Soviets have achieved and preserved their gains. To the Soviets this means taking special care to meet the needs of the leadership elite or (in what is usually the same thing in Third World countries) the military. Given the threats facing these elites and the dire consequences of not responding to those threats, the greatest need of potential and existing Third World leaders is simply gaining and maintaining power. By focusing on such concerns, the Soviets hope to compensate for their economic and ideological weaknesses and to increase their influence dramatically.

For a Third World leader in need of a quick infusion of arms to protect his country or placate restless officers in his army, the Soviet Union has proven to be a most attractive supplier. The Soviets' huge stockpiles of weapons combined with the newly developed air and sea transport capabilities allow the USSR to deliver arms "off the shelf" usually much more rapidly than the West. The rugged, easy-to-use-and-maintain quality of Soviet arms makes them ideal for use in most conflicts in the Third World. In Angola, for example, Soviet arms shipments to the MPLA (including tanks, aircraft, and mobile rocket launchers) gave that faction the superior firepower it needed to triumph over its rivals. Similarly, a massive Soviet sea-and airlift of arms enabled the Ethiopian regime to repel a Somali invasion, which if successful might well have destroyed the government in Addis Ababa and eradicated the Soviets' newly acquired influence there.[11]

Another successful ploy has been the Soviets' use of Cuban troops to advance the Kremlin's objectives in the Third World. Again, the Angolan and Ethiopian cases are instructive. The Soviet transport and logistical support for over 10,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola provided the margin of victory to the MPLA. (Although the Cuban presence in Angola increased after South Africa intervened in October 1975, it must be emphasized that thousands of Cubans were already fighting alongside MPLA units before South African troops entered the conflict.)[12] In Ethiopia, the Soviets commanded, equipped, and transported some 20,000 Cuban troops to help defend Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime against a multiplicity of threats.[13] As in Angola, the Soviet/Cuban intervention proved decisive in helping to secure a pro-Soviet regime.

The significance of the Soviet use of Cuban troops is often obscured by debates concerning the

[10]According to Hosmer and Wolfe, from 1955 to 1980, Soviet economic aid to the Third World (excluding North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba) was US$28 billion, of which $9.8 billion came from East European states (p. 75). From the end of World War II to 1979, comparable American economic aid to the Third World amounted to over $107 billion. See the US Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 72, 87, 102, and 107. The unimportance of Soviet trade is forcefully indicated by Brian Pockney in his chapter, "Soviet Trade with the Third World," in Feuchtwanger and Nailor. As Pockney states, "Even if the USSR were to double or treble its trade with the third world every five years, it would be 1990 before this would show any significant change in the percentages of world trade amongst the major groups" (p. 68). Pockney also gives figures for Soviet trade with the Third World (pp. 70–78).

[11]For Soviet aid to Ethiopia, see Clapham, loc. cit., pp. 90–94.

[12]Jorge Domínguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Fall 1978, pp. 96–97; *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1975–1976*, ed. by Colin Legum, New York, Africana Publishing Co., 1976, pp. A14, A15; and Hosmer and Wolfe, p. 82.

[13]Clapham, loc. cit., pp. 90–94.

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independence of the Cubans' actions and goals. While it is clear that the Cubans are not mere puppets of the USSR, it is equally evident that they could not have intervened on the scale they did without direct and ongoing Soviet assistance. This type of "cooperative intervention," as Hosmer and Wolfe so aptly put it (pp. 79–107), allows the Soviets to reap gains in the Third World without incurring the costs a direct superpower intervention would entail. Moreover, in the Cubans the Soviets have a disciplined, well-trained, surrogate fighting force capable of putting Soviet weaponry to immediate use in both offensive and defensive operations. Given the rather small populations and low level of political development of many Third World countries, the introduction of a few thousand Cuban troops can often be decisive. Since the vast majority of these states cannot count on direct American or Soviet intervention to assist them (neither superpower would want to risk a confrontation with the other over such issues), the availability of such a surrogate provides the Soviets with an important, and at this point nearly exclusive, advantage in the superpower competition for influence.

Until recently, however, this advantage was often short-lived. Many Third World regimes initially choosing the "socialist" path later got either sidetracked or derailed. In the mid-1960's, for example, several pro-Soviet regimes were overthrown by coups d'état, most notably those in Indonesia, Ghana, and Mali.[14] And, as noted above, in the mid-1970's, the Soviets lost even more ground in the Third World when the formerly "progressive" leaders of Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia changed their minds about their pro-Soviet orientation and turned to the West.

TO COPE WITH such setbacks the Soviets have adopted a policy of using Cuban and East German proxies to form a kind of praetorian guard around Third World leaderships. Just as the praetorian guard of the Roman Empire began as a special military unit designed to protect the emperor and became a source of control over the regime it defended, so have these proxy guards of the Soviet Union become a significant extension of Soviet power. By placing pro-Soviet Third World leaders in a "cocoon" of Cuban and East German personnel—the former as bodyguards and military advisers, the latter as monitors of the security apparatus—the Soviets have lessened the likelihood of either a successful coup against a friendly government or a realignment of an existing leader's position.

The "cocoon" strategy is effective for two reasons. First, the nature of Third World states is such that the political orientation of a given country is determined by a single individual or at most a small group. It is relatively easy therefore to defend (or threaten) this political elite with a small (i.e., no more than a few thousand soldiers), well-trained military force. Second, a coup d'état by definition involves an attempt to seize power by a small group. Since the principal threats to Third World governments (and their pro-Soviet position) are narrowly based, defending against those threats does not require a major effort.

The Cubans have proven especially useful in training bodyguards and security personnel for the protection of Third World regimes. Their first venture in setting up special security formations took place in the mid-1960's when they formed Presidential Guards to protect the regimes in Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville). They subsequently became involved in the protection (either directly or indirectly) of regimes in Libya, South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Cubans also trained the murderous security forces of Nguema's Equatorial Guinea and Idi Amin's Uganda.[15] The Cuban presence provides a unique security dimension for both the new regime and the Soviet Union: on the one hand, it guarantees high-quality protection for Third World leaders; on the other hand, it ensures that the protectors will not likely participate in any anti-Soviet plots.

The Soviet use of East Germans to dominate the internal security environment in many developing countries is also noteworthy. Indeed, the East German State Security Service (SSD) has been instrumental in penetrating and controlling the upper echelons of several Third World governments, most notably those in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, South Yemen, and Libya. The SSD's responsibilities there include

[14] In Indonesia, a communist coup attempt against the army in September 1965 was ruthlessly suppressed by forces under General Suharto. As a result, the pro-Soviet leader of Indonesia, Ahmed Sukarno, gradually lost power until 1967, when he was formally replaced by the pro-Western Suharto. In Ghana, economic difficulties, government corruption, and President Kwame Nkrumah's establishment of a separate military regiment outside the army's chain of command provoked a military-police coup d'état in February 1966. The coup replaced the pro-Soviet Nkrumah with a National Liberation Council, which realigned Ghana away from the USSR and toward the West.

Mali's Modibo Keita was another pro-Soviet leader who fell victim to a coup d'état. As in Ghana, the immediate cause of the coup was the regular army's resentment at the establishment of a rival force—in this case a "People's Militia"—that challenged the military's position. The army reacted by launching a successful coup in 1968 and putting in power a regime that proved to be markedly less pro-Soviet than Keita's.

[15] See Walter Laqueur's introduction to his edited volume, *The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World*, New York, Praeger, 1983.

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training bodyguards, advising military and civilian intelligence agencies, and establishing secret police networks.[16] Such activities place the East Germans in an ideal position to deter, prevent, or even initiate coups.

The alleged use of Cubans and East Germans in South Yemen, where the South Yemeni leader Rubayyi Ali was overthrown and replaced by the more pro-Soviet Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani and Abd al-Fattah Ismail, is illustrative of the gains that can be made when the internal security environment of a Third World nation is controlled by Moscow. The dispute between Rubayyi Ali and Ismail produced the usual array of palace intrigues and clandestine activities,[17] but without the usual result. Before the new government could entrench itself, Ali launched a countercoup to regain power. He mobilized the palace guard and the loyal units in the armed forces, whose support in most Third World states would be tantamount to success. But in South Yemen the Cubans had been building up a "people's militia" under Ismail's control that was stronger than the nation's regular armed forces.[18] Augmenting the militia was an internal security force (called the Tanzim) established and led by the East Germans. Cuban and Soviet advisers had also been busily training and influencing the South Yemeni air force and navy. As a result, Ismail's militia, backed by the navy and air force, routed Ali's forces. The rapidity and efficiency of Ali's defeat led some analysts to suggest that there was direct Soviet and/or proxy participation in repelling the countercoup, particularly in carrying out air strikes against the presidential palace.[19]

The significance of the South Yemeni coup and countercoup was lost on most observers. Since South Yemen was already in the Soviet orbit, the intensification of its alignment did not appear to be a cause for much concern. What was overlooked was the manner in which Ismail seized and retained power. The Soviets and their proxies had taken full control of South Yemen. Without having to incur the political and military costs of outside intervention, the Kremlin apparently overthrew a leader it did not approve of, placed in power an individual more to its liking, and protected its choice from significant internal opposition. Thus, the prospect of a successful pro-Western coup in South Yemen or of the realigning of an existing South Yemeni leader is virtually nonexistent.

The Soviets have also attempted to prevent reverses by pushing leaders of Third World countries to establish "vanguard" parties. As Mark Katz explains in his study of Soviet military thought, there had been an ongoing dispute between Soviet military and civilian officials on the need for such parties—with the military preferring instead to preserve Soviet influence through the use of "progressive" armies (p. 53). The realignments of Egypt, Somalia, and Peru[20] undercut the military's position, however, and the Soviet party's emphasis on Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties emerged triumphant. Still, according to Katz, only four Third World states not actually in the socialist camp had what the Soviet Union considered "true" vanguard parties: Angola, Mozambique, Benin, and South Yemen (p. 108). The Mengistu regime in Ethiopia has thus far successfully resisted Soviet pressure in this regard, though it is not clear how long it will be able to do so. Indeed, since its inception in December 1979, Mengistu's Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) has been a constant target of Soviet attempts to form a vanguard party independent of the government. Mengistu's resistance appears to be weakening, and Ethiopia will likely soon join the ranks of Third World states with full-fledged Soviet-style vanguard parties. In any event, Soviet leaders are hopeful that the creation of vanguard parties among the USSR's new friends will institutionalize communist (and pro-Soviet) governments in much the same way that has already occurred in Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam, and North Korea.[21]

The willingness and capability of the Soviets to keep friendly regimes in power despite large-scale military threats and internal challenges makes them an attractive patron for many Third World leaders. This is especially true

[16] See Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1980, p. 31.

[17] In June 1978, Ali sent an envoy to the president of North Yemen to enlist his support in the ongoing dispute between Ali and Ismail. Before he could depart, however, the envoy was reportedly arrested under the direction of the East Germans. A new messenger with a new briefcase was substituted (Novik, op. cit., p. 18). When this envoy met with the North Yemeni president, he opened the briefcase and triggered an explosion that killed them both (*Newsweek* [New York], July 10, 1978, p. 10). Ismail quickly blamed Ali for the murder and used it as a pretext to depose the South Yemeni leader.

[18] Faris Glubb, "The Yemens: The Pot Boils," *Middle East International* (London), August 1978, p. 16.

[19] Novik, op. cit., p. 19.

[20] As Mark Katz reports (p. 81), the Soviets were initially pleased when a leftwing military coup overthrew the rightist regime in Peru in 1968, but were severely disappointed when the friendly new government turned away from Moscow in the mid-1970's.

[21] This is not to say, however, that North Korea is pro-Soviet in the sense that it supports the Soviet Union at the expense of China. Indeed, some accounts suggest that North Korea leans toward China at the expense of the Soviet Union (see, e.g., Hikaru Kerns, "Trying To Keep Pace with a Showcase State," *Far Eastern Economic Review* [Hongkong], Feb. 2, 1984, p. 24). The point to be stressed here is that relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union are on quite a friendly footing.

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given the perception that the United States will abandon its friends—for example, the Shah in Iran, Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, as well as Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua—when the going gets tough. (This is not to suggest, however, that the United States was wrong not to have given more support to these leaders, only that the failure to keep them in power hurt American credibility with other Third World leaders.) The fact that over the long term the United States with its economic wealth might be preferred is irrelevant to a leader facing the immediate prospect of being overthrown. By doing more to keep friendly regimes in power, and by making certain they remain friendly, the Soviet Union threatens to become the dominant power in the Third World.

A Third World increasingly under the sway of the Soviet Union, it would seem, is not in the best interests of the United States. For those states deemed vital to American interests, such as Saudi Arabia, the reasons are obvious. But even the loss of nonvital countries would hurt the United States. Some have important raw materials (e.g., Zaire), while others are strategically located (e.g., Oman). Moreover, if one nonvital country after another adopts a pro-Soviet orientation, the impact on vital Third World states and on America's vision of its role in global politics could be devastating. Thus, the Third World is likely to remain an important source of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States—to the former because its victories there demonstrate the vitality of its system; to the latter because it can ill afford continued setbacks there.

OUR UNDERSTANDING of the means and implications of recent Soviet actions in the Third World has been enhanced by all three books under review here. In *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, edited by E. J. Feuchtwanger and Peter Nailor, Soviet activities are examined on both the global and regional level. The book is noteworthy for its close examination of the economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union in the developing world. Like most anthologies, however, this book suffers from important omissions (Latin America is not covered at all) and the uneven quality of the contributions. In addition, the book was published too early to allow for a comprehensive treatment of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, several of its chapters are excellent. Especially interesting are Jonathan Alford's study of the Soviets' use of new military instruments to achieve foreign policy objectives (although his conclusion that the West should focus on economic policies to cope with Soviet military advantages is unconvincing) and Christopher Clapham's essay on the Horn.

Mark Katz's *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* is a valuable examination of the treatment in Soviet military literature of conflict in developing countries. Its focus is on the Brezhnev years, with an occasional brief history provided as background. Katz's extensive research of Soviet sources reveals how the military changed its views over the years on such important issues as fighting local wars (top military leaders now believe that local wars can be kept limited), peaceful coexistence (a useful policy to spread Soviet gains in the Third World), and prospects for the future (more pessimistic in the later Brezhnev years than in the early period). As valuable as these insights are, however, Katz makes it clear that Soviet military literature is not useful in predicting new Soviet policies, as the writings only discuss past actions that proved successful.

Katz is at his best in dissecting the Soviet military literature for nuances that explain or justify policy shifts. Nonetheless, his own policy recommendations appear to stem more from his personal views than from the military writings he so expertly analyzes. This in no way detracts from the value of this excellent study, which will be of special interest to experts in the field.

Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts, by Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, is a comprehensive, exhaustively researched account of past Soviet involvement in various conflicts in developing countries. The authors draw on extensive data to try to determine what factors or conditions encourage Soviet intervention, what the prospects for future Soviet activity are, and, to a lesser extent, how the United States can most effectively respond to Soviet behavior. The focus of the book is on post–World War II activities, with special emphasis on Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

Hosmer and Wolfe's list of the conditions that encourage and discourage Soviet intervention is excellent. Drawing from a multitude of sources, they describe how the Soviets use arms transfers, "cooperative intervention," and other instruments to pursue a policy of "assertiveness combined with caution." While concerned about the growing effectiveness of Soviet policies in the Third World, Hosmer and Wolfe are careful to point out these policies' many weaknesses. The book is not without flaws, however. It occasionally lapses into a superficial textbook style of writing, is sometimes repetitious, and suffers from poor organization (many of its early chapters should have been combined). Nevertheless, for the expert and nonexpert alike, this

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is an indispensable source on the Soviet Union and the Third World.

THE SOVIETS are surely a force to be reckoned with in the Third World. The recent adaptations in Soviet policy seem to have shifted the balance in the Soviets' favor. But the short-term advantages secured by threatening and defending regimes there need not lead to long-term gains. If the security concerns of Third World leaders can be eliminated or mitigated, the overwhelming superiority of the West in the economic and other spheres will succeed in containing Soviet influence at tolerable levels. Exactly how to go about this task is the source of legitimate dispute. One only hopes that those trying to resolve this issue will take account of the valuable insights provided in books such as these.

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Two Scandinavians in Moscow

By Per Egil Hegge

VIBEKE SPERLING. *Fra stormagtens baggårde. Om Konflikten mellem drøm og virkelighed i sovjetisk hverdag* (From the Backyards of the Superpower: On the Conflict Between Dream and Reality in Soviet Everyday Life). Copenhagen, Vindrose, 1983.

HANS WILHELM STEINFELD. *Arven etter Bresjnev* (Brezhnev's Heritage). Oslo, J. W. Cappelen, 1982.

THE "FAST BOOK" or "quickie" has become a journalistic genre in its own right. Within two or three weeks of some major event, the book is on the shelves—a paperback of 200 hastily produced pages summarizing what only last month you were reading in the newspapers or watching on television. The majority of these books are written without much sense of perspective, but they are hawked with all the latest marketing techniques. More often than not, attention has been paid to the demands of speed rather than to those of accuracy, and the prose is rarely memorable, except occasionally in the negative sense.

In the field of Sovietology, the British, French, German, or American reader has been spared exposure to this somewhat disturbing trend. British and American journalists, mostly former Moscow correspondents, have generally taken at least a year off to produce a summing-up of their experiences in the Soviet Union. Only very few of these recent works fail to hold their own against anything that has come from the supposedly more specialized hands and minds of persons safely rooted in academic life. However, in Scandinavia, the tendency has been different, and the "quickie" book on the Soviet Union is a rule far more honored in the observance than in the breach. This reviewer can claim some authority on that subject, having produced two such books himself.

Significantly, over the last decade, there has been a remarkable shift in Scandinavian attitudes toward the USSR. Back in the 1960's and 1970's, one of the indirect effects of the Vietnam war on public opinion in Scandinavia, as in the rest of Europe, was an increased willingness to listen to the official Soviet view on international issues. Also contributing to this climate was the lingering memory of Nikita Khrushchev's promises to overtake the United States economically. The other side of the coin was a far more critical Scandinavian attitude toward the United States—again because of the Vietnam war, along with the urban American race riots of that era. Skepticism about American values and intentions was by no means confined to the 1968 generation of European rebels or even to young people in general, though it was definitely more conspicuous among that group.

The shift toward a more balanced Scandinavian approach is hard to date exactly, but probably set in around 1980, give or take a year or two. While Scandinavian opinion has become, if anything, still more critical of the United States, the Soviet Union is now getting even less praise than is the rival superpower. Soviet agricultural and overall economic misery, the treatment of dissidents, and the repression in Poland and Afghanistan have all combined to give Moscow a European public relations problem of the first order. In Scandinavia, in particular, the trend was already well under way when, in October 1981, a Soviet submarine ran aground in restricted waters just outside a naval base in southeast Sweden. Whatever credibility Soviet propaganda might have had before this episode the Kremlin proceeded to squander, and with a devastating lack of professionalism.

Indeed, in neutral Sweden, part of the press is by now so critical of Soviet policy—both foreign and

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domestic—that Soviet journalists have started complaining that the media even in some NATO countries like Norway and Denmark take a more benevolent or at least less vitriolic view. On balance, the Soviets may well have a point, if not necessarily the one that they intend. Swedish books tend to be slightly more neutral and "academic," as well they should, but even there the shift to a more skeptical attitude toward the Soviet Union is clearly visible. An excellent recent example of such writing—one that unfortunately came to this author's attention too late for inclusion in this review—is Disa Håstad's *En Elit far Vasterut* (An Elite Goes West), which takes a knowledgeable and critical look at Soviet cultural and intellectual life, both at home and in the increasingly prominent Soviet émigré community.

OF THE TWO books dealt with here, Vibeke Sperling's is easily the better one—which is not to say that it is all that good, since too much of it still reflects the outdated and overly indulgent approach to miscellaneous Soviet problems or transgressions. The author spent 12 months in 1982–83 in Moscow as correspondent of the Copenhagen daily *Information*, a paper started after the war by the redoubtable Borge Outze, one of the leaders of the Danish resistance against the Nazis. During the 1970's, the paper turned into a leftist though still fiercely independent publication. The aim was to produce a Danish equivalent of the French *Le Monde*, but that prospect seemed to recede farther and farther beyond a horizon turning steadily more red.

The left wing in Scandinavian politics, as noted, has consistently exhibited a strong reluctance—almost on a par with that of prominent leftwing intellectuals in France—to criticize the Soviet government even for some of its less commendable actions and policies. In some of her chapters, Vibeke Sperling seems clearly to reflect this reluctance. What is one to make, for example, of this remarkable statement: "Experience has shown that the Helsinki agreements do not benefit persons unjustly persecuted in the Soviet Union or the so-called psychiatric dissidents. And it is hypocritical to maintain that this is only the fault of Soviet power" (p. 208). Well, whose fault is it then? The fault of the unruly dissidents? Or of any given American administration that either does or does not complain about practices that have surely given the people responsible for them a dubious place in history?

Yet, Sperling does write admirably and succinctly on some of the problems that the Soviet Union faces as a multinational state. She seems to have managed to travel widely during her brief stay in the USSR, and her short chapters on Turkmenia, Armenia, Azerbaydzhan, Georgia, and Moldavia are both analytical and descriptive, giving her an opportunity to deal with national characteristics, religion, and significant demographic trends worrying Soviet leaders. She is scathing in her criticism of Soviet peace propaganda. Sperling also offers an interesting and perceptive analysis of what she terms "the power of the powerless": while fully aware of the total and undisputed monopoly of power that the Soviet Communist Party preserves, she describes a number of instances in which the Soviet people (and especially Soviet workers) demonstrate considerable power to refrain from doing anything they do not particularly want to do.

This is why Sperling is pessimistic about the prospects for the reforms that Yuriy Andropov seemed to advocate just after he succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as party leader in November 1982. She correctly points out what many of her colleagues missed: Andropov never did let the actual world "reform" pass his lips, at least not in public. Writing in the summer of 1983, at about the time that Andropov disappeared from public view, she describes him as a transitory figure, possibly preparing the ground for the "takeover generation" of men now in their fifties. She may still be right; her prediction seems equally applicable to Andropov's septuagenarian successor, Konstantin Chernenko—from whom there is even less reason to expect much pressure in the direction of economic reforms.

Sperling shares one defect with our other author, Hans Wilhelm Steinfeld, when it comes to writing about Soviet agriculture. Both appear to be confirmed "city slickers": they keep to generalization and shy away from descriptions of practical difficulties and even from statistics, especially relevant historical statistics. It would hardly be irrelevant to remind the reader (or, for that matter, to tell readers too young to remember) how wildly exaggerated were the agricultural programs, plans, and promises of the 1960's. In 1961, Nikita Khrushchev promised not only to overtake the United States in per capita production of milk, meat, and eggs by 1970, but to achieve an annual grain production of 300 million tons. Only exceptionally has the Soviet harvest climbed above 200 million tons in the last several years, and the official party program, adopted unanimously by the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, is subversive literature today.

STEINFELD is now approaching the end of his posting to Moscow

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as correspondent of Norwegian Radio and Television. He had already written most of his book when Brezhnev died in November 1982, but the author has furnished a new introductory chapter describing what such a prominent death does to a Moscow correspondent's complicated life. That may be of some limited interest to people in the profession, but it is pretty stale reading, even so soon after the passing of Brezhnev's successor.

Overall, the Steinfeld volume exhibits some of the worst defects of the typical "fast book": it is disorganized, the writing is sloppy, the editing even more so, and the personal pronoun "I" occurs so frequently that the reader may be forgiven for wondering whether parts of the book are lifted from Steinfeld's private correspondence. The introduction, written by Tor Strand (the current Norwegian Radio and Television correspondent in London and one of Steinfeld's predecessors in Moscow), manifests some of these same rather galling characteristics. For example, Strand vividly describes how he observed the buoyant Leonid Brezhnev "with the new Czechoslovak leader Gustav Husák" in the Kremlin in November 1968. In fact, Alexander Dubček was still at least nominally the party leader of Czechoslovakia in November 1968; Husák's visit as the country's "new leader" actually took place in late October 1969.

Steinfeld follows Strand down this error-prone path, giving the wrong year for the Yalta meeting and the wrong title of "President" to Lazar Kaganovich, and placing Georgiy Malenkov as Premier in the 1957 "anti-party" group—two years after he had resigned as head of government and been replaced by Nikolay Bulganin. This sloppiness (and the list is considerably longer) must necessarily undermine the credibility of the whole exercise.

Irritating as all this may be, what really nettles the reader is the knowledge that Steinfeld could have written a much better book. He is a well-educated, dynamic, and enterprising reporter, as anyone who has followed his radio and television work from Moscow can attest. He spent one year as an exchange student at Moscow State University in 1975; his Russian is excellent; and he wrote his B.A. thesis at Bergen University on the subject of Soviet collectivization. He is thus quite capable of putting things in perspective, though few will suspect it from having seen only this book.

Steinfeld's formidable qualities as an observer of the Soviet scene do come through, all the same, in a few chapters. The most remarkable one tells the story of his interview with the prose writer Yuriy Nagibin, author of the short story "Patience" (*Novyy Mir,* February 1982). Nagibin told our author bluntly that the criticism directed at his poignant tale "killed my desire to write." (It is only fair to add that Nagibin was upset not only by official Soviet criticism, but by what he clearly felt to be an unwarranted attack by the exiled writer Viktor Nekrasov in a program broadcast by Radio Liberty from Munich.) Mainly, his despondency was due to what he calls neo-Stalinism, manifested in the official complaint that Nagibin had chosen an "untypical" subject. In the story, a Soviet family visits an old monastery used as a nursing home of sorts for mutilated war victims. Clearly, they have been shunted away from public view. In writing about them, Nagibin has touched a raw nerve and violated one of the great taboos of Soviet society.

It is in glimpses like these that Steinfeld shows his mettle as an intelligent and hard-working correspondent. The trouble is that his work has not left him time enough to write the book he could have written. Also, parts of it are highly opinionated and sprinkled with less than interesting polemics against such worthies as US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the leaders of the Scandinavian women's peace march in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1982.[1]

Interestingly, events in the year or so since this book's publication make its title, *Brezhnev's Heritage,* seem newly (and perhaps ominously) relevant today, especially if one refers back to the Nagibin interview. Not long after that memorable conversation, on July 30, 1982, *Pravda* printed a long decree from the Central Committee about ideological shortcomings in contemporary Soviet literature. Nobody was in much doubt as to the man behind this polemic: Brezhnev's long-time aide and the late Mikhail Suslov's anointed successor as the keeper of the ideological flame—Konstantin Chernenko.

Brezhnev's heritage indeed.

[1]Ironically, Steinfeld has been falsely attacked as an agent of the US Central Intelligence Agency in the pages of the Soviet weekly *Nedelya* (published in Moscow), according to Western wire service reports on April 6, 1984.

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Controlling Risks in the East-West Conflict

By Richard K. Betts

HANNES ADOMEIT. *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior.* London, Allen & Unwin, 1982.

ALEXANDER GEORGE, Ed. *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

PAUL BRACKEN. *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1983.

HARRIET FAST SCOTT and WILLIAM F. SCOTT. *The Soviet Control Structure: Capabilities for Wartime Survival.* New York, Crane, Russak, for the National Strategy Information Center, 1983.

IN DIVERSE WAYS, these books bracket two general issues of great concern to strategists. One is how Washington or Moscow works to avoid intensification of their "normal" state of tension, and how they work to manage risks when a crisis nevertheless occurs. The other is how the complex organizations, plans, and procedures of the apparatus below the top level of leadership in each capital fulfill the day-to-day mission of preparing for war, and how they can do so without aggravating a crisis. The first two books reviewed here deal with the former set of questions; the other two, with the latter.

The notion of controlling risks is almost a contradiction in terms. Indeed, the fact that neither superpower can be confident that provocative initiatives will not escalate dangerously is one of the underpinnings of deterrence. This makes the problem of risk a fundamental one in managing US-Soviet relations. Although it has become a cliché that the United States and Soviet Union have both competitive and cooperative interests, the only cooperative one on which there has been real consensus is the avoidance of war. Even this has not prevented the use of force against or through third parties. On almost everything else competition takes precedence.

Another, related cliché is that Americans became disillusioned with détente because they expected too much from it. But it is not clear that the concept was oversold by the Nixon Administration—any more than it was "overbought" by other politicians or citizens who, given the American liberal tradition, have difficulty conceiving international relations in terms of gray rather than black or white. Yet, as Alexander George shows, even the leaders who negotiated détente left crucial ambiguities in the concept, each side trying to constrain the other while retaining freedom of maneuver for itself. Subsequent moves were then viewed as more provocative than the side undertaking them claimed to have intended. Much of the nature of risk lies in this gray area where ends, means, and their limits can be miscalculated by one side or misunderstood by the other. As Adomeit's study of two crises in the pre-détente period shows, Soviet aims and behavior were actually more limited and cautious than they were seen to be in the West. At the same time, though Adomeit does not focus on Western behavior in these crises, American indications of readiness for war appear to have surprised Moscow as disproportionate responses to the stakes at issue.

The possibility of war, whether from deliberate or mistaken action, remains the background that dominates superpower interaction. It exists because of the conflicting interests that make them competitors in the first place; it also provides the principal incentive for restraint. The bureaucracies most involved in the details of preparing for war, however, are not those involved in grand strategy. The implications of military technology and organization for crisis stability are not always appreciated by generalists, or even by harried spe-

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cialists at the top of government hierarchies. Paul Bracken demonstrates how the control arrangements for nuclear retaliatory forces entail a disturbing potential for unanticipated escalation during a period of high tensions. Harriet and William Scott's review of the Soviet organizations for wartime population control and protection highlights the concerns of critics of US defense policy who, in the past decade, have decried the naiveté of Americans in assuming that Soviet attitudes mirror US attitudes toward nuclear war.

In both of the general sets of issues identified above, there remain essential dilemmas that defy solution. In grand strategy, leaders want to square the circle of competition—to advance their interests while minimizing conflict. In war preparations, political leaders want to maximize deterrence and keep war unthinkable, while military professionals need viable options to execute if war nevertheless occurs. Perhaps because these dilemmas are ultimately insoluble the four books under review succeed better in diagnosis than in prescription.

HANNES ADOMEIT's *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior* is the densest and richest of the four books. It presents thorough case studies of the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961 (Adomeit dismisses the 1958 crisis, not quite convincingly, as far less significant). The author meticulously analyzes Soviet motives, constraints, and behavior in terms of four categories of explanation: ideology, security and state interests, military power, and domestic politics. Adomeit's three general conclusions (p. 315) are that much of the literature on crises is unhelpful in explaining the Berlin cases, that the Soviets are adept at manipulating risks, and that their behavior reflects Bolshevik ideology to a surprisingly high degree.

The emphasis on the latter point is a refreshing antidote to the all-too-prevalent impression that ideology has little to do with Soviet actions—an impression that usually rests on crude interpretations of Marxism and inattention to Leninism. Adomeit provides a subtle explanation (especially on pp. 328–34) of the functions of a belief system that complements rather than contradicts other factors determining Soviet policy. As in other aspects of his treatment, the author takes pains to balance his overall judgment with useful qualifications: for example, in noting that the ideological significance of Zhdanov's arguments in 1948 was cushioned by greater prudence in Soviet signals (p. 114).

Similarly, Adomeit's positive assessment of Soviet risk management is modified by his account of misunderstandings on both sides. The Soviets underestimated the political costs of their venture in the Berlin blockade, which, combined with the Korean war, solidified the Cold War consensus and impetus to rearmament in the West. On the Western side, the difference in Soviet aims in the two Berlin crises does not appear to have been sufficiently appreciated. In 1948 Moscow had substantial interest in political gains from forcing the West out; but in 1961 the dominant goal was economic, to fence the East in—that is, to stem the flood of East German refugees by constructing the Berlin wall. Thus the Soviets could later claim, without complete disingenuousness, that the outcome of the latter crisis was a victory (pp. 300–02).

Adomeit's point about the relevant theoretical literature is not quite as persuasive as are his other conclusions. The author makes a reasonable case that the frequent focus on the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis could be misleading in the case of Berlin, but since his own analysis rests on only two cases there is little reason to infer any more generalizable lessons. In this respect the book's title invites greater expectations about wider conclusions than the contents deliver. Also, the first four chapters' theoretical discussion of the types and nature of risk in international relations is not as clearly integrated as it should have been with the last 13 chapters' historical treatment. But, while theorists might wish for pithier arguments or grander lessons, Adomeit's carefully complex analysis offers valuable insight into the ways in which different variables combine in Soviet decisions about undertaking, orchestrating, and moderating the risks of international conflict.

THE SECOND volume on our list, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*, is very much Alexander George's book. He wrote six of the 15 chapters and succeeded far better than most editors in disciplining contributors to address the themes with which he begins. The book diagnoses the failure of détente and promotes its revival under clearer agreed-upon rules of how competition should be constrained and cooperation fostered. All the authors attempt seriously to give balanced appraisals, and there is nothing polemical in the book. To the extent that there is a tendentious flavor, it echoes the battle for the soul of the Carter Administration, with this book serving almost as a retrospective brief for the positions associated with former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in his battles with former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski. Almost all the authors distribute blame for the

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deterioration of US-Soviet relations equally between Moscow and Washington; there is thus little here that will appeal to partisans of the Reagan Administration.

George emphasizes the faulty construction of the 1972 Basic Principles Agreement (BPA), which left enough ambiguity about norms of restraint, concepts of crisis prevention, and definitions of equality that subsequent competition inevitably fueled charges of bad faith on both sides. For the most part, the crumbling of early hopes for accommodation is presented here as a tragedy of misperception or failure of imagination rather than as a conspiracy. Perhaps because of the asymmetry of sources that afflicts any investigation of superpower policies, George dwells at length on the Machiavellianism of Richard Nixon and especially of Henry Kissinger. For example, in negotiating the BPA with Brezhnev, Kissinger purposely chose not to convey the strength of Nixon's view about what sorts of Soviet behavior would be deemed impermissible (pp. 108–09). Later Kissinger duped the Soviets about prospective collaboration in the Middle East (pp. 141–43). And in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the notorious Soviet ultimatum threatening unilateral intervention followed by only a few days a letter from Nixon to Brezhnev saying that the superpowers "must step in, determine the proper course . . . and then bring pressure to bear on our friends for a settlement" (p. 150). All the evidence about these incidents comes from Kissinger's own memoirs.

In another chapter, George Breslauer gives a scrupulously evenhanded interpretation of the failure of détente, learning toward the view that it was inevitable because both sides put a higher premium on pursuing advantage than on collaborating. For better prospects in the future, he stresses the need for clearer definitions of equality of rights and reciprocity as the basis for cooperation, and notes that this has proved easy only in Europe, where there was no ambiguity about both powers' interests. (And even there, of course, we had the Berlin crises.) He might also have noted that the early solidification of the political and military partition of the continent created a durable basis of stability there. But how can this be done in the volatile Third World without a condominium in which the superpowers divide the whole world, as they divided Europe? Otherwise, conflict remains a zero-sum game, despite contrary claims by those who overestimate the decline of bipolarity.

Indeed, though the word is scarcely ever mentioned, condominium seems to be the hidden agenda of the book. How else would it be practical to improve the understandings about rights and restraints meant to prevent crises arising from local instabilities? One logical alternative is mentioned fleetingly: agreements not to compete in certain regions. It is hard to see, though, how this does not amount to a wistful hope that the superpowers will agree not to act like superpowers. The past examples cited are weak. One is the West's lack of meddling in Finland. But the government there has been stable, and the Finns have offered no opportunity for serious involvement. Almost everywhere else it was some group of local clients in a chaotic situation that attracted Western intervention. The other example is George's claim that the Soviets have "often forgone competing in parts of the Third World" (p. 375). But he cites no such instances, and it is hard to think of a case of such forbearance that was not dictated by insufficient resources, opportunity, or access. Breslauer makes a reasonable case that Soviet policy in the Middle East qualifies somewhat, but I remain unconvinced.

Another verdict rendered by George is that moderation of competition "will require US policy to . . .facilitate and channel sociopolitical change in a particular country rather than opposing it" (p. 371). US interventions, however, have not been as crudely reactionary as this implies. American policy has opposed not change per se but only nondemocratic leftist revolutionary or pro-Soviet change. Indeed, the injunction to "channel" change is a warrant for a degree of intervention, and that degree would have to vary (if intervention is to be effective) with how closely the local situation approaches anarchy and how energetically the USSR or its clients are involved.

Consider two cases compared in a chapter by Larry Napper: Angola and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. He presents the former as a Western bungle, and the latter as a success. But in Angola—keeping in mind George's suggestion for Washington to channel change constructively—there is no evidence that, when the Portugese withdrew, the Soviet-supported MPLA represented the popular will or the positive forces of change any more than did the pro-Western UNITA, or (somewhat less credibly) the FNLA. According to Napper's own chronology (pp. 161–62), the Cubans were first into the fray in June 1975, with 250 advisers to train MPLA troops. Only the following month did Washington authorize covert aid—and on quite a modest scale—to the opposing parties. The real disaster was South African military intervention,

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which conceivably might not have occurred had the United States done what for many good reasons was unthinkable at the time: intervene on a much larger scale to help the anti-MPLA forces reach Luanda.

Napper makes much of the US failure to focus on the specific conditions of the African political "terrain." Yet, curiously, he seems to overlook some of those conditions in the comparison with the Zimbabwe "success." In that case the process of change did not take place in a vacuum of authority as it did in Angola. US policy did not have a great deal to do with the final transition, which was managed by an orderly election—and then only after a civil war that lasted longer than the one in Angola yet has.

Breslauer notes accurately that the lists of responsibilities on both sides for the collapse of détente cannot be reconciled, because "they are based upon conflicting assumptions about the nature of the contemporary international order" (p. 338). The book does not explicitly convey a preferred interpretation on that question, although it does hint at a preference for deemphasizing both bipolarity and political intervention in volatile areas. There remains, however, a large question about how susceptible today's international order is to the sort of regulatory norms discussed in the book. George puts Paul Gordon Lauren's chapter, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth Century Diplomacy," at the book's beginning, presumably as a model for dealing with current problems. If so, then this is a conceptual confusion, a yearning for a post-Napoleonic order where today's Napoleonic power (or two of them, if one wants to equate American with Soviet expansion) is still rampant. The norms and mechanisms Lauren describes did not so much resolve the basic conflict as reflect its resolution. They functioned in a de-ideologized multipolar system. Both stability and instability in today's international system, by contrast, are largely the products of bipolarity. Moreover, the Soviets' concept of the evolving "correlation of forces" (to which their spokesmen frequently attributed the inevitable US acceptance of Moscow's equality in the early 1970's) rejects the 19th century's "balance of power" norms.

George and his authors[1] are careful to present the complexities of this problem along with some of the barriers to its solution. While they might be a bit optimistic about the objective potential for a safer and more institutionalized set of arrangements if statesmen were only wiser, they are not unduly optimistic that such wisdom will prevail. For those who do have hopes for a rebirth of détente, this book is a good place to begin.

ON THE NARROWER, military aspect of superpower crisis-management, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* is the first general work on a subject that profesional military analysts have long recognized as crucial but that has still largely escaped the broader political debate about nuclear strategy and deterrence. Bracken's book goes beyond the briefer and more technical analyses so far available[2] in discussing ways in which organizational evolution of command systems, war plans and weapon deployments, and communication technology have interacted to produce peculiar problems for strategic stability. At least until the forthcoming comprehensive study by Bruce Blair appears,[3] this will stand as the definitive book-length work.

As most specialists have long known but feared to say, the vulnerability of nuclear forces—the issue that drove so much of the defense policy debate of the 1970's—pales in significance beside the vulnerability of the people and mechanisms that control their use. The starkest example is the center of highest US authority, Washington, DC, which can be destroyed with less than ten minutes of warning time by a Soviet submarine-launched missile. The situation is only very slightly better for most subordinate control centers. Over the years, as Bracken points out at length, this fragility has prompted informal as well as official decentralization of control over procedures—the details of which are among the most highly classified—for release and coordination of nuclear forces. Bracken emphasizes the dangers posed by the combination of such decentralization with the process of alerting forces in a crisis. In his view, this creates a dangerous and poorly understood potential for crisis escalation as each side reacts to the other's precautionary alerts, and, by implication, a potential for accidental war. For example, he makes a persuasive case that organizational sociology and technical imperatives would lead to more devo-

[1] In addition to those cited are chapters by Coit Blacker on Soviet views of détente; Barry Blechman, Janne Nolan, and Alan Platt on arms transfer negotiations; Gloria Duffy on the controversies over Cienfuegos and the Soviet brigade in Cuba; and I. William Zartman on preventive diplomacy in the Third World.

[2] John J. Hamre, Richard H. Davison, and Peter J. Tarpgaard, *Strategic Command, Control, and Communication: Alternative Approaches to Modernization*, Washington, DC, US Congressional Budget Office, October 1981; Desmond Ball, *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?* Adelphi Paper No. 169, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1981.

[3] Bruce G. Blair, "Headless Horseman of the Apocalypse: Command and Control of U.S. Strategic Forces," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University (New Haven, CT), 1984, to be published by The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

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lution of discretion to commanders in practice than is officially allowed in principle (pp. 231–32). "The likelihood of nuclear Munichs has been exaggerated," according to Bracken, "but the possibility of nuclear Sarajevos has been understated" (p. 2).

Some of the ways in which the author supports such inferences brush over important qualifications. He notes that the chief of the North American Air Defense Command was "given emergency authority to use certain nuclear weapons" (p. 198), conjuring up the fanciful image from the 1983 movie *War Games* in which that commander not only has but almost uses his authority to launch strategic forces. The authority to which Bracken refers, however, involves air defense weapons, not offensive retaliatory forces. Similarly, the crucial discussion of the "safety catch" design of the US command structure (pp. 196–204) leaps further beyond ambiguity than the evidence cited permits. Bracken asserts that an attack on the Presidential center would "destroy the one mechanism holding back all-out retaliation" (p. 202), but he fails to prove that release authority would not pass to a surviving center (such as the "Looking Glass" command plane that is constantly in the air) rather than devolving piecemeal to subordinate units. The actual procedures, as noted, are highly classified; if Bracken knows what they really are, he does not tell us his sources. The author also accepts the Soviet accusation that the Pershing II can reach command centers in the Moscow area (p. 222), and does not mention the official US statement that the missile's range falls more than 100 miles short of the city. All of these are far from trivial points, given the theme of the book, and deserve more careful argumentation.

When the author addresses the Soviet system he is also not sufficiently cautious about analytic inference. Citing only one tract by General Daniel Graham, Bracken maintains that the Soviet leadership has probably pre-delegated authority to the military to launch nuclear weapons "if there are indications of attack" (p. 43). According to Raymond Garthoff, in my view a rather more reliable expert on Soviet military doctrine and organization, there is no evidence for such a conclusion.[4] Indeed, it contradicts the bulk of the evidence for extremely tight centralized control in Moscow. Bracken appears to confuse the evidence for a Soviet policy of launch on warning with the question of pre-delegation.

The reader could be more confident about a number of the author's assertions if the analysis were not so scantily documented. The book shows unfortunate signs of very hasty publication (repetition, lax editing, utterly superfluous diagrams, trivial errors of spelling and dates, lack of a preface). In sum, Bracken's book does not yield a satisfactorily precise account of specifics, or a conceptual schema as tightly crafted as it could have been. Nevertheless, in terms of setting the general intellectual scene for wider thought about vital lacunae in our strategic lore, it succeeds well as a readable and provocative presentation.[5] Deficiencies of detail are far less significant than the book's value in alerting and sensitizing a bigger audience to how far the debate about strategy, deterrence, and stability has been mired in second-order issues.

On a related topic, Harriet and William Scott's *The Soviet Control Structure* is a workmanlike handbook of the USSR's numerous command and political organizations for planning and directing wartime operations on the home front. It is a good primer on Soviet mechanisms for indoctrinating, mobilizing, and protecting both elites and the general population, and for preserving or restoring communication networks. In a few places the recitation of things like martial law provisions or regulations for requisitioning materials is a bit laborious; and the discussion of how *dachas* could be used for shelters and post-attack recovery really does seem to lose perspective on the magnitude of the task. But overall the book offers a useful laundry list for those with little knowledge of the formal organization of the Soviet system.

The authors do not attempt analytical interpretation of the relative effectiveness of the organs and plans they describe, though the compilation implies that we should be quite impressed. This may be fair enough, and reviewers may err when they criticize a book for not accomplishing what it did not purport to do. Still, it is a little dispiriting to find inconclusive conclusions such as these:

- "It is possible that under certain conditions the Soviet Communist Party system might survive a nuclear exchange and accomplish post-attack recovery" (p. 121).
- "There is no certainty that any group governing a large, heterogeneous population can design controls that would be effective throughout a nuclear war and in its aftermath" p. 129).
- "There is no reasonable method to determine the effective-

[4]Personal communication to the author.

[5]The clearest formulations of the problem yet published are two shorter pieces by John Steinbrunner: "National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Beverly Hills, CA), September 1978; and "Nuclear Decapitation," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Winter 1981-82.

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ness, or vulnerabilities, of the Soviet control structure" (p. 135).

In terms of implications for US strategy, it would be interesting to ask what this survey suggests about the feasibility of counter-C^3 (command, control, and communications) targeting, which was raised in prominence by Presidential Directive 59 (the 1980 revision of targeting doctrine). The Scotts mention the question of targeting policy in just two sentences (p. 137) and do not provide an answer. If one takes the diversification and robustness of the Soviet control system described in the book at face value, one could infer counter-C^3 warhead requirements far beyond US capabilities.[6] On the other hand, the focus on control *structure* (which is comparatively observable) rather than *process* (which is harder to trace or predict) may overemphasize the Soviet control system's potential efficacy even when the system itself is not a target of a dedicated nuclear attack. In either case, the larger question of how serious the Soviets *really* are about nuclear war survival—and the meaning of that question for deterrence—becomes even more important. On this the authors seem to take old official Soviet statements (for instance, those in Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy's *Soviet Military Strategy*[7]) at face value, confronting neither counterarguments by Americans nor more recent public statements by Moscow's highest leaders repudiating the notion that nuclear war can be won. The authors' implicit assumptions may be correct, but the analytical case is not made, so the question remains as unresolved as it has always been in the strategic debate.

BEYOND the specific issues treated in these works, there are also implications for the future to be drawn from them. Adomeit's book, broader in scope than Bracken's and narrower than George's, allows for the most optimistic inferences. The two crises he looks at were among the most severe of the Cold War, yet both were resolved on acceptable terms. In neither case—even when tensions rose and Soviet actions prompted Western responses that included military reinforcement—did the conflict degenerate into an uncontrolled action-reaction sequence of escalation. Adomeit emphasizes that, notwithstanding its prevalence in crisis-management theory, the "image of the escalation ladder just does not fit" (p. 316). Similarly, in the more recent disputes discussed in the George book, intensification of hostility never approached the point of uncontrollable escalation. And though the incidents considered in that book were damaging, one has to stretch to apply the term "crisis" to any of them without devaluing earlier episodes. Thus, in the context of the postwar period as a whole, the George book's message is less that competition has gotten worse than that it just has not gotten any better. Perhaps the positive lessons from Adomeit's study and the negative ones from George's reflect the different prevalent expectations of the two periods: fear in the Cold War and hope in the time of détente.

The issues for Bracken and for the Scotts are ones that would arise only from an intense crisis for which there is no precedent. Unfortunately, Adomeit's and George's cases do not provide grounds for confidence that such a crisis is improbable. In the Cold War period American strategic superiority was recognized. Later, in the rise and decline of détente, many of the controversies involved recognizing the advent and meaning of superpower parity. But in the future, under the altered and ambiguous circumstances of parity, something like the Cuban missile crisis could be more likely to provoke the sort of inadvertent escalatory sequence that worries Bracken. The Soviet promise to respond to the new NATO intermediate-range missile deployments—in the context of the most brittle political relationship between the superpowers in over two decades—underlines this potential. One hopes that it is too somber to view the books by Adomeit and George as history, and those by Bracken and the Scotts as forecasting.

[6]Especially if that requirement is added to requirements for basic counterforce missions after a Soviet first strike.

[7]See Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3rd ed., trans. by Harriet F. Scott, New York, Crane, Russak, 1975.

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